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Abstract 
This thesis explores subsidiarity‟s untapped potential as an enforceable legal 
principle in EU law. To date, discussion of the principle‟s function in European 
integration remains overly focused on its effect as a restraint on the Union 
legislature. In the first part of the thesis, I seek to challenge this entrenched view. 
Specifically, I question whether or not the subsidiarity principle could and, 
ultimately, should apply also as a brake on the interpretative authority of the Court of 
Justice. Arguing that subsidiarity does indeed have a role to play in this context, I 
then turn to examine, in the second part of the thesis, the implications of this 
conclusion for the Court‟s interpretation of the scope of the Treaty provisions 
guaranteeing intra-EU movement. In the final analysis, I argue that the subsidiarity 
principle necessitates an adjustment of the Court‟s current approach to defining the 
concept of an obstacle to intra-EU movement. This adjustment isolates and protects 
an appropriate sphere of Member State regulatory competence from the Court‟s 
scrutiny at Union level. In so doing, it ensures that, in the process of establishing and 
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 12  
Introduction 
This thesis examines the function of subsidiarity as a legal principle in European 
integration. Its primary objective is to assess whether or not this principle could and, 
ultimately, should also apply as a brake on the interpretative authority of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (ECJ or the Court).  
Subsidiarity 
In European Union law, the principle of subsidiarity has one specific purpose. The 
principle aims to protect Member State autonomy in areas of concurrent competence; 
that is, in areas in which competence to act is shared by both the Union and the 
Member States. This objective is achieved by placing conditions on the exercise of 
competence by the Union institutions in defined areas of shared competence (these 
areas are set out in Art 4 TFEU). The founding Treaty of Rome made no reference to 
the subsidiarity principle. However, the principle subsequently made its way into the 
constitutional framework of the European Union and was finally formalized as a 
general constitutional principle by the Maastricht Treaty.
1
  
The core subsidiarity test in EU law is now to be found in Art 5(3) TEU.
2
 This 
provision states that, in order to exercise concurrent competences, the Union 
institutions must first demonstrate that there is a need for intervention at Union level. 
In summary, this test comprises two cumulative requirements. First, it must be shown 
that Union action is necessary in order to address regulatory problems exhibiting 
sufficient transnational or „cross-border‟ effects. Secondly, subsidiarity requires the 
Union institutions to demonstrate that their action will bring with it clear benefits or 
„added value‟ as compared to continued (or no) unilateral action at Member State 
level. Again, only where both conditions are satisfied does the Union enjoy the right 
to exercise competence in the relevant area of shared responsibility. 
Subsidiarity‟s (rebuttable) presumption in favour of Member State autonomy is 
based on a normative belief in the value of localised decision-making. Subsidiarity 
                                                          
1
 Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) [1992] OJ C 190/1. 
2
 See also Art 1 TEU. 
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seeks to protect the right of Member State institutions to respond unilaterally to 
regulatory problems at the national/sub-national level. The desire to carve out and 
safeguard a meaningful role for national/sub-national decision-making bodies in the 
integration process has both economic and political significance. From an economic 
perspective, localised decision-making is considered better able to satisfy voter 
preferences and thus capable of achieving more efficient outcomes. In political 
terms, increasing the proximity between decision-makers and those affected by the 
decisions they take is associated with greater democratic legitimacy.  
The buzz around subsidiarity has certainly faded since the principle‟s introduction 
into the Treaty framework nearly 20 years ago. Indeed, until very recently, one might 
have ventured to say that subsidiarity had largely served its purpose. The principle 
had successfully unlocked the political deadlock at Maastricht and, to a certain 
degree, also sent an important message to the Union institutions that more integration 
was not necessarily to be equated with more Union intervention. Post-Maastricht, 
subsidiarity has unquestionably remained a key phrase in the vocabulary of European 
integration. Furthermore, attempts have been made to flesh out the principle‟s 
substance in more detail.
3
 But, the initial excitement around subsidiarity was never 
really recaptured, particularly in the legal scholarship.  
In recent years, however, the spotlight has returned to subsidiarity. During the 
Union‟s turbulent process of constitutional reform, the principle played a key part in 
securing the passage of the Lisbon Treaty.
4
 Indeed, one might go so far as to say that 
subsidiarity has gone from being the „word that saved Maastricht‟ to the word that 
saved Lisbon.
5
 Yet, this recent resurgence in interest in subsidiarity should come as 
no surprise. After all, the very problem that the principle is designed to resolve has 
not gone away. On the contrary, concerns over the appropriate distribution of 
competence between the Union institutions and the Member States remain at the 
forefront of debates on European integration. The Member States (or at least some of 
                                                          
3
 See, in particular, Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality 
[1997] OJ C 340/105. 
4
 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community [2007] OJ C 306/01. 
5
 The allusion here is to D. Z. Cass, „The Word that Saves Maastricht? The Principle of Subsidiarity 
and the Division of Powers within the European Community‟ (1992) 29(1) CMLRev 1107. 
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them) continue to express genuine concerns over the loss of regulatory competence 
to the Union. Equally, the Union institutions are still searching for stronger 
normative bases to support and legitimatise their own activities.  
Scope of this thesis 
The principle of subsidiarity has been subject to extensive – and, some may argue, 
exhaustive – analysis in the scholarship on European integration. However, current 
analysis, particularly amongst legal writers, remains rather narrowly focused. For 
many years now, studies into subsidiarity‟s role as a legal principle have clustered 
around analysis of a single substantive issue: the function of the subsidiarity 
principle as a restraint on the actions of the Union legislature.
6
 This narrow approach 
to the analysis of subsidiarity reflects an established and now widely held view that 
the principle‟s core contribution to the integration process is as a political principle 
that operates to guide the legislative rather than judicial process. This view is also 
reflected in the substance of the most recent Treaty reforms. The entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty has introduced a series of new innovations that are specifically 
designed to bolster the principle‟s effectiveness in the legislative context.
7
 
This thesis seeks to challenge the entrenched view that subsidiarity is only relevant to 
the actions of the Union legislature. It is motivated by a firm belief that subsidiarity 
can – and should – be made to work much harder in the integration process. 
Specifically, this thesis questions whether the principle could and, ultimately, should 
also apply as a source of self-restraint on the interpretative functions of the Court of 
Justice. To date, this issue has remained largely overlooked in the academic 
literature. Legal commentators, in particular, have remained broadly critical of 
subsidiarity‟s effectiveness as an enforceable legal principle and, perhaps for this 
reason, have not explored its possible broader implications in any great detail. It is 
                                                          
6
 See eg A. Estella, The EU Principle of Subsidiarity and its Critique (Oxford: OUP, 2002), G. 
Davies, „Subsidiarity: The Wrong Idea, in the Wrong Place, at the Wrong Time‟ (2006) 43(1) 
CMLRev 63, M. Kumm, „Constitutionalising Subsidiarity in Integrated Markets: The Case of Tobacco 
Regulation in the European Union‟ (2006) 12(4) ELRev 503 and R. Schütze, „Subsidiarity after 
Lisbon: Reinforcing the Safeguards of Federalism?‟ (2009) 46(3) CLJ 525. 
7
 See here esp. Art 12 TEU and Art 5(3) TFEU, and the procedures set out in Protocol (No. 1) on the 
Role of National Parliaments in the European Union [2010] OJ C 83/203 and Protocol (No. 2) on the 
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submitted that this criticism of subsidiarity‟s function as a legal principle is 
misplaced. Subsidiarity is more than simply a political principle of concern only for 
the Union legislature. On the contrary, it is a useful legal tool with considerable 
untapped potential as a source of restraint on the Court‟s functions as a Union 
institution.   
The case study 
This thesis does not seek to analyse subsidiarity‟s implications for the Court of 
Justice in broad terms. It also examines the principle‟s practical impact in a specific 
substantive context. The Court‟s interpretation of the term „obstacle to intra-EU 
movement‟ in EU free movement law is selected as the most appropriate case study.
8
 
The definition of this concept constitutes the first limb of the Court‟s review of 
Member State preferences against the Treaty framework. In cases where a particular 
national measure is found to fall within the scope of the Treaty freedoms as an 
obstacle to intra-EU movement,  it is always open to the Member State concerned to 
try and defend their policy preference within the Union derogation framework. This 
requires the Member State, first, to identify a suitable ground for derogation and, 
secondly, to demonstrate that the contested national measure is a proportionate 
means of securing that derogation. 
The Court‟s case law on obstacles to intra-EU movement is chosen as a suitable 
testing ground for subsidiarity analysis for two key reasons. First, the Court‟s 
interpretation of the scope of the Treaty freedoms can be shown to meet the 
prerequisites for the application of the subsidiarity principle. When asked to interpret 
the scope of the individual provisions on intra-EU movement, the Court is, in effect, 
making a decision about the distribution of competence between the Union and the 
Member States in an area of shared competence: the regulation of the internal market 
(Art 4(2) TFEU). The Court‟s preferred reading of the scope of the Treaty freedoms 
determines the extent to which the Member States are required to defend their 
particular policy preferences at Union level. If the Court chooses, for example, to 
                                                          
8
 This is synonymous with the definition of the scope of the Treaty provisions guaranteeing the free 
movement of goods, services, persons and capital within the internal market. The individual Treaty 
freedoms are set out in Arts 21, 34, 35, 45, 49, 56 and 63(1) TFEU. 
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define obstacles to intra-EU movement broadly, then this has the effect of subjecting 
a greater range of Member State policies to scrutiny at Union level. Conversely, a 
narrower interpretation of the Treaty freedoms operates to safeguard many more 
national policy choices from review at Union level. This is exactly the type of 
decision that subsidiarity was introduced to structure. 
The second reason for selecting the Court‟s jurisprudence on obstacles to intra-EU 
movement as a case study is that there is a genuine „subsidiarity problem‟ in this 
area. In recent years, the Court has confirmed its preference for an extremely broad 
effects-based reading of the scope of the Treaty freedoms.
9
 The case law across the 
freedoms can now be shown to be converging around expansive tests based on the 
potential „deterrent‟ or „dissuasive‟ effects of a particular Member State policy on 
intra-EU movement.
10
 The Court‟s shift in this direction sits uncomfortably 
alongside the logic of the subsidiarity principle. Applied literally, the Court‟s 
preferred reading of the scope of the Treaty freedoms could bring virtually any 
national policy within the scope of its review as an obstacle to intra-EU movement. 
This would leave the Member State little meaningful space to contribute unilaterally 
to the regulation of the internal market as an area of shared responsibility. 
 
 
                                                          
9
 See here, in particular, Case C-110/05 Commission v. Italy (Motorcycle Trailers) [2009] ECR 519 at 
para. 33, Case C-325/08 Olympique Lyonnais SASP v Olivier Bernard and Newcastle UFC [2010] 
ECR I-2177 at para. 34. 
10
 For Art 21 TFEU, see eg Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I-2691 at para. 32, Case C-138/02 
Collins [2004] ECR I-2703 at para. 61, Case C-209/03 Bidar [2005] ECR I-2119 at para. 32 and Case 
C-524/06 Huber [2008] ECR I-9705 at para. 35; for Art 34 TFEU, see eg Case 8/74 Dassonville 
[1974] ECR 837 at para. 5 and Case C-110/05 Commission v. Italy (Motorcycle Trailers) op. cit. at 
note 9 at para. 33; for Art 35 TFEU see eg Case C-161/09 Kakavetsos-Fragkopoulos AE, judgment of 
the Court (First Chamber) of 3 March 2011 (nyr) at para. 29; for Art 45 TFEU, see eg Case C-415/93 
Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921 at para. 96, Case C-109/04 Kranemann [2005] ECR I-2421 at para. 26 
and Case C-208/05 ITC [2007] ECR I-181 at para. 31; for Art 49 TFEU see eg Case C-19/92 Dieter 
Kraus v Land Baden-Württemberg [1993] ECR I-1663 at para. 32, Case C-318/05 Commission v 
Germany (School Fees) [2007] ECR I-6957 at para. 81 and Case C-281/06 Jundt [2007] ECR I-12231 
at para. 52; for Art 56 TFEU, see eg Case C-76/90 Manfred Säger v Dennemeyer & Co. Ltd [1991] 
ECR I-4221 at para. 11, Case C-136/00 Danner [2002] ECR I-8147 at para. 29 and Joined Cases C-
544/03 and C-545/03 Mobistar and Belgacom Mobile [2005] ECR I-7723 at para. 30; for Art 63(1) 
TFEU, see eg Case C-35/98 Staatssecretaris van Financiën v B.G.M. Verkooijen [2000] ECR I-4071 
at para. 34, Case C-367/98 Commission v Portugal (Golden Shares) [2002] ECR I-4731 at para. 45 
and Joined Cases C-155/08 and C-157/08 X (C-155/08) and E. H. A. Passenheim-van Schoot (C-
157/08) [2009] ECR I-5093 at para. 39. 
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Relationship to the existing scholarship on EU free movement law 
In the legal literature, there is certainly no shortage of possible explanations of and 
justifications for the Court‟s expansion of the scope of the Treaty freedoms. 
According to the leading school of thought, the Treaty freedoms should focus on 
scrutinizing national measures that place severe restrictions on economic freedom 
within the internal market.
11
 This view is certainly capable of rationalising the 
Court‟s shift to expansive tests that focus on a measure‟s „deterrent‟ or „dissuasive‟ 
effects on intra-EU movement. On another view, the same set of rules should now be 
re-interpreted in light of the introduction of the status of Union citizenship.
12
 Read 
together with this new legal status, it has been argued that the term „obstacle to intra-
EU movement‟ now grants the Court the power to review all Member State measures 
that interfere disproportionately with the personal freedom of Union citizens.  
The existing conceptual models all offer convincing explanations for the Court‟s 
expansion of the scope of the Treaty freedoms. However, it is argued that their 
shared (and fatal) weakness is their failure to engage with the subsidiarity principle. 
Those writers who support, at least to some degree, the Court‟s continued expansion 
of the Treaty freedoms overlook the implications of subsidiarity as an important 
source of restraint on the Court. They assume that the Court is essentially free to 
shape its reading of the scope of the Treaty freedoms as its sees fit. This thesis argues 
that this position is wrong. It argues that subsidiarity functions as a brake on the 
Court‟s competence to contribute to the regulation of the internal market through its 
interpretation of the Treaty freedoms. In the final analysis, it is argued that 
subsidiarity does not demand a total revolution in the case law. On the contrary, the 
conclusion reached is more modest, and calls only for an adjustment of the 
jurisprudence at the margins. However, it is submitted that this adjustment is worth 
making.  
                                                          
11
 Those supporting the market access approach include, eg the Opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-
412/93 Leclerc-Siplec [1995] ECR I-179 at paras 38-49, S. Weatherill, „After Keck: Some Thoughts 
on How to Clarify the Clarification‟ (1996) 33(5) CMLRev 885 at pp 96-101, J. Steiner et al EU Law 
(9
th
 Ed.) (Oxford: OUP, 2009) esp. at p. 388 and C. Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The 
Four Freedoms (3
rd
 Ed.) (Oxford: OUP, 2010) at p. 144. 
12
 See, in particular, E. Spaventa, Free Movement of Persons in the European Union: Barriers to 
Movement in the Constitutional Context (AH Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer, 2007). 
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Chapter overview 
Chapter 1 examines the meaning, origins and evolution of subsidiarity as a legal 
principle in EU law. It concludes that, despite considerable scepticism in the 
commentary, there is clear evidence that the Court has in fact transformed 
subsidiarity into an enforceable legal test – at least during one period of its post-
Maastricht case law. This test operates to restrain the Union legislature in the 
exercise of its shared regulatory competence to regulate the internal market (Art 114 
TFEU).  
Chapter two assesses the implications of the subsidiarity principle for the Court of 
Justice as a Union institution. This analysis starts with a critical review of the 
exisiting literature on this point. Thereafter, the chapter surveys the case law for any 
evidence to suggest that the Court is already engaging with subsidiarity as a source 
of restraint on its interpretative functions. The second part of the chapter then 
addresses the normative dimension, namely whether or not the Court should be 
considered bound by subsidiarity. After dealing with some of the possible challenges 
and objections to this line of argument, the chapter concludes that there are no 
obstacles to applying subsidiarity to the Court.  
Chapter 3 isolates the case law on obstacles to intra-EU movement as a suitable case 
study to test the subsidiarity argument developed in Chapter 2. The chapter then 
proceeds to consider the how the Court currently defines the scope of the individual 
Treaty freedoms. In summary, it is argued that the Court‟s reading of the scope of the 
Treaty freedoms is now converging around expansive effects-based tests. Applied 
literally, the Court‟s preferred approach could bring virtually any national measure 
within the scope of the Court‟s scrutiny. This, it is argued, sits uncomfortably with 
the demands of subsidiarity. 
Chapter 4 presents a critical analysis of the key judicial devices that the Court has 
developed to manage its broad effects-based definition of obstacles to intra-EU 
movement. These include: the wholly internal rule, the concept of an inherent 
obstacle to intra-EU movement, the criterion of „effects too uncertain and indirect‟ 
and the de minimis test. Examining these devices in turn, it is argued that, whilst the 
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existence and use of these judicial rules demonstrate the Court‟s awareness of the 
need to place limits on its own powers of review, their effect in practice is rather 
limited. Of the various judicial devices, it is argued that only an implicit and 
qualitative de minimis test has any impact on the case law on obstacles to intra-EU 
movement. However, it is submitted that the Court has set the threshold for this test 
too low to make a meaningful contribution to the protection of Member State 
autonomy. 
Chapter 5 reviews the competing interpretative models that are presently used to 
rationalise the case law on obstacles to intra-EU movement. On the one hand, several 
writers favour a narrow approach to the obstacle concept. This focuses on (1) 
eliminating national measures that discriminate on grounds of Member State 
nationality and/or on (2) ensuring adherence to the principle of mutual recognition.
13
 
On the other hand, most commentators defend a broader reading of the Treaty 
freedoms. This extends, in principle, to permit scrutiny at Union level of genuinely 
non-discriminatory Member State rules that simply characterise the conditions for 
economic and/or non-economic activity within individual Member States.
14
 It is 
argued that both approaches to defining the scope of obstacles to intra-EU movement 
are problematic and, moreover, fail to engage fully with the subsidiarity principle.  
Finally, Chapter 6 brings together the conclusions of the overall analysis and offers a 
conceptual framework to define an obstacle to intra-EU movement in EU free 
movement law. In summary, it is argued that subsidiarity is an important – and to 
date overlooked – source of self-restraint on the exercise of the Court of Justice‟s 
competence to interpret the scope of the Treaty freedoms. Furthermore, it is 
submitted that the principle provides the key to resolving one of the great and 
persisting points of dispute in the case law and literature on intra-EU movement: 
whether the Treaty freedoms are intended to liberalise intra-EU trade or are intended 
                                                          
13
 See eg N. Bernard, Multilevel Governance in the European Union (Amsterdam: Kluwer, 2002), J. 
Snell Goods and Services in EC Law (Oxford: OUP, 2002) and G. Davies, Nationality Discrimination 
in the European Internal Market (The Hague: Kluwer, 2003). 
14
 See eg Weatherill op. cit. at note 11, Barnard op. cit. at note 11 and Spaventa op. cit. at note 11. 
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15
 See the Opinion of AG Tesauro in Case C-292/92 Hünermund [1993] ECR I-6787 at para. 1. See 
also, more recently, eg the Opinion of AG Bot in Case C-110/05 Commission v. Italy (Motorcycle 
Trailers) op. cit. at note 9 at para. 74. 
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Chapter 1 
Subsidiarity and its evolution as a legal principle in EU law 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter examines the principle of subsidiarity and its evolution as a legal 
principle in EU law. It begins in section 2 by offering a working definition of the 
principle and examining (briefly) its origins and evolution as a normative principle in 
constitutional, political and economic theory. In section 3, attention turns to the 
introduction and development of subsidiarity in European integration. Here it is 
argued that subsidiarity has been formalised in the Treaties as a constitutional 
principle, which draws on both the principle‟s economic and political characteristics 
for its operation. Section 4 then traces the evolution of subsidiarity in the case law 
and literature. In spite of a considerable degree of scepticism in the commentary over 
the principle‟s effectiveness, it is argued that the Court has in fact transformed 
subsidiarity into an enforceable legal principle restraining the Union legislature in the 
exercise of its shared regulatory competences. The inherent limits of the Court‟s 
review have, however, prompted the introduction of a new system of ex ante 
compliance monitoring, which is designed to bolster the principle‟s effectiveness in 
this specific context. 
2. Definition, origins and evolution 
2.1 Definition  
At its most abstract, the principle of subsidiarity is a principle structuring the 
relationship between individuals. It governs their interaction as they exist 
simultaneously as members of different social groupings. It is not itself a democratic 
principle, but a principle that may be employed to structure the distribution and 
exercise of authority within a democracy.
1
 It is premised on the existence of a 
hierarchical order of at least two autonomous social units, unified through the pursuit 
                                                          
1
 N.W. Barber, „The Limited Modesty of Subsidiarity‟ (2005) 11(3) ELJ 308 at p. 315.  
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of a common objective.
2
 The principle has both a negative and positive dimension.
3
 
As a negative proposition, it seeks to protect the autonomy of the smaller constituent 
social groups to accomplish unilaterally that which they are in fact capable of 
achieving themselves. Intervention by the higher entities in an area of shared 
competence is therefore confined to those tasks that the lower units are incapable of 
realising sufficiently well when acting independently. This latter, supporting, role of 
the higher unit(s) forms the basis of the principle‟s positive dimension.  
2.2 Origins 
The principle of subsidiarity is most frequently associated in EU legal scholarship 
with Catholic social doctrine and, in particular, the encyclical Quadragesimo Anno, 
published in 1931 under the authority of Pope Pius XI.
4
 This work refers to respect 
for subsidiarii officii principium, the principle of the subsidiary office. Only through 
translation and further analysis did this concept emerge as the „principle of 
subsidiarity.‟
5
 According to this „unshaken and unchangeable‟ principle, the primary 
right of action rests with smaller social groupings within a community and, 
ultimately, the individual.
6
 Intervention by larger and higher units – notably the State 
– in activities that can be accomplished successfully by smaller and lower 
communities is condemned as a serious evil (grave damnum) and a disruption of 
proper order (recti ordinis perturbatio).
7
  
Whilst it is correct that the „principle of subsidiarity‟ so-called was indeed formalised 
– albeit through translation – through Catholic social doctrine, it is generally 
                                                          
2
 N. Bernard, „The Future of European Economic Law in the Light of the Principle of Subsidiarity‟ 
(1996) 33(4) CMLRev 633 at p. 653 and, most clearly, C. Calliess, Subsidiaritäts- und 
Solidaritätsprinzip in der Europischen Union (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996) at p. 29.  
3
 Calliess op. cit. at note 2 at pp 21-2. 
4
 Pope Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno (London: Catholic Truth Society, 1936) at p. 31. As noted by eg 
N. Emiliou, „Subsidiarity: An Effective Barrier against “the Enterprise of Ambition”?‟ (1992) 17(5) 
ELRev 383 at p. 384 and G. A. Bermann, „Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European 
Community and the United States‟ (1994) 94(2) Columbia Law Rev 331 at p. 339 and Barber op. cit. 
at note 1 at p. 310. 
5
 P. Pescatore, „Mit der Subsidiarität Leben‟ in Festschrift für Ulrich Everling (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
1995) 1071 at p. 1072. 
6
 Pope Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno op. cit. at note 4 at p. 31.  
7
 Ibid. See also Emiliou op. cit. at note 4 at pp 384-385 and Pescatore op. cit. at note 5 at p. 1072. 
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accepted that its roots may be followed back much further.
8
 For example, Estella 
traces the principle back to the writings of Aristotle.
9
 Framing society in terms of a 
series of autonomous groups forming part of a larger body, Aristotle advocated 
respect for the autonomy of individual groups to perform their particular tasks free 
from interference by the other bodies. The individual groups only enjoyed a right of 
intervention in each other‟s affairs in cases of strict necessity.
10
 This thesis, as 
subsequently developed by others, sits comfortably with the subsidiarity principle‟s 
negative presumption. In the same vein, to emphasise the positive dimension of 
subsidiarity (intervention by the larger group in support of the smaller unit(s)), 
commentators rely on the fruits of etymological research. In particular, it is often 
noted that the Latin subsidium has its origins in a military context, in which it 
denoted a body of reserve troops who entered the field of conflict only when the 
resources of front line troops proved insufficient.
11
 
A comprehensive re-examination of the development of subsidiarity in historical, 
philosophical and political thought is, however, beyond the scope of the present 
inquiry.
12
 It is sufficient, for present purposes, to note that, despite a considerable 
degree of indeterminacy, there is a common thread running through the various 
expositions. Underpinning the rationale of subsidiarity since Aristotle is a desire, in 
principle, to safeguard the primary autonomy of smaller constituent units of a larger 
unity.
13
 As Estella rightly notes:  
„the ethos underlying subsidiarity is the protection of the autonomy of smaller 
entities (and, in the last instance, the individual) against intervention by larger 
entities. This is irrespective of whether we speak of the public-public level, 
the public-private, or the private-private one.‟
14
  
                                                          
8
 See eg Calliess op. cit. at note 2 at pp 24-6, K. Endo, „The Principle of Subsidiarity: From Johannes 
Althusius to Jacques Delors‟ (1994) 44(6) Hokkaido Law Review 2064-1965 and A. Estella, The EU 
Principle of Subsidiarity and its Critique (Oxford: OUP, 2002) at p. 76. 
9
 Eg Estella op. cit. at note 8 at pp 76-79. 
10
 Ibid., at p. 77. 
11
 Calliess op. cit. at note 2 at p. 21. See also R. Schütze, „Subsidiarity after Lisbon: Reinforcing the 
Safeguards of Federalism‟(2009)  68(3) CLJ 525 at p. 525.  
12
 For discussion, see eg Endo op. cit. at note 8 and also the collected essays in A. Riklin and G. 
Batliner (Eds.) Subsidiarität: Ein interdisziplinäres Symposium (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1994). 
13
 Calliess op. cit. at note 2 at p. 21. 
14
 Estella op. cit. at note 8 at p. 80. 
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Viewed in this light, the principle of subsidiarity as presented in the Quadragesimo 
Anno is therefore merely one particular contextual formulation of a broader general 
principle. It emerged against a background of an increasing consolidation of power 
by totalitarian regimes with the specific objective of „steer[ing] [society] between the 
twin perils of individualism and collectivism.‟
15
 Addressing both state and private 




In more recent years, subsidiarity has found particular expression in the specific 
contexts of federal, political and economic theory.
17
 This section does not present an 
exhaustive inquiry into the position of subsidiarity in each of these individual fields. 
Instead, the aim is more modest. It attempts only to show that, in all three disciplines, 
subsidiarity functions as a normative principle designed to structure the distribution 
of competences in systems of multi-level governance. The analysis in this section 
forms useful background for the discussion of the introduction and development of 
subsidiarity in EU law – the specific focus of inquiry in this thesis – in section 3.   
As we shall see in this section, the three main disciplinary expressions of the 
subsidiarity principle – the federal, the political and the economic – are not mutually 
exclusive.
18
 There is in fact a considerable degree of overlap between the three 
individual manifestations of the principle. That said, it is important to point out that 
each discipline approaches subsidiarity differently. Federal, economic and political 
theories are motivated by distinct concerns and, therefore, place particular emphasis 
on different outcomes and input variables. 
 
 
                                                          
15
 Barber op. cit. at note 1 at p. 310. 
16
 Ibid., at p. 311. 
17
 Eg Bermann op. cit. at note 4, J. Pelkmans, European Integration: Methods and Economic Analysis 
(Harlow: Pearson, 2006) and R. Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism (Oxford: OUP, 
2009). 
18
 On this point, see also J. Pelkmans, „Testing for Subsidiarity‟ in T. Bruha and C. Nowak (Eds.), Die 
Europäische Union: Innere Verfasstheit und Globale Handlungsfähigkeit (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
2006).   
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2.3.1 Subsidiarity as a constitutional principle 
As a constitutional principle in federal systems, the starting point for subsidiarity 
analysis is the recognition that a federal state is characterised by the coexistence of 
diversity and unity. In this context, the basic problem that subsidiarity – or, where 
not expressly referred to, its logic – seeks to address is simple enough.  Subsidiarity 
is designed to ensure that the individuality of distinct component states is maintained 
and protected, whilst at the same time, also brought together for a common purpose 
in the development of the federation.
19
 In connection with this dynamic struggle 
between, on the one hand, preserving the identity of the individual states and, on the 
other hand, exploiting the advantages of centralised action, subsidiarity can be used 
in two distinct contexts. First, subsidiarity may be employed to question the extent to 
which the division of competences between the states and the federation reflects – or 
indeed offends – the logic of the principle.
20
 This means critiquing, for example, the 
decision to reserve as exclusive specific substantive areas of competence to the 
federation ex ante against the ability of the individual states to achieve the relevant 
objective unilaterally.  
More frequently, however, subsidiarity arises in a second context: the exercise of 
competences shared by the federation and the states. Leaving discussion of the 
European Union aside, a clear example can be found in the German Grundgesetz.
21
 
Although the term „subsidiarity‟ does not feature expressly in this document, its logic 
can be found to operate in Art 72(2) GG.
22
 According to this provision, in the 
designated areas of concurrent competence, the Länder (States) retain competence to 
the extent that the Bund (the Federal State) has not exercised its power through 
                                                          
19
 For discussion with respect to the German Constitution, see eg K. Hesse, Der Unitarische 
Bundesstaat (Karlsruhe: C.F Müller, 1962) at p. 12. See also, with respect to the constitutional 
settlement in the United States, eg A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (4
th
 Ed), translated by H 
Reeve, edited by F Bowen (Cambridge: Sever & Francis, 1864) at p. 206: „The federal system was 
created with the intention of combining the different advantages which result from the magnitude and 
littleness of nations.‟  
20
 Schütze op. cit. at note 17 at p. 246. 
21
 See also Emiliou op. cit. at note 4 at pp 388-390 and esp. J. Isensee, Subsidiaritätsprinzip und 
Verfassungsrecht (Berlin: Dunker & Humblot, 2001). For discussion of the implicit operation of 
subsidiarity in US constitutional law and practice, see eg Bermann op. cit. at note 4 at pp 403-447. 
22
 For discussion of the operation of the subsidiarity principle as a contested principle of German 
constitutional law, see eg Isensee op. cit. at note 21. 
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legislation. In other words, unless and until the Bund has intervened at the federal 
level, regulatory competence remains with the individual Länder. This sits 
comfortably with the negative presumption at the heart of the subsidiarity principle. 
Furthermore, according to Art 72(2) GG, the Bund is empowered to legislate in areas 
of shared responsibility only „if and to the extent that the establishment of equivalent 
living conditions throughout the federal territory or the maintenance of legal or 
economic unity renders federal regulation necessary in the national interest.‟
23
 Again, 
this carries distinct echoes of the positive, supporting, function at the core of the 
subsidiarity principle. 
Significantly, since 1994, Art 72(2) GG has been justiciable.
24
 According to Art 
93(2a) GG, the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) is now 
expressly authorised to rule on the compatibility of federal legislation with the 
requirements set out in Art 72(2) GG. Exercising its express power of review in 
recent years, the Court has not shied away from its responsibilities. In at least two 
cases, the Court‟s review under Art 72(2) GG has resulted directly in federal 
legislation being declared invalid.
25
 Indeed, the Court‟s approach to its task has 
prompted what many now view as a subsequent dilution of the principle‟s 
justiciability through constitutional reform in 2006.
26 
Although leaving the wording 
of Art 72(2) GG unchanged, the recent amendments have excluded substantive areas 






                                                          
23
 Art 72(2) GG, taken from the official translation, available at: https://www.btg-
bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf  (last accessed 14.09.11). 
24
 Art 93(1)(2a) GG op. cit. at note 23. 
25
 BVerfGE 111, 10 (Shop Trading Hours) (2004) and BVerfGE 112, 226 (University Fees) (2005). 
For discussion of subsidiarity principle by the Court, see also BVerfGE 106, 62 (Geriatric Care) 
(2002), BVerfGE 110, 141 (Dangerous Dogs) (2004) and BVerfGE 111, 226 (Junior Professors) 
(2004). 
26
 For discussion, see G. Taylor, „Germany: The Subsidiarity Principle‟ (2006) 4(1) Int J 
Constitutional Law 115. 
27
 See the new proviso inserted into Art 72(2) GG. Effectively, this has created two categories of 
concurrent legislative powers, only one of which subjects the federal legislature to the subsidiarity test 
in that provision.  
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2.3.2 Subsidiarity as a political principle 
Subsidiarity features (often implicitly) in many of the great political and 
philosophical works, from the writings of Aristotle, through those of St Thomas 
Aquinas and Althusius, to the more recent work of Neil MacCormick.
28
 As a political 
principle, subsidiarity is typically seen as a device to safeguard individual liberty 
against excesses of state authority.
29
 As Emilou surmises: 
„Liberty is natural and therefore in defining the sphere of the individual and 
that of the state there should be a presumption in favour of the individual. At 
this point subsidiarity can be helpful in the sense that in dividing 
responsibility between the individual, the community and the state, 
everything is reserved for the individual and the community, except what is 
granted to the state by the constitution and only in so far as the objectives of 




More recently, the principle has also become synonymous with efforts to promote 
„good governance‟ and to increase the proximity of citizens to the political decision-
making processes that affect them.
31
 As Calliess notes, „decentralised solutions 
reduce the complexity of the decision-making process and thereby contribute to 
increased transparency. Those affected are better able to identify with the political 
decision, where it is taken as closely as possible to them.‟
32
 Subsidiarity is therefore 
embraced as a principle that is capable of enhancing the democratic character of the 
political process. In an attempt to bolster this effect, other commentators have also 
discussed the principle in the context of institutional reform. Here, subsidiarity is 
                                                          
28
 For a comprehensive historical review, see eg C. Millon-Delsol, L’état Subsidiaire (Paris: PUF, 
1992) and A. Føllesdal, „Survey Article: Subsidiarity‟ (1998) 6(2) JPP 190 esp. at pp 198-213. For an 
overview of MacCormick‟s work, see N. MacCormick, „Democracy and Subsidiarity in the European 
Commonwealth‟ in N. MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State, and Nation in the 
European Commonwealth (Oxford: OUP, 1999) at pp 137-156. 
29
 Though, as discussed above, the principle is also employed to structure private relations between 
individuals. See here eg Pope Pius XI Quadragesimo Anno op. cit. at note 4. 
30
 Emiliou op. cit. at note 4 at p. 388 (discussing Blackstone‟s work on liberty). 
31
 Calliess op. cit. at note 2 at p. 26.  
32
 Ibid (this author‟s translation). See, to same effect, eg E. Swaine, „Subsidiarity and Self-Interest: 
Federalism at the European Court of Justice‟ (2000) 41(1) Harvard Int. LJ 1 at p. 52 and C. Ritzer and 
M. Ruttloff, „Die Kontrolle des Subsidiaritätsprinzips: Geltende Rechtslage und Reformperspektiven‟ 
(2006) EuR 116 at p. 118. 
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Related to these developments and to the preceding arguments on democracy and 
transparency, there is now also an increasing belief in the value of localised decision-
making per se. In particular, policy-makers recognise that, despite increasing 
globalisation, certain problems are in fact best regulated – or at least managed and 
resolved – locally.
34
 In both competition and environmental policy, for example, the 
logic of subsidiarity finds expression in the view that sub-national actors may enjoy 
information advantages vis-à-vis centralised authorities and are frequently better 
placed to implement policies in the particular context in which problems arise.
35
  
The political dimension of the subsidiarity principle also serves a particularly 
important function. The politics of subsidiarity provide the case for the defence of 
the principle‟s substantive a priori claim in favour of the autonomy of the smaller, 
lower units. The benefits associated with localised decision-making, notably 
increased transparency, accountability and democratic legitimacy, all serve to 
strengthen subsidiarity‟s fundamental defence of the right of lower units to govern 
their own affairs without interference from centralised bodies as far as possible.
36
 
2.3.3 Subsidiarity as an economic principle  
Finally, in economics, the subsidiarity principle finds expression in the theory of 
fiscal federalism.
37
 This theory addresses the allocation of public economic functions 
                                                          
33
 Barber op. cit. at note 1 at p. 312. See also A. Scott, J. Peterson and D. Miller, „Subsidiarity: A 
“Europe of the Regions” v. the British Constitution?‟ (1994) 32(1) JCMS 47, who reflect on the 
pressures to decentralise decision-making within the United Kingdom in light of the introduction of 
the subsidiarity principle into the (then) EC. See also, to the same effect, D. Miller and A. Scott, 
„Subsidiarity and Scotland‟ in A. Duff (Ed.) Subsidiarity within the European Community: A Federal 
Trust Report (London: Federal Trust, 1993) 87. 
34
 Calliess op. cit. at note 2 at p. 26.  
35
 With respect to EU competition law, see eg the reforms introduced by Regulation 1/2003 EC of 16 
December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of 
the Treaty [2004] OJ L 1/1. In the area of environmental law, see recently eg the Commission 
proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Common Fisheries 
Policy, COM (2011) 425 final, which seeks, amongst other things, to decentralise the governance of 
fisheries. 
36
 Calliess op. cit. at note 2 at p. 27. 
37
 For a summary of the evolution of fiscal federalism, see W. Oates, „Towards a Second-Generation 
Theory of Fiscal Federalism‟ (2005) 12(4) Int Tax Public Finance 349.  
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in systems of multi-level governance. In this context, subsidiarity – also referred to 
as the „decentralisation theorem‟ – seeks to secure an optimum balance of unity and 
diversity in order to maximise global welfare.
38
 In line with the politics of „good 
governance,‟ the starting point is the assertion that all-out centralisation is sub-
optimum. In other words, local, not central, governments are considered better able 
to satisfy voter preferences. This is due to their increased proximity to citizens. 
However, the decentralisation theorem also acknowledges that the benefits and 
burdens of local policies often extend beyond the jurisdictional boundaries of the 
regulating local authority. For example, the environmental impact of industrial 
activities may transcend local frontiers. Likewise, the provision of certain public 
goods such as defence or healthcare at local level is often associated with increased 
costs when compared with centralised provision.  
Against this background, subsidiarity operates within fiscal federalist theory to direct 
regulatory competence both ways along the vertical axis. In accordance with the 
logic of subsidiarity, there is a rebuttable presumption in favour of localised 
decision-making. Externalities or „spill-over effects‟ associated with particular policy 
decisions should therefore be addressed by the lowest tier of government capable of 
internalising their effect at the lowest cost. On the other hand, and in line with the 
principle‟s positive dimension, subsidiarity supports intervention by the centralised 
regulator in order to exploit clear economies of scale that are associated with 
significant cost-savings.
39
 Broadly speaking, it is argued that, in result, the 
subsidiarity principle restricts intervention by the central authority to three cases: (1) 
the correction of market failures arising from externalities (including the provision of 
                                                          
38
 See Oates op. cit at note 37 at p. 351. Whilst not using the term himself, Oates notes expressly that 
„fiscal decentralisation‟ is referred to as „the principle of subsidiarity‟ in Community law: See W. 
Oates, „An Essay on Fiscal Federalism‟ (1999) 37(3) JEL 1120 at p. 1122, footnote 6. See also 
Pelkmans, European Integration: Methods and Economic Analysis op. cit. at note 17 at p. 37. 
39
 The debate over the relative advantages of centralised intervention versus the benefits of local 
regulation has become more nuanced in recent years. The evolving approach to fiscal federalism – the 
so-called second-generation fiscal federalism – now incorporates insights from, inter alia, public 
choice theory and work on information issues. In so doing it challenges, in particular, the traditional 
assumption of the benevolent public authority acting in the general interest. See on this generally, 
Oates op. cit. at note 37 pp 356-368. 
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certain „national‟ public goods such as defence); (2) the redistribution of income; and 
(3) ensuring macro-economic stability.
40
  
2.3.4 Summary  
As this brief introductory review of the definition, origins and evolution of the 
principle has revealed, subsidiarity has a „diverse and rich‟ history as a structural 
principle in systems of multi-level governance.
41
 The principle finds expression in 
contemporary constitutional, political and economic theory. Each discipline 
approaches subsidiarity differently and seeks to instrumentalize it for particular 
purposes. However, notwithstanding such differences, there is a common thread. In 
each context, subsidiarity is employed as a device designed to negotiate an optimum 
balance of unity and diversity in areas of shared regulatory responsibility.  
From this starting point, this chapter turns now to consider how the principle was 
introduced and developed in European integration. The next section begins with a 
brief review of early expressions of the principle in the integration process. It then 
considers, in greater detail, the formalisation of subsidiarity as a legal principle of 
EU law through the Maastricht Treaty and the principle‟s subsequent evolution 
thereafter. This discussion forms the basis for the analysis of subsidiarity in the 
literature and case law in section 4. 
3. Subsidiarity and the European Union 
3.1 Early expressions 
The term subsidiarity did not feature in the original Treaty of Rome. However, the 
concept began to emerge in the 1970s in connection with debates over the ongoing 
trajectory of European integration.
42
 For example, the subsidiarity principle was 
referred to expressly in both the Tindemans Report on the European Union and the 
                                                          
40
 Oates op. cit. at note 37 at p. 1121. 
41
 Bernard op. cit. at note 2 at p. 635. 
42
 Emiliou op. cit. at note 4 at p. 391 and Estella op. cit. at note 8 at p. 85. 
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MacDougall Report on fiscal federalism.
43
 In the latter, the principle was in fact 
invoked to support increased intervention by the then Community institutions.  
The European Parliament‟s proposed Draft Treaty establishing the European Union 
contains the first clear reference to subsidiarity as a general principle.
44
 In its 
preamble, the Draft Treaty refers to the intention to „entrust the common institutions, 
in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only with those powers required to 
complete successfully the tasks they may carry out more satisfactorily than the States 
acting independently.‟ Art 12 of the Draft Treaty set out the specifics of the 
subsidiarity test. Following the approach in the German Grundgesetz discussed 
above, this provision introduced a distinction between exclusive and concurrent 
competences.
45
 With respect to areas of concurrent competence, Art 12(2) sought to 
confer the primary right to legislate on the Member States. The Union institutions 
were to be empowered to act: 
„only… to carry out those tasks which may be undertaken more effectively in 
common than by the Member States acting separately, in particular those 
whose execution requires action by the Union because their dimension or 
effects extend beyond national frontiers.‟  
Although the Draft Treaty never entered into force, it is generally considered to have 
influenced the subsequent Treaty reform process prior to the express adoption of the 
subsidiarity principle at Maastricht. Art 130r EEC,
46
 which formalised the 
Community‟s competence in environmental policy, provides the clearest example in 
this respect.
47
 According to this provision, which was introduced by the Single 
European Act, „the Community shall take action relating to the environment to the 
extent to which the objectives referred to in paragraph 1 can be attained better at 
                                                          
43
 Report by Mr Leo Tindemans to the European Council, Bulletin of the European Communities, 
Supplement 1/76; Report of the Study Group on the Role of Public Finance in European Integration 
(1977) OOPEC, Luxembourg (the MacDougall Report). 
44
 Draft Treaty establishing the European Union, Bulletin of the European Communities, 2/84 at pp 8-
26. 
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 Calliess op. cit. at note 2 at p. 36 and Emiliou op. cit. at note 4 at p. 392. 
46
 Post-Lisbon, environmental protection is listed as a „shared competence‟ (Art 4(2)(e) TFEU) and, as 
such, is now subject to the subsidiarity principle in Art 5(3) TEU. See also earlier, eg Case C-114/01 
AvestaPolarit Chrome Oy [2003] ECR I-8725 at para. 56. 
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 Supporting this analysis, see eg Emiliou op. cit. at note 4 at pp 393-394, F. Röhling, Europäische 
Fusionskontrolle und Subsidiaritätsprinzip, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2002) at p. 65. See also the 
Padoa-Schioppa Report of the Commission (Luxembourg, 1987), available at 
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Community level than at the level of the individual Member States.‟ As the reference 
to the „respective spheres of competence‟ in the following paragraph confirms, 
competence in the substantive field of environmental policy was therefore shared by 
the Community and the Member States, with intervention by the former conditional 
on its capacity to respond to specific problems „better‟ than the individual states.  
3.2 The Maastricht Treaty 
The Treaty on European Union formalised the subsidiarity principle as a 
constitutional principle of European integration. This Treaty introduced subsidiarity 
as a general principle of EU law in both the amended EC Treaty and the newly 
created Treaty on European Union. The classic reference to subsidiarity was 
contained within the first of these Treaties. Art 3b(2) of the amended EC Treaty 
provided that: 
„In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the 
Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can, 
therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be 
better achieved by the Community.‟  
Alongside the above provision, both the preamble to and Art 1 of the TEU also 
contained an express reference to the subsidiarity principle. These provisions 
established that, in the evolving process of European integration, decisions are to be 
taken „as closely as possible to the citizen.‟ 
The formalisation of subsidiarity at Maastricht was prompted by concerns over 
increasing centralisation in the integration process.
48
 In particular, the introduction of 
majority voting de jure and de facto in core substantive policy areas through the 
Single European Act disturbed the historical balance of European Integration.
49
 The 
shift in favour of increased qualified majority voting in the Council took a 
considerable degree of control over the pace and depth of integration out of the hands 
of individual Member States, who, acting alone, were no longer able to block 
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 Ritzer and Ruttloff op. cit. at note 32 at p. 116.  
49
 Estella op. cit. at note 8 at p. 179. For Estella, subsidiarity was specifically introduced as a „counter-
majoritarian instrument.‟ 
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specific legislative proposals in key areas.
50
 As Bermann notes, this development 
„generated press for a principle like subsidiarity.‟
51
 In particular, the Governments of 
the United Kingdom and Germany were most troubled by the prospect of further 
centralisation, albeit for differing reasons.
52
 Whereas the UK Government was more 
hostile to federal ambitions for the Community and anxious to restrict integration to 
market integration, the German Government sought to protect the legislative 
competence of its individual Länder.
53
 The principle of subsidiarity was therefore 
embraced as a means of addressing – or even appeasing
54
 – these concerns directly in 
order to ensure the continuing development of the European integration project.
55
  
In terms of substance, the subsidiarity principle as introduced through the Maastricht 
Treaty draws on both the economic and political expressions of the principle to guide 
its operation. First, in line with the wording of the defunct Draft Treaty discussed 
above, the references to „sufficiency,‟ „scale and effects‟ and „better achieved‟ in Art 
5(2) EC alluded to the economic dimension of subsidiarity outlined earlier.
56
  As 
noted in section 2.3.3 above, in economic theory, subsidiarity provides, inter alia, a 
normative basis for intervention by the centralised regulator in order to address the 
spill-over effects of particular policies enacted at lower levels.  Further support for an 
economic reading of Art 5(2) EC could be found in the first Subsidiarity Protocol, 
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available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199293/cmhansrd/1992-05-20/Debate-
3.html (last accessed 14.09.11). 
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state model that continues to frame theories of fiscal federalism discussed in section 2.3.3 above. The 
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Accordingly, discussion of subsidiarity as an economic principle in Union law is restricted to its use in 
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For further discussion of this point, see J. Pelkmans, „Testing for Subsidiarity‟ (2006) BEEP Briefing 
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accessed 14.09.11). 
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annexed to the subsequent Treaty of Amsterdam.
57
 In Art 5, this Protocol set out 
supplementary guidance to assist in the determination of whether or not intervention 
by the then Community met the demands of the subsidiarity principle. In particular, 
this provision referred to the requirement to examine whether or not „the issue under 
consideration [had] transnational aspects which cannot be satisfactorily regulated by 
action by Member States.‟
58
 
The economic characteristics of subsidiarity set out in Art 5(2) EC may be 
distinguished from the principle‟s expression in the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU). In both the preamble to and Art 1 of the TEU, subsidiarity‟s normative claim 
was more political than economic. The requirement that decisions are taken as 
closely as possible to the citizens they affect appeals directly the political values of 
localised decision-making.  As noted in section 2.3.2 above, this is associated with 
enhanced transparency and democratic legitimacy, both of which remain important 
concerns in European integration  today.  Indeed, as will be discussed further below, 
recent efforts to bolster the effectiveness of subsidiarity as a legal principle in EU 
integration have returned to consider this particular dimension of subsidiarity more 
directly. 
3.3 Subsequent development within EU law 
Subsidiarity has been rightly described as „the word that saved Maastricht.‟
59
 
However, subsidiarity cannot simply be dismissed as a „Maastricht moment.‟ The 
commitment of the Member States to the principle has been strengthened 
progressively through subsequent Treaty amendments and remains firm. In terms of 
substance, the principle is largely unchanged since Maastricht. Following the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty, Art 5(2) EC (ex Art 3b(2) EC) now finds expression 
in Art 5(3) of the Treaty on European Union with no substantive amendment.
60
 
Similarly, the preamble to and Art 1 of the revised TEU continue to refer to the 
objective of ensuring that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizens 
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 Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality [1997] OJ C 
340/105. 
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 Ibid., Art 5.  
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 D. Z. Cass, „The Word that Saves Maastricht? The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Division of 
Powers within the European Community‟ (1992) 29(1) CMLRev 1107. 
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that they affect. As noted above, the addition of the first Subsidiarity Protocol, 
annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty, provided a welcome source of clarification. 
However, it did not alter the substance of the principle. 
What has changed in more recent years is not the commitment to subsidiarity itself.
61
 
Instead, the focus has been on developing more effective mechanisms to ensure that 
the principle is properly enforced. The most significant change in this respect entered 
into force in December 2009 with the Lisbon Treaty.
62
 This Treaty introduced a new 
system of ex-ante control. In accordance with the procedure set out in the revised 
Subsidiarity Protocol and the new Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments,
63
 
Member State parliaments are now engaged as the „watchdogs‟ of subsidiarity.
64
 The 
detail of these recent amendments is discussed in section 4.4 below. In the next 
section, we turn first to examine the reception and evolution of subsidiarity as a legal 
principle in both the case law and literature. 
4. Subsidiarity in the legal literature and case law 
Notwithstanding its central position within the Treaty framework, legal 
commentators have never really rated subsidiarity as a legal principle. From its 
introduction into the Treaty framework at Maastricht onwards, the principle has been 
repeatedly criticised as an ineffective legal tool. Piecing together some of the classic 





 or a „formula for failure‟
67
 that is incapable of 
„solv[ing] a single substantive problem‟
68
 within the Union.
69
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 Pescatore op. cit. at note 5 at p. 1073 (this author‟s translation). 
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Broadly speaking, criticism of subsidiarity as a legal principle of European 
integration can be divided under two headings.
70
 First, the principle has been 
attacked on technical grounds. It is argued that subsidiarity lacks substance as an 
enforceable legal rule and, for that reason, is simply ineffective. In the words of 
Estella, „functionally speaking, the principle seems devoid of any clear legal content, 
which makes its implementation, especially its legal implementation, problematic.‟
71
 
Secondly, subsidiarity has also been criticised on normative grounds. In this 
connection, it has been argued that the principle is destructive to the integration 
project itself.
72
 Toth, for example, denounced the introduction of the principle into 
the Treaty framework at Maastricht as a „retrograde step‟: „Without providing any 
cure for the any of the Community‟s ills, it threatens to destroy hard-won 




To test the strength of this persisting negative opinion, this section examines how 
subsidiarity has been interpreted in both the commentary and case law. The analysis 
will focus primarily on addressing the first line of the subsidiarity critique: the 
technical critique of subsidiarity as an enforceable legal rule. The literature and 
jurisprudence will be examined concurrently in order to trace the evolution of 
subsidiarity as a legal norm in EU integration. In summary, it is argued, contrary to 
the prevailing view in the legal literature, that the Court has in fact transformed 
subsidiarity into an enforceable legal principle restraining the Union legislature in its 
exercise of shared regulatory competences. The inherent limits of the Court‟s review 
have, however, prompted the introduction of the new system of ex ante compliance 
monitoring provided for in the Lisbon Treaty. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
69
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4.1 The initial view from the commentary  
Following the principle‟s introduction at Maastricht, commentators focused closely 
on assessing the implications of Art 5(2) EC (now Art 5(3) TEU) as an enforceable 
legal principle.
74
 In particular, their efforts centred on discussing the principle‟s 
effect as a legal restraint on the actions of the Union legislature. As will be argued in 
Chapter 2, this rather narrow, institution-specific view of subsidiarity as a principle 
of EU integration does not necessarily follow from the wording of either the Treaties 
or the Subsidiarity Protocols. Indeed, there is no reason not to consider the 
principle‟s effect in other contexts. However, notwithstanding this point, the fact 
remains that analysis of subsidiarity in the literature focused initially on discussing 
the principle‟s effect as a brake on the Union legislature.  
In the early literature on subsidiarity, there was significant disagreement among 
commentators over both the substance and legal effect of Art 5(2) EC. Turning first 
to substance, the key dispute concerned the interpretation of „non-exclusive‟ 
competences.
75
 This was a fundamental issue as the reference to non-exclusive 
competences in Art 5(3) TEU ultimately determined whether or not the principle of 
subsidiarity actually applies. Of course, following the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, this issue is now of only historical interest. Articles 3-6 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) now categorise Union competences 
(using broad policy headings) as exclusive, shared, coordinating and supporting. For 
present purposes, Art 4 TFEU is the key provision. This article sets out the areas of 
competence that are held concurrently by the Union and the Member States. These 
include, in particular, competence for the regulation of the internal market; 
economic, social and territorial cohesion; environmental policy; consumer protection 
and energy policy. 
With respect to the operative criteria in Art 5(2) EC, there was (and remains) 
noticeably less dispute in the commentary. The exercise of shared competence by the 
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Community was viewed as being subject to a two-step analysis.
76
 The first criterion, 
the requirement that the objective of the proposed action „cannot be sufficiently 
achieved‟ by the Member States,‟ is framed as a negative test. It refers not to the 
inadequacy of any actual or potential action by the Member States, but to their 
inability to realise the proposed objective unilaterally.
77
 The concept of inability is 
defined by reference to the need for Union intervention to address issues exhibiting 
an overt transnational dimension.
78
 This view is also supported by the wording of the 
second limb of Art 5(2) EC, which refers to the „scale and effects‟ of the relevant 
issue. With respect to the second additional test, the requirement that the objective 
can be „better achieved‟ by the Union, this is viewed as causally linked through the 
reference to „and therefore.‟ Whilst this is correct, satisfying the second limb of Art 
5(2) EC is not considered to be automatic.
79
 In line with the original Subsidiarity 
Protocol, this positive criterion is viewed as having an independent function. It 
needed to be shown that Community action „adds value.‟  
Turning now from questions of substance to enforcement, the key question in early 
subsidiarity debates was whether or not Art 5(2) EC was justiciable. Prior to the 
Court‟s first decision on this point (discussed in the next section), commentators 
offered differing approaches.
80
 At the extreme end of the spectrum, it was argued that 
Art 5(2) EC was a fully justiciable rule, enabling the (then) Community courts to 
determine absolutely the respective spheres of competence of the Community and the 
Member States.
81
 Reaching the opposite conclusion, other commentators argued that 
Art 5(2) EC was too imprecise to unfold anything other than political effect.
82
 
Indeed, according to Mackenzie-Stuart, the subsidiarity principle in that provision 
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was „gobbledygook.‟
83
 It required judges „to answer questions which are, by their 
nature, essentially political,‟ which, he maintained, was „fundamentally wrong‟ in 
principle.
84
 For the overwhelming majority of commentators, however, the question 
was not whether Art 5(2) EC was amenable to judicial review but rather the extent of 
that review.
85
 Even amongst its most vocal critics, the provision was recognised as a 
legal principle in the Treaty, the observance of which the Community courts were 
bound to ensure according to Art 220 EC (now Art 19 TEU).
86
 Art 5(2) EC was „a 
mandatory restriction on the exercise of Community competence,‟ and any act of the 




With respect to the intensity of the Court‟s review, the initial consensus in the 
literature was that Art 5(2) EC was amenable only to very limited review.
88
 The 
review of assessments of whether the objectives of a legislative measure may be 
„sufficiently achieved‟ by the Member States was considered a „judicial no man‟s 
land.‟
89
 Any attempt at substantive review would inevitably lead the Court to 
substitute its own assessment for that of the Union legislature. Accordingly, 
commentators maintained that control by the Community courts should be largely 
restricted to monitoring compliance with procedural formalities. This included, in 
particular, ensuring that the Community legislature‟s decision to act was adequately 
reasoned on subsidiarity grounds.
90
 In substantive terms, it was generally accepted 
that the Court‟s review of Art 5(2) EC was much more limited. As Toth noted, „all 
the Court may be expected to do… is to examine whether in arriving at its decision 
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the Council has not committed a manifest error or a misuse of powers or has not 
patently exceeded the bounds of its discretion.‟
91
  
Perspectives on the justiciability of subsidiarity have remained relatively unchanged. 
In summary, the broad consensus in the legal literature remains that Art 5(2) EC 
(now Art 5(3) TEU) is, in principle, subject to judicial review by the Court of Justice 
and to the degree outlined by Toth above.
92
 This position largely reflects the 
accepted reading of the Court‟s case law on subsidiarity, to which we now turn to 
consider.  
4.2. The case law of the Court of Justice 
Following the formal integration of subsidiarity into the Community legal order, it 
was only a matter of time before the principle reached the Community courts. 
References to subsidiarity soon began to emerge in submissions and, in particular, in 
the opinions of the Advocates General.
93
 Indeed, post-Maastricht, aligning arguments 
with subsidiarity arguably became rather fashionable. In van Schijndel, for example, 
Advocate General Jacobs interpreted the Court‟s historic efforts to balance effective 
judicial protection with respect for national procedural autonomy as a „precise 
reflection‟ of the subsidiarity principle.
94
  
Leaving brief allusions to the principle aside, judicial engagement with subsidiarity 
has centred almost exclusively on the ECJ‟s review of the respect for Art 5(2) EC by 
the Union legislature.
95
 In a series of cases, the ECJ was requested to address 
challenges to the validity of Community legislation on subsidiarity grounds. Notably, 
though rather unsurprisingly, the leading voices behind the introduction of the 
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subsidiarity principle – the United Kingdom and Germany – instigated a number of 
these proceedings.
96
 Responding to these complaints and others, the ECJ was forced 
to confront the issues raised in the early subsidiarity commentary discussed above, 
most notably the justicability of Art 5(2) EC. 
4.2.1 Case C-84/94 United Kingdom v. Council (Working Time) 
The first case requiring the ECJ to engage comprehensively with the subsidiarity 
principle was United Kingdom v. Council (Working Time).
97
 In this decision, the 
applicant challenged the validity of Council Directive 93/104, laying down minimum 
health and safety requirements for the organisation of working time.
98
 In support of 
its argument, the United Kingdom Government invoked the subsidiarity principle in 
Art 5(2) EC. It took the view that: 
„the Community legislature [had] neither fully considered nor adequately 
demonstrated whether there were transnational aspects which could not be 
satisfactorily regulated by national measures, whether such measures would 
conflict with the requirements of the EC Treaty or significantly damage the 
interests of Member States or, finally, whether action at Community level 
would provide clear benefits compared with action at national level.‟
99
 
However, for reasons that are difficult to fathom, the applicant stated expressly that it 
was not seeking to raise an infringement of Art 5(2) EC as a separate plea.
100
   
In a gesture of goodwill to the applicant, the Court did, in effect, isolate and address 
the Directive‟s conformity with Art 5(2) EC as a distinct plea.
101
 However, the 
Court‟s review did very little to attribute substance to subsidiarity as a legal 
principle. Essentially, the ECJ only considered the negative criterion in Art 5(2) EC. 
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The question of whether any (necessary) action by the Community also brought with 
it „clear benefits‟ was not examined at all.
102
 In summary, the Court concluded that 
Art 138 EC (the relevant legal basis) empowered the Council to adopt measures 
contributing to the improvement of the health and safety of workers achieving that 
objective.
103
 The decision to make recourse to this legal base in the Treaty was, 
however, left entirely to the Council, to be resolved solely through political 
negotiation:  
„[o]nce the Council has found that it is necessary to improve the existing 
level of protection as regards the health and safety of workers and to 
harmonize the conditions in this area while maintaining the improvements 
made, achievement of that objective through the imposition of minimum 
requirements necessarily presupposes Community-wide action.‟
 104
 
The Court‟s approach in Working Time provides little evidence to support 
subsidiarity‟s operation as a legal restraint on the Union legislature. The judgment 
made it clear that the Court was prepared only to engage in the review of other 
matters. This included, first and foremost, whether or not the contested Directive had 
been enacted using the correct legal basis.
105
 In effect, this amounted to little more 
than an examination of whether the Directive had as its principal objective the 
improvement of the health and safety of workers.
106
 Thereafter, the Court scrutinised 
(albeit rather lightly) the Directive‟s proportionality; in other words, it examined 
whether the means which that instrument employed were suitable for the purpose of 
achieving the desired objective and whether they did not go beyond what was 
necessary to achieve it.
107
 By contrast, the Court did not even engage in the most 
cursory assessment of the subsidiarity principle.
108
 In particular, no attempt 
whatsoever was made to distinguish between, on the one hand, the existence of the 
Council‟s competence to act (pursuant to Art 138 EC) and, on the other hand, its 
right to exercise that same competence.  
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The above distinction between the existence and exercise of regulatory competence 
is not pulled out of thin air, but rather follows expressly from the wording of Art 5 
EC (now Art 5 TEU). The existence of competence to act is a matter for the principle 
of conferral in Art 5(1) EC (now Art 5(2) TEU). This provision established that, „the 
Community shall within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty.‟ In 
line with the structure of Art 5 EC (Art 5 TEU), the identification of a legal basis in 
the Treaty necessarily precedes the assessment, in so far as shared competences are 
concerned, of whether or not the Community (now Union) legislature actually enjoys 
the right to exercise that competence. This second limb is governed by the 
subsidiarity test in Art 5(2) EC. Where the subsidiarity test is met, attention then 
turns to the final limb of the Treaty‟s competence control mechanism in Art 5 EC 
(Art 5 TEU): the proportionality test. This criterion seeks to control the nature and 
intensity of Community (Union) intervention, a point that is now made very clear by 
the revised wording of Art 5(4) TEU (ex Art 5(3) EC). According to this provision, 
„Under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union action shall 
not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties.‟
109
  
In subsequent cases, the Court adhered closely to its approach in Working Time. For 
example, on several occasions the ECJ was requested to scrutinise the legal basis of 
particular Community measures.
110
 As in Working Time (and before), the ECJ‟s 
review on this point focused exclusively on whether or not the contested Community 
instrument served the substantive objective that its chosen legal basis was designed 
to advance. In other cases, the Court was also asked to adjudicate on the 
proportionality of Community measures or alleged misuse of powers by the 
Community legislature.
111
 Here again the Court followed the same fairly light-touch 
approach that it used in Working Time, making it clear that it would only step in to 
control manifest errors.
112
 Crucially, subsidiarity did not really feature in any of this 
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case law. Following Working Time, the principle was raised again only in Germany 
v. Parliament and Council (Deposit Guarantee Schemes).
113
 However, in this case, 
the applicant did not rely on subsidiarity as a tool to attack the Community 
legislature‟s assessment of the substantive criteria in Art 5(2) EC. By contrast, the 
German Government sought to argue (unsuccessfully) that the contested Directive 
was invalid by reason of its failure to refer expressly to the subsidiarity principle.
114
  
4.2.2 Case C-376/98 Germany v. Parliament and Council (Tobacco 
Advertising) 
The ruling in Tobacco Advertising marked an important change in approach to the 
application of subsidiarity as a justiciable restraint on the Union legislature.
115
 In this 
case, the Court can be seen, for the first time, to tease out a fundamental distinction 
between the existence of legislative competences and the conditions under which 
such competences may be exercised. Unfortunately, this important point is not 
immediately apparent from the wording of the decision. However, this fact perhaps 
goes some way to explaining why the Court‟s change of approach to the review of 
Union legislation on subsidiarity grounds is largely overlooked in the legal 
commentary.
116
 Legal writers tend to focus instead on examining the function of the 
principles of conferral
117
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In Tobacco Advertising, the German Government sought the review of Directive 
98/43, approximating national laws on the advertisement of tobacco products.
119
 In 
support of its argument, the German Government maintained, amongst other things, 
that the Directive infringed the subsidiarity principle in Art 5(2) EC. However, the 
applicant did not locate and develop the relevant supporting arguments on this point 
under the heading of subsidiarity. Instead, the German Government opted to place its 
key subsidiarity objections at the centre of its (first) allegation that the Directive had 
been enacted on the incorrect legal basis.  
In summary, the German Government argued that the Community legislature did not 
enjoy competence to enact a broad ban on tobacco advertising within the internal 
market. It its view, the advertising of tobacco products was „essentially an activity 
whose effects do not extend beyond the borders of individual Member States.‟
120
 In 
particular, the applicant objected to the Directive‟s prohibition on „static advertising 
media‟ such as posters and cinema advertising.
121
 It argued that cross-border trade in 
such products was „practically non-existent.‟
122
 Finally, the German Government 
also maintained that the Directive did not contribute to the elimination of distortions 
of competition in the tobacco sector within the Union.
123
 
In its review of the legal basis of the Directive, the Court in Tobacco Advertising can 
be seen to differentiate clearly between the existence and exercise of competence 
under Art 95 EC (now Art 114 TFEU). The Court first affirmed the existence of the 
Community legislature‟s competence to act in terms of Art 5(1) EC (now Art 5(2) 
TEU). It noted that Art 95 EC empowered the Council
124
 to adopt measures for the 
approximation of national laws that have as their object the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market.
125
 The remainder of the Court‟s legal basis 
analysis is, however, more directly concerned with the conditions under which the 
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Union legislature may exercise that competence. In areas of shared competence, such 
as the regulation of the internal market, the right to exercise competence is, of 
course, the proper domain of the subsidiarity principle.  
Although not referring at all to subsidiarity directly at this junction in its analysis, it 
is submitted that the Court nonetheless unquestionably integrated the principle‟s 
logic into its reasoning.
126
 Specifically, the Court stated that the existence of 
Community competence under Art 95 EC was not to be construed as granting the 
Community legislature a „general power to regulate the internal market.‟
127
 In line 
with the logic of the subsidiarity principle, the use of Art 95 EC was instead 
conditional on the existence of national measures forming barriers to intra-EU 
movement and/or appreciable distortions of competition within the internal 
market.
128
 This position follows precisely the first limb of the subsidiarity test in Art 
5(2) EC, as supplemented by the original Subsidiarity Protocol.
129
 As discussed 
earlier, these instruments sought to restrict Community intervention to the resolution 
of regulatory problems with clear transnational aspects which cannot be satisfactorily 
regulated by action by the Member States.
130
 
From the above starting point, the Court then proceeded to examine the substance of 
the contested Directive. In effect, this resulted in a reduction in the scope of 
Community intervention in the regulation of tobacco advertising in line with the 
demands of subsidiarity principle. With respect to „static media,‟ the ECJ concluded 
that the prohibition on advertising could not be justified by a need to eliminate 
obstacles to the free movement of such products within the Union.
131
 Moreover, 
referring implicitly to the positive criterion in Art 5(2) EC, the Court also stated that 
the Directive did not „help to facilitate trade in the products concerned‟ – in other 
words, it did not „add value.‟
132
 Equally, the Court also found that the effects of 
disparate national laws gave rise to appreciable distortions of competition only in 
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4.2.3 Beyond Tobacco Advertising: retrograde steps?  
The decision in Tobacco Advertising marked an important stage in the evolution of 
subsidiarity as a legal restraint on the Community (now Union) legislature. As 
Kumm rightly notes, „without using the language of subsidiarity directly, the Court 
of Justice‟s focus [in that case] on “obstacles to trade” and “distortion of [intra-EU] 
competition”… operationalize[d] the commitment to subsidiarity in its interpretation 
of Art 95 EC.‟
134
 In so doing, the Court made it clear to the Community legislature 
that its power to use that provision to contribute to the establishment of a functioning 
internal market was not without limits and also subject to ex post judicial review. 
In its subsequent case law, the Court has cleared up some of the confusion 
surrounding its subsidiarity test. Specifically, the Court has usefully linked the 
subsidiarity analysis that it first formulated as part of the „legal basis‟ review to its 
analysis of Art 5(2) EC (Art 5(3) TEU) proper. This important step was first taken by 
the Court in British American Tobacco.
135
 In this case, the Court stated expressly 
that, according to the principle of subsidiarity in (now) Art 5(3) TEU, the Union 
legislature: 
„does not [enjoy]… exclusive competence to regulate economic activity on 
the internal market, but only a certain competence for the purpose of 
improving the conditions for its establishment and functioning by eliminating 




The Court‟s reasoning here reflects exactly the approach to subsidiarity developed in 
Tobacco Advertising under a different heading. 
The decision in Tobacco Advertising remains to date the only case in which the 
Court has struck down an act of the Union legislature (implicitly) for non-
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compliance with the subsidiarity principle. At first sight, the ECJ appears to have 
reverted to a much lighter review in subsequent decisions. Several commentators 
have also made this same point, although without direct reference to subsidiarity.
137
 
For Dougan, „it is not that the Tobacco Advertising Directive judgment has been 
formally overruled in law; it seems rather that its spirit has been steadily undermined 
by a series of small yet significant steps.‟
138
 Similarly, Weatherill has argued that the 
Court‟s case law on Art 114 TFEU has since evolved into little more than a neat 
„drafting guide,‟ which actually operates to increase the scope for legislative 
intervention under that provision.
139
 
There is certainly evidence to support the view that, post-Tobacco Advertising, the 
Court has loosened its control of the Community legislature‟s use of Art 95 EC (Art 
114 TFEU). First, in several cases, the Court appears to have expanded the scope for 
legislative intervention under that provision. For example, in Germany v. Parliament 
and Council (Tobacco Advertising II), the Court stated that the validity of Union 
legislation was not conditional on the proof of „an actual link with free movement 
between the Member States in every situation covered by the measure.‟
140
 Similarly, 
in Ireland v. Parliament and Commission (Data Retention), the Court also hinted at a 
lowering of the threshold for intervention in order to eliminate distortions of 
competition within the internal market by dropping the reference to 
„appreciability.‟
141
 In a second strand of case law, the Court has upheld the validity 
of Union legislation enacted under Art 95 EC that, on one view, goes against the very 
purpose of that provision. For example, in Swedish Match, the ECJ upheld as valid 
the Community‟s recourse to Art 95 EC in order to introduce a total ban on a 
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particular product within the internal market.
142
 If anything, this measure prevented 
intra-EU movement, rather than securing it.  
Does this apparent weakening of the Court‟s review signal a break with the approach 
to subsidiarity first formulated in Tobacco Advertising? Perhaps, though not 
necessarily. First, in the above cases compliance with the demands of subsidiarity 
was not really at issue. Indeed, in the individual cases, it is possible to argue that the 
Community legislature enjoyed, in principle, the right to exercise its competence 
under Art 95 EC. In each of the above decisions, the Community legislature provided 
evidence of the existence or likely emergence of obstacles to intra-EU movement 
and/or appreciable distortions of competition giving rise to the competence to 
intervene at Community level. The concerns motivating the applicants lay elsewhere. 
For example, in Ireland v. Parliament and Commission, the applicant was seeking to 
contest the choice of Art 95 EC over an alternative legal basis in the Treaty.
143
 
Similarly, in Swedish Match, the dispute centred on the legislature‟s preferred 
response – the decision to enact a total ban.
144
 This issue arises once it has been 
established, in accordance with the demands of subsidiarity, that the Community 
legislature enjoys competence to act in the first place. 
Secondly, when critiquing the Court‟s post-Tobacco Advertising subsidiarity case 
law, we must always remain aware of the nature of Court‟s ex post review. 
Importantly, the Court does not conduct its own de novo subsidiarity assessment. 
Instead, it restricts itself to examining whether or not the evidence relied upon by the 
Union legislature to support its decision to intervene in the regulation of the internal 
market „adds up.‟
145
 This follows its approach to the review of complex economic 
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and political assessments more generally.
146
 As such, only where the applicant 
demonstrates that this is clearly not the case can the ECJ be expected to step in and 
strike down Union legislation. In Tobacco Advertising, the German Government 
presented clear, targeted and reasoned objections to the Union legislature‟s exercise 
of competence to regulate tobacco advertising within the Union.
147
 By contrast, in 
subsequent cases, the parties seeking to strike down Union legislation on the same 
basis have failed (or simply not sought) to adduce sufficient evidence to overturn the 
Union legislature‟s decision to exercise its competence in an area of shared 
responsibility. 
Finally, even if is accepted that Tobacco Advertising marks the high-water mark of 
the Court‟s Art 114 TFEU subsidiarity review, this does not actually weaken the 
present argument. The finding that the Court has since diluted its scrutiny of Union 
legislation on subsidiarity grounds is a distinct issue for separate critique. What is 
important for the purposes of this thesis is the fact that, following Tobacco 
Advertising, the Court can be seen to have integrated the demands of Art 5(3) TEU 
into its scrutiny of the Union legislature‟s decision to exercise its competence under 
Art 114 TFEU. Moreover, for present purposes, it is also particularly important to 
note how subsidiarity has been operationalized as a legal principle. In summary, the 
Court has made it clear that Art 5(3) TEU restricts the exercise of competence by the 
Union legislature in areas of shared responsibility to the elimination (1) obstacles to 
intra-EU movement and (2) appreciable distortions of competition within the internal 
market.    
4.3 Renewed Critique  
In the previous section, it has been argued that, following the decision in Tobacco 
Advertising, the Court has transformed Art 5(2) EC (Art 5(3) TEU) into a substantive 
legal test restraining the Union legislature in the exercise of competences that are 
shared with the Member States. This test developed initially under the heading of 
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„legal basis‟ review. However, it has since been linked to the review of subsidiarity 
as a separate plea (in British American Tobacco). Focused on the need to 
demonstrate negative externalities, the ECJ has clearly modelled its approach to 
subsidiarity as a legal principle on the economic dimension of subsidiarity. However, 
owing to the nature of the complex political and economic assessments the ECJ is 
asked to review, it must be conceded that judicial supervision is limited. The ECJ 
will only examine whether the facts support the conclusions drawn by the Union 
legislature, paying particular attention to any reasoned objections submitted to the 
contrary. 
In spite of the fact that the Court has attributed substance to subsidiarity as a legal 
principle binding the Union legislature in the manner detailed above, recent analyses 
of the principle have remained largely critical.
148
 In particular, commentators 
continue to criticise the effectiveness of subsidiarity as a device capable of 
structuring the exercise of shared regulatory competences. At least one writer has 
also questioned the institutional role of the Court of Justice in the principle‟s 
enforcement as an ex post restraint on the Union legislature. However, as will be 
argued below, there are considerable weaknesses in both lines of argument.  
Davies has offered the strongest critique of subsidiarity‟s capacity to ensure an 
appropriate balance of power between the Union and the Member States in areas of 
shared competence. For Davies, subsidiarity remains „the wrong idea, in the wrong 
place, at the wrong time.‟
149
 He maintains that subsidiarity „misses the point‟:  
„its central flaw is that instead of providing a method to balance between 
Member State and [Union] interests…it assumes the [Union] goals, privileges 




Examining two hypothetical examples – the harmonisation of contract laws and 
higher education – Davies concludes that „subsidiarity does not provide a convincing 
reason why these measures should not be taken [by the Union].‟
151
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As a solution to the underlying problem, Davies points to the proportionality 
principle. In the determination of the scope of Union competences, it is argued that 
the Court should attribute a competency-related function to proportionality.
152
 He 
argues that the principle should be applied to examine whether or not the importance 
of the relevant Union measure is sufficient to justify its effects on particular national 
interests, such as the social and cultural significance of maintaining independent 
education and legal systems (his chosen illustrations).
153
 This application of 
proportionality is distinct from its current use by the Court as a tool to assess the 
relationship between the means used to achieve the objective at issue.
154
 The latter 
application of proportionality does not weigh up the advantages associated with 
Union intervention against the loss of Member State autonomy. Instead, it simply 




The central difficulty with the critique offered by Davies is that it rests on an 
incorrect reading of Art 5(3) TEU. Subsidiarity is not applied to the central issue it 
seeks to address: the decision of the Union legislature to act.
156
 It is this error that 
leads Davies to give up on subsidiarity too easily and to seek instead to develop 
proportionality into a tool to address what remain subsidiarity concerns (structuring 
the distribution of competence between the Union and the Member State in areas of 
shared regulatory responsibility).
157
 For Davies, Art 5(3) TEU is interpreted as 
meaning that:  
„the [Union] should only act where the objectives of the proposed action 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and by reason of the 
scale or effects of the proposed action the [Union] could achieve these better. 
Thus where the [Union] decides that a goal must be reached, it has to ask 
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itself how much of the work of reaching that goal really needs to be done at 
[Union] level, and how much could be left to the Member States.‟
158
 
However, this is not a correct understanding of the subsidiarity principle. Davies 
does not use subsidiarity to restrain the Union legislature‟s decision to act, but 
instead reads Art 5(3) TEU as little more than a principle of optimum 
decentralisation.  
In a separate line of argument, Estella has criticised the Court‟s implementation of 
the subsidiarity principle. Alongside others, Estella views the Court‟s interpretation 
of Art 5(3) TEU as „prudent,‟ with the ECJ prepared to exercise control only in 
respect of manifest error.
159
 However, Estella goes further in his critique of 
subsidiarity. With respect to the Court‟s approach to what he defines as „procedural‟ 
subsidiarity – compliance with the procedural demands imposed on the Union 
legislature – it is argued that the ECJ‟s approach has been conditioned by its own 
institutional „integrationist‟ agenda.
160
 Estella argues that, even in this rather more 
clear cut context, the Court has in fact afforded the Union legislature a questionable 
degree of leeway. According to Estella, the Court considers subsidiarity to be a 
„threat to integration,‟ which explains why it chooses not to implement the 
procedural dimension of the principle with any real vigour either.
161
 
It is certainly true that the ECJ has adopted a rather relaxed approach to the 
supervision of procedural requirements in certain cases. For example, and as noted 
above, in Germany v. Parliament and Council (Deposit Guarantee Schemes) the 
Court upheld the validity of the contested Directive notwithstanding the fact that the 
Community legislature had failed to refer expressly to its compliance with the 
subsidiarity principle.
162
 However, Estella‟s charge is rather difficult to defend when 
considered in the broader context. As the above analysis of the case law has 
demonstrated, the ECJ has in fact transformed subsidiarity into a legal principle, 
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note 47 at p. 77. 
161
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which operates to restrain the Union legislature in the exercise of its competences in 
areas of shared responsibility (typically: Art 114 TFEU). Estella‟s critique overlooks 
this development completely. He declares both Tobacco Advertising and Netherlands 
v. Parliament and Council – the most recent decisions at the time of his analysis – 
„irrelevant‟ on the basis that the Court did not address subsidiarity under that heading 
expressly.  
Admittedly, and in Estella‟s defence, the Court‟s transformation of subsidiarity into a 
legal principle restraining the Union legislature has followed a rather torturous path. 
However, some of the blame for this must rest with the Member States. As detailed 
above, it is the latter who have persistently failed to locate their subsidiarity-based 
arguments under that heading. Instead, they have tended to subsume their objections 
to the Union legislature‟s exercise of competence under the „legal basis‟ heading. 
However, this approach fails to recognise the important distinction between the 
principles of conferral and subsidiarity; between, on the one hand, the existence of 
competence to act in the Treaty and, on the other hand, the right to exercise that 
competence in specific cases.  
4.4 Bolstering subsidiarity’s effectiveness 
As the previous section has demonstrated, much of the continued criticism of the 
legal attributes of the subsidiarity principle does not withstand closer scrutiny. The 
most serious line of attack, presented by Davies, starts from a false premise. Put 
simply, Davies does not apply the subsidiarity test to contest the Union legislature‟s 
decision to exercise its competence to contribute to the regulation of shared areas of 
responsibility.  His criticism falls down for this reason.  
Notwithstanding such weaknesses, it would be wrong to deny that there are any 
difficulties associated with the Court‟s application of Art 5(3) TEU as an enforceable 
legal principle. As argued in section 3.2 above, the Court‟s use of this provision as an 
ex post check on the Union legislature‟s decision to exercise competence under Art 
114 TFEU is subject to serious limitations. In particular, it is clear that, for obvious 
reasons, the Court is extremely reluctant to engage in any de novo assessment of 
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whether or not the conditions for Union intervention in the regulation of the internal 
market are met in particular cases.  
There have been two distinct responses to the limits of the Court‟s ex post 
subsidiarity review. The first seeks to enhance the effectiveness of the Court‟s 
existing ex post review by reconfiguring the subsidiarity principle as a 
proportionality test.
163
 Schütze maintains that the Court should reinterpret 
subsidiarity in terms of a principle of „federal proportionality.‟
164
 This approach 
seeks to take subsidiarity analysis beyond the issue of determining whether or not the 
Union legislature has the right to exercise competence in areas of shared regulatory 
responsibility. In short, it involves asking the Court to examine, in addition, whether 
or not the EU legislature has „unnecessarily restricted national autonomy in the 
exercise of its legislative competences.‟
165
 As Schütze freely admits, this would 
demand much more of the Court. It would require it to engage much more closely in 
review of sensitive political choices.
166
 However, he argues that this should not be 
considered problematic by reason of the fact that Court of Justice is a constitutional 
court and, as such, must be prepared to take difficult decisions on occasions.
167
  
There is some support for Schütze‟s line of argument. First and foremost, it will be 
recalled that Art 5(3) TEU does in fact include a reference to the proportionality of 
Union intervention in areas of shared competence.
168
 Specifically, that provision 
states that the institutions of the Union shall act „only in so far as‟ the objectives of 
the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States acting 
alone. However, as will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, the 
proportionality limb of Art 5(3) TEU is distinct from the strict subsidiarity inquiry in 
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 For discussion see eg Swaine op. cit. at note 32 at p. 52. 
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that same provision. In brief, discussion of the nature or intensity of Union 
intervention arises after the determination of whether or not the Union enjoys the 
right to exercise regulatory competence in the first place.  
A second, and dominant, line of argument shifts the focus away from judicial review 
altogether. Instead, it supports the introduction of new mechanisms of ex ante 
political control.
169
 The argument here is that ensuring compliance with the demands 
of subsidiarity in the course of the Union legislative procedure is the most 
appropriate – and effective – means of attributing substance to the principle. As early 
as 1994, Bermann argued that subsidiarity should be „recast‟ as an essentially 
procedural principle, that is, „as a principle directing the legislative institutions of the 
Union to engage in a particular inquiry before concluding that action at Union rather 
than Member State level is warranted.‟
170
 Significantly, this second line of reasoning 
has been embraced as the latest solution to the problem of ensuring that the demands 
of the subsidiarity principle are adhered to by the Union legislature.
171
 As noted in 
section 3.3 above, the Lisbon Treaty recently introduced a new layer of pre-
legislative subsidiarity control. For the first time, national parliaments are to be 




In brief, according to Art 6 of the revised Subsidiarity Protocol, national parliaments 
are now granted an eight-week window within which to submit to the EU institutions 
a reasoned opinion stating why they consider the proposed measure incompatible 
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with the subsidiarity principle.
173
 The Union legislature is prevented from proceeding 
further with its proposal during the standstill period and, if objections are raised, is 
obliged to take these into consideration.
174
 Where at least one third of the national 
parliaments contest the measure‟s compliance with subsidiarity, the Union legislature 
is compelled to instigate a formal review of its proposal.
175
 Thereafter, it may resolve 
to maintain, amend or withdraw the proposal, subject to a requirement to state the 
reasons for its decision.
176
 
Taking a step back from the detail of the reforms anticipated in the Protocols, it is 
clear that current attempts to enhance the credibility of the subsidiarity commitment 
are based on dispersed supervision and on encouraging the resolution of disputes 
through political negotiation.
177
 The involvement of national parliaments in the pre-
legislative process is designed to function as a „safety valve,‟ relieving the Court of 
pressure to risk its integrity by engaging in comprehensive scrutiny of complex 
political and economic assessments. The resolution of such issues is instead shifted 
to the most appropriate forum: political negotiation. However, the colour of the 
national parliaments‟ card is only yellow and not red.
178
 There is, of course, no 
guarantee that conflicts will always be resolved through the legislative process.
179
 In 
the end, the Court of Justice remains ultimately responsible for the enforcement of 
subsidiarity in line with the approach discussed in section 4.2 above. 
In substantive terms, the involvement of national parliaments in policing subsidiarity 
is much more than just a means of ensuring that the Union legislature respects the 
economics of the principle. Granting national actors a voice on proposed 
interventions by the Union legislature also contributes to credibility by increasing the 
legitimacy of the decision-making process per se. The recent reforms seek, therefore, 
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also to bolster the political dimension of subsidiarity by contributing to the objective 
of ensuring that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizens they affect. 
Indeed, this objective has been elevated to the opening lines of the preamble to the 
revised Subsidiarity Protocol.
180
 The connection between the two facets of 
subsidiarity is important. Recalling the discussion in section 2, the desire to find the 
optimum level of decentralised decision-making is an inherent component of the 
principle of subsidiarity. 
5. Conclusion 
This opening chapter has examined the principle of subsidiarity and its evolution as a 
legal principle in EU integration. In contemporary constitutional, political and 
economic theory, subsidiarity features as a normative principle designed to structure, 
in particular, the exercise of shared regulatory competences. Each discipline 
approaches the principle with its own particular emphasis. However, the basic 
normative claim is the same. In each context, subsidiarity operates as a rebuttable 
negative presumption in favour of localised regulatory autonomy. In order to 
overturn this presumption, the centralised regulator must demonstrate clearly why 
there is a need for intervention at the higher level.  
The principle of subsidiarity was formalised as a constitutional principle of European 
integration through the Treaty of Maastricht. In terms of substance, it draws on both 
the economic and political characteristics of subsidiarity. In order to overturn the 
presumption in favour of Member State autonomy in areas of shared regulatory 
responsibility, Art 5(3) TEU requires the Union institutions to demonstrate clearly 
that there is a need for Union intervention in order to address regulatory problems 
with sufficient transnational effects. Furthermore, there is also a comparative 
efficiency test. The Union legislature must demonstrate that Union intervention is 
associated with clear benefits or added value as compared to continued unilateral 
action (or inaction) by individual Member States. Alongside Art 5(3) TEU, 
subsidiarity also finds expression in Art 1 TEU. This provision, referring to the need 
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to ensure that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizens they affect, 
captures the political expression of subsidiarity. 
This chapter has argued, contrary to prevailing opinion, that the Court of Justice has 
in fact transformed subsidiarity into a justiciable legal principle, which operates to 
restrain the Union legislature in the exercise of its shared regulatory competences. 
These competences include, first and foremost, Art 114 TFEU, which empowers the 
Union legislature to enact measures that have as their object the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market.  In this context, subsidiarity precludes the Union 
legislature from using that provision as a „general power to regulate the internal 
market.‟ Instead, subsidiarity operates to restrict the Union legislature‟s exercise of 
its competence in Art 114 TFEU to the regulation of two categories of measure: (1) 
obstacles to intra-EU movement and (2) appreciable distortions of intra-EU 
competition. 
Admittedly, the development of the Court‟s subsidiarity test was not entirely 
transparent. The Court‟s test emerged as part of its „legal basis‟ review. However, 
some of the blame for this must rest with the Member States, who have failed to 
grasp the key distinction between the principles of conferral and subsidiarity; 
between the existence of competence (outlined in the Treaties) and the right to 
exercise that competence in specific cases. In any case, the Court has since clarified 
the position somewhat by linking its implicit „legal basis‟ subsidiarity test to the 
analysis of Art 5(3) TEU proper (in British American Tobacco).   
In terms of its effectiveness, there are obvious limits to the Court‟s ex post review of 
the Union legislature‟s use of Art 114 TFEU on subsidiarity grounds. The Court is 
reluctant to conduct its own de novo assessment of the reasons motivating the Union 
legislature to exercise its regulatory competence for the regulation of the internal 
market. As a result, the burden is firmly on the party seeking the measure‟s 
annulment to demonstrate why the Union legislature‟s subsidiarity assessment does 
not add up. The inherent limits of the Court‟s powers of review were clearly behind 
the Lisbon Treaty reforms on the enforcement of subsidiarity as a restraint on the 
Union legislature. Interestingly, the new system of ex ante compliance monitoring 
builds on the political characteristics of the subsidiarity principle. The involvement 
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of national parliaments in the pre-legislative process does not just present the latter 
with a new opportunity to check whether or not the conditions for Union intervention 
are met. More importantly, it also attributes increased political legitimacy to any 
action taken by the Union legislature. This follows from the fact that the directly 
elected representatives of the individual Member States now enjoy a right, in 
principle, to express their concerns in the Union legislative process. 
The continued efforts to make subsidiarity work as a restraint on the Union 
legislature must be welcomed. The subsidiarity principle is not a miracle solution to 
the problems of transnational integration. It does, however, have an important role to 
play in ensuring that, where relevant, both the Union and the Member States play 
their appropriate roles. As Toth rightly notes, subsidiarity is a yardstick against 
which the „constitutionality‟ of certain acts of the Union must be measured.
181
 
Properly understood, it is difficult to see why the principle is subject to such intense 
normative criticism, particularly amongst legal writers. More often than not, 
subsidiarity provides a stronger normative basis to justify intervention at the Union 
level. In cases where the Union legislature can point, for example, to the existence of 
appreciable distortions of competition within the internal market, subsidiarity 
provides an explicit rationale for legislative intervention using Art 114 TFEU. As 
such, it is unlikely to paralyse continued market integration. Instead, the principle 
simply operates to protect the legitimate right of the Member States to contribute 
unilaterally, where appropriate, to the regulation of the internal market as an 
expressly defined area of shared responsibility (Art 4(2)(a) TFEU).  
In view of the above, it is perhaps rather surprising to note that, of those few 
commentators who continue to discuss the principle in detail, most have dismissed or 
abandoned subsidiarity as a legal principle in favour of alternative devices. Opinion 
in the legal literature tends to favour the development of alternative mechanisms or 
rules to enhance Member State autonomy. These include, in particular, the 
proportionality principle. This principle, which is discussed further in Chapter 2, 
operates at the second-stage of inquiry, namely, after the decision to exercise 
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competence has been taken.
182
 In this context, the principle contributes to the 
protection of Member State autonomy by ensuring that the form and intensity of 
Union intervention do not go beyond that which is necessary to achieve the objective 
in point. Proportionality is undoubtedly an important limit on the actions of the 
Union legislature. Moreover, and as we shall see in the next chapter, it has also been 
adopted as a general principle of EU law. However, irrespective of its value as a 
legal principle, proportionality complements and does not displace subsidiarity. For 
that reason, it is argued that one should not overlook the importance of examining the 
independent function of the latter as a legal principle of EU integration. 
Building on the preceding analysis, the next chapter breaks with the dominant line of 
subsidiarity inquiry. It argues that, although valuable, the continued efforts to take 
subsidiarity seriously as a restraint on the Union legislature have come at the expense 
of exploring the principle‟s wider implications. Chapter 2 seeks to correct this 
imbalance by examining whether or not subsidiarity also affects the interpretative 
authority of the Court of Justice – an important, but largely overlooked issue. 
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Chapter 2 
Subsidiarity as a legal principle: more than just a restraint on 
the Union legislature? 
 
1. Introduction 
Chapter 1 surveyed the current position of subsidiarity as a legal principle in EU law. 
The conclusion reached was that, at present, the principle functions as a legal 
restraint on the actions of the Union legislature in areas of shared competence. 
Furthermore, it was argued that, notwithstanding recent reforms, commentators 
continue to argue over the possibilities for, and merits of, bolstering subsidiarity‟s 
effect as a judicial restraint in this context.  
Discussing possible ways of enhancing the Court‟s review of the Union legislature‟s 
compliance with subsidiarity remains a valuable exercise. However, it is important 
not become trapped in analysis of this isolated application of the principle. After all, 
subsidiarity is a general principle of Union law, listed in the „common provisions‟ of 
the TEU. From that starting point, this chapter questions whether or not subsidiarity 
does – and, ultimately, should – play an increased and stronger role as a legal 
principle in the integration process. Specifically, this chapter asks: does subsidiarity 
also apply to the Court qua Union institution, i.e. as a legal limit on the exercise of 
its interpretative functions? If this is indeed the case, as this chapter will argue, then 
it is necessary to ensure that the Court‟s interpretative choices meet the demands of 
the subsidiarity principle (where it applies). Otherwise, there is a real risk that the 
Court could itself end up suppressing legitimate claims by the Member States to 
respond to localised regulatory problems at the national level. This would clearly 
undermine the recent efforts to bolster the effectiveness of subsidiarity introduced by 
the Lisbon Treaty. 
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part (sections 2 and 3) examines the 
current state of play. It offers a critical review of both the existing literature and case 
law addressing the issue of whether or not the subsidiarity principle binds – or should 
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bind – the Court of Justice as a Union institution. The analysis in sections 2 and 3 is 
largely descriptive. In short, it is argued that there is some support for the application 
of the subsidiarity principle as a restraint on the Court of Justice as an institutional 
actor. In the second part (section 4), discussion shifts from the descriptive to the 
normative. This section considers the arguments for, and also the implications of, 
applying subsidiarity to the Court as an institutional actor. In sum, the conclusion 
reached is that there are no obstacles to extending the scope of the principle‟s 
application in this manner.  For that reason, it is argued that this overlooked 
dimension of the subsidiarity principle should be examined more closely through the 
lens of a particular case study. 
2. The view from the literature 
In spite of the fact that most commentators frame subsidiarity as a general if not 
„constitutional‟ principle in Union law, there has been remarkably little attempt in the 
legal literature to consider the full implications of this statement.
1
 In 1998, de Búrca 
noted that, „[a]part from considering its use by the Court in reviewing the other 
institutions, the debate has only rarely touched upon the impact of subsidiarity on the 
Court‟s exercise of its own powers.‟
2
 This statement continues to hold true many 
years later. Subsidiarity is presented as a general constitutional principle of European 
integration. However, in the vast majority of cases, no reference whatsoever is made 




This lack of direct academic engagement with the implications of the subsidiarity 
principle for the Court of Justice is rather surprising for a number of reasons. First, as 
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36(2) JCMS 217 at p. 220 (emphasis in the original). 
3
 See eg N. Emiliou, „Subsidiarity: An Effective Barrier against “the Enterprise of Ambition”?‟ (1992) 
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N.W. Barber, „The Limited Modesty of Subsidiarity‟ (2005) 11(3) ELJ 308, G. Davies, „Subsidiarity: 
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„Subsidiarity after Lisbon: Reinforcing the Safeguards of Federalism‟ 68(3) CLJ (2009) 525. 
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noted in the introductory remarks, subsidiarity is framed in the Treaties as a general 
principle of Union law. In particular, the wording of Art 5(3) TEU clearly states that 
„the Union‟ and not just the „Union legislature‟ is subject to its demands. Nothing in 
the wording of the Treaties or, for that matter, the Subsidiarity Protocol would 
therefore appear to excuse the Court as an institution from compliance with the 
principle. Secondly, the absence of a wealth of literature on subsidiarity‟s 
implications for the Court of Justice is also surprising given that institution‟s 
historical role as a key driver in the integration process.
4
 It is an accepted starting 
point in the study of EU law that the Court has assumed, and continues to play, a 
leading role in this process. To take one classic example, it was the Court that 
developed the fundamental principles of direct effect and primacy to transform the 
Community from an international grouping of states into a new legal order.
5
 
Collectively, these two principles enabled the Court to advance market integration at 
a remarkable pace. However, what effect, if any, does the formalisation of 
subsidiarity as a general principle of EU law at Maastricht have on the Court‟s 
freedom to engage in such acts of judicial creativity? 
To date, Bermann, Schilling and de Búrca offer the key in-depth responses to this 
important question.
6
 In each case, discussion of subsidiarity‟s implications for the 
Court of Justice has focused on the Court‟s freedom to interpret primary (Treaty) 
law. In this connection, the debate has centred largely on the principle‟s effect on the 
Court‟s interpretation of the Treaty rules on intra-EU movement (and Art 34 TFEU 
on the free movement of goods in particular).
7
 As will be argued in detail further 
below, this is both a suitable and obvious arena in which to test subsidiarity‟s 
untapped potential as a restraint on the Court‟s interpretative freedom. In this specific 
substantive context, the Court is faced with interpretative choices that meet the 
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 For a classic account, see eg J. Weiler, „The Transformation of Europe‟ (1991) 100(8) Yale LJ 2403. 
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 Case 26/62 van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration [1963] ECR 1 and Case 
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6
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 For an exception, see Swaine op cit. at note 1 esp. at pp 77-128, who conducts an inquiry into 
subsidiarity‟s implications for the Court‟s case law on state liability.   
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criteria for the application of the subsidiarity principle (see further section 2 below).  
However, before discussing the detail of this further, it is necessary to consider the 
views in the literature noted above more closely. 
2.1 Bermann: Taking subsidiarity seriously 
Bermann was the first writer to reflect in any great detail on the implications of the 
subsidiarity principle as a restraint on the Court‟s freedom to interpret primary EU 
law. As noted in chapter 1, Bermann maintains that the principle‟s essential function 
in EU law is as a political principle guiding the legislative process. However, writing 
shortly after the principle‟s introduction at Maastricht, he also noted that, in order to 
ensure that subsidiarity was „taken seriously‟ as a principle of integration, it would 
also be necessary for the Court to show some engagement with its demands.
8
 This, 
he argued, followed from the fact that: 
„the demand for subsidiarity among Europeans [was] fuelled not only by the 
perception of legislative excess on the part of the Commission and Council, 
but also by the perception, at least amongst those aware of the Court of 
Justice‟s role in legal integration, of judicial excess on the Court‟s own part.‟
9
 
To test this thesis, Bermann briefly examines the Court‟s jurisprudence on the free 
movement of goods.
10
 As will be argued in subsequent chapters, the Court‟s 
interpretation of this provision has met with considerable criticism over the years. In 
particular, the Court‟s interpretation of the term „measure having equivalent effect to 
a quantitative restriction‟ (MEQR) in Art 34 TFEU (ex Art 28 EC) has been attacked 
for its extreme breadth.  As Bermann notes, the classic definition of this term would 
appear to catch virtually all Member State regulation, irrespective of the nature or 
magnitude of its effect on intra-EU trade.
11
 In Dassonville, the Court famously 
defined a MEQR as capturing „all trading rules enacted by Member States which are 
capable of hindering directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community 
trade.‟
12
 For Bermann, the breadth of the Dassonville formula posed an „obvious 
threat‟ to subsidiarity, by reason of the fact that it granted the Court the power to 
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review particular national regulations against the Treaty without any real 
consideration of the scale of their effects on intra-EU trade.
13
 Bermann then contrasts 
the ruling in Dassonville with the Court‟s subsequent decision in Keck.
14
  In this 
case, the Court famously qualified its approach to the review of national measures 
against Art 34 TFEU.
15
 Specifically, the Court curtailed its own powers of review by 
removing from the scope of the Dassonville formula a certain category of non-
discriminatory „selling arrangements.‟
16
 For Bermann, this ruling, which was 
delivered shortly after the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, sits comfortably 
with the logic of subsidiarity:  
„Whatever may have been the Court‟s purposes in retreating from well-
established Art [34 TFEU] case law, the Keck ruling demonstrates the Court‟s 
willingness to leave Member States the kind of regulatory scope that the 
principle of subsidiarity requires of the Community‟s political branches.‟
17
  
Bermann‟s argument is two-fold. First, he maintains that the Court should 
acknowledge the fact that its decisions can also suppress national/sub-national 
regulatory autonomy.
18
 This threat is not only posed by the actions of the Union 
legislature. Secondly, Bermann calls for the Court to show greater awareness of the 
subsidiarity principle in its free movement case law. He argued that: 
„the Court [should] pay more attention in particular cases as to whether the 
exercise of regulatory authority by a Member State or its subcommunities 
sufficiently impairs cross-border mobility to justify suppression of the 
relevant measure in the interest of the common market.‟
19
  
Unfortunately, Bermann does not go into the specifics of his test. The criterion of 
sufficiency certainly appeals to the economic characteristics of subsidiarity discussed 
in Chapter 1. It implies that the Court should only interfere with national regulatory 
choices in cases where the effects on intra-EU movement surpass a certain threshold. 
However, on one view, this does not yet translate into a workable legal rule that is 
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capable of being applied by the Court with minimal scope for discretionary judicial 
assessments.  
In subsequent analyses, the work of at least two commentators can be viewed as 
attempts to inject greater precision into Bermann‟s criterion of „sufficient effects.‟ 
First, in his brief review of the principle‟s implications for the Court‟s case law on 
intra-EU movement, Bernard reached a clear conclusion. He argued that subsidiarity 
necessarily inclined the Court‟s reading of the scope of the Treaty freedoms towards 
the elimination of two categories of national measure: (1) discriminatory national 
rules and (2) non-discriminatory measures that block intra-EU movement.
20
 In his 
more recent work, Rohe offered a slightly different approach. He also proposed, 
though again without detailed explanation, that subsidiarity should operate to limit 
the Court‟s reading of obstacles to intra-EU movement to the elimination of all 
national measures that discriminate on nationality grounds. However, for Rohe, the 
Court‟s review of non-discriminatory national measures should be subject to a de 
minimis threshold; in other words, he argues that the Court should only examine such 
measures in cases where they exhibit „appreciable‟ effects on intra-EU movement.
21
 
We shall return to consider the detail of these lines of argument in Chapter 6. The 
present analysis continues to review the leading academic literature that engages with 
subsidiarity‟s potential as a source of restraint on the interpretative functions of the 
Court of Justice. 
2.2 Schilling: Subsidiarity as a rule and a principle 
Along with Bermann, Schilling also argued in favour of applying the subsidiarity 
principle to the Court‟s interpretation of the Treaty freedoms.
22
 However, he offers 
an alternative solution to that proposed by Bermann. Schilling‟s subsidiarity analysis 
is based on Dworkin‟s distinction between legal rules and legal principles.
23
 
According to Dworkin, the two categories differ in the nature of the legal direction 
they give. Whereas legal rules apply in an all or nothing manner, legal principles 
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operate to incline decisions in a particular direction. Where the latter conflict with 
other relevant principles, they must be balanced, taking into account their relative 
weight. Transposing this distinction to Union law, Schilling interprets the 
subsidiarity principle in Art 5(3) TEU (ex Art 5(2) EC) as a legal rule.
24
 He argues 
that: 
„the subsidiarity principle as laid down in Art [5(3) TEU] must be considered, 
in spite of its name, as a rule…. The Community is only allowed to legislate, 
within its concurrent competences, when certain requirements are met. There 
is no weighing of intersecting principles. Either the requirements are met – 




The application of the subsidiarity principle in the above sense is not controversial 
and was discussed in the previous chapter. However, in order to take subsidiarity 
seriously, Schilling argues in favour of developing an additional role for subsidiarity 
as a legal principle.
26
 He maintains that „[s]ubsidiarity, taken seriously, must be 
given an additional role as a principle in its technical sense, with the aim, among 
other things, to defend the position of the subsidiarity rule [in Art 5(3) TEU].‟
27
 
Furthermore, he submits that, as a broader legal principle, subsidiarity does not only 
apply to the actions of the Union legislature. On the contrary, he argues that 
subsidiarity is a „pervading principle to be respected by all the institutions of the 
Community, including the Court of Justice.‟
28
 Moreover, the principle „also applies 
to the interpretation and application of Community law.‟
29
 To operationalise 
subsidiarity as a broader legal principle, Schilling then turns, in particular, to the 
preamble to the EU Treaty (now, TEU). He maintains that subsidiarity‟s basic 
message is clear: „the Union should only act when, and in so far as, a decision closer 
to the citizen, i.e. on a national level is not possible.‟
30
  
How then does Schilling see subsidiarity, expressed as a broader legal principle, 
affecting the Court‟s interpretation of primary EU law? In short, he argues that, as a 
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legal principle, subsidiarity operates to qualify the principle of primacy in EU law – 
in certain cases.
31
 According to Schilling, primacy has a very specific objective. In 
his view, primacy seeks to secure the uniformity of economic law throughout the 
Union.
32
 In line with his analysis of subsidiarity, Schilling maintains that primacy 
functions as both a rule and a broader legal principle. The question of whether or not 
primacy functions as a legal rule or as a broader principle is determined by the nature 
of the national law at issue. Primacy operates as a legal rule – and therefore applies 
in an absolute manner – in cases where the conflicting Member State law is not 
intended to regulate an economic matter falling within (as then) Art 3 EC.
33
 By 
contrast, it is argued that primacy functions as legal principle in cases dealing with 
national measures regulating non-economic policy areas.
34
 In the latter cases, where 
the contested measure is not intended to regulate trade, Schilling argues that the 
demands of the primacy principle – favouring Union intervention – must be 
„balanced‟ with the competing claim of the subsidiarity principle.
35
 This of course 
favours Member State autonomy in such areas.  
To illustrate his argument, Schilling points to several examples in the Court‟s free 
movement case law.
36
  To aid comparison with Bermann‟s approach, we shall focus 
on Schilling‟s analysis of Art 34 TFEU on goods, which he himself also views in 
isolation as a „special case.‟
37
 Applied to the case law on Art 34 TFEU, Schilling 
starts from the same point as Bermann. He argues that subsidiarity precludes a 
sweeping interpretation of the scope of that provision to capture almost all types of 
national regulation.
38
 Schilling then offers his distinction between legal rules and 
principles to resolve the tension in the case law over the scope of Art 34 TFEU.  He 
argues that, as a legal rule, Art 34 TFEU should be interpreted as prohibiting only 
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those national measures that are intended
39
 to restrict imports.
40
  This category of 
intentional restrictions would include all quantitative restrictions.  With respect to all 
other measures, Schilling maintains that Art 34 TFEU (as a specific expression of the 
primacy principle in favour of the uniformity of Union economic law)
41
 must be 
reduced to a principle.  In such cases, the Court is required to balance the Union 
interest in intra-EU movement with the demands of subsidiarity as a general 
principle. The latter principle, he argues, operates to protect the national legislature‟s 
right to choose between different non-economic policy objectives as it sees fit.
42
 
In the final analysis, Schilling argued that, at the time of writing, his rule/principle 
analysis could better explain the Court‟s case law on Art 34 TFEU.
43
 This included 
the decision in Keck.
44
 Schilling maintained that the national measure at issue in 
Keck – a rule prohibiting the resale of products at a loss – was not intended to 
regulate intra-EU trade.
45
 Instead, he argued that the rule was designed to promote 
„fair competition.‟
46
 For that reason, the French measure should be considered to be 
subject to his balancing test.
47
 The end result of this assessment is the same as the 
outcome reached by the Court. However, Schilling believes that his approach 
provides a superior framework within which to take the competing interests of intra-
EU movement and Member State autonomy fully into account. He argues that, whilst 
broadly approximate in result, the Court‟s preferred approach, based on the 
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distinction between rules regulating „product characteristics‟ and „selling 
arrangements‟ is normatively weaker.
48
   
There is much to commend Schilling‟s argument.  It represents a coherent attempt to 
explore the implications of subsidiarity for the Court of Justice as a Union institution. 
However, even at this early stage of analysis, it is possible to point to some problems 
with his approach. The main criticism relates to his preference for a distinction in the 
application of subsidiarity according to the substantive nature of the particular 
national rules at issue. Schilling seems overly concerned with whether or not 
Member States measures regulate – or better: seek to regulate – intra-EU trade or 
other „economic matters‟ falling within the Union‟s broad objectives. Essentially, he 
maintains that subsidiarity is only applicable as a restraint on the Court‟s own 
functions in cases where the contested national rule addresses a non-economic matter 
of national public policy. Only in such cases does subsidiarity function as a general 
principle which must then be balanced with the competing Union interest in intra-EU 
movement. In all other cases, subsidiarity is considered inapplicable. Primacy – as 
expressed in specific provisions including Art 34 TFEU – applies as the rule. 
It is difficult to accept Schilling‟s underlying approach for determining whether or 
not subsidiarity applies to affect the Court‟s interpretation of primary EU law.  It will 
be recalled from Chapter 1 that the application of the subsidiarity principle in EU law 
is not conditional on any such distinction between economic and non-economic 
measures. The principle instead applies in all cases in which regulatory competence 
is shared between the Union and the Member States. As Schilling indeed argues, this 
covers the regulation of the internal market as a shared regulatory space.
49
 Chapter 1 
discussed the implications of the subsidiarity principle for the Union legislature. It 
will be recalled that, in connection with the latter‟s use of its legislative competence 
to regulate the internal market (Art 114 TFEU), no distinction is made according to 
the nature of the national rules at issue. Subsidiarity is instead concerned only with 
the (transnational) effects of national measures. In short, it is unclear why the 
position should be any different in so far as the application of the subsidiarity 
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principle as a restraint on the Court of Justice is concerned.  In both cases, we are 
dealing with the same principle and the exercise of Union competence in the same 
area of (shared) regulatory competence.   
Full discussion of how the subsidiarity test could apply to guide the Court in its own 
efforts to contribute to the internal market aim is reserved for chapter 6. However, at 
this stage in the analysis, it should be clear that Schilling‟s method, though detailed, 
appears to sit uncomfortably with our understanding of how subsidiarity currently 
operates at present as a principle of EU law. This may be contrasted with Bermann‟s 
view discussed above. Bermann does not make any such distinction according to the 
nature of particular national regulations.
50
 More promisingly, he structured his 
approach around the effects of Member State rules on intra-EU movement. 
2.3 De Búrca: The Court of Justice as an institutional actor 
Finally, in 1998, de Búrca offered an insightful and fresh analysis of subsidiarity‟s 
implications for the Court as an institutional actor.
51
 In line with the views of 
Bermann and Schilling above, de Búrca also argues that the Court must respond to 
the introduction of subsidiarity as general principle of integration in connection with 
the exercise of its own interpretative functions. However, in contrast to the preceding 
analyses, de Búrca is less concerned with how subsidiarity should be operationalised 
in specific contexts. By contrast, she focuses primarily on discussing whether or not 
the Court should in fact be subject to the principle‟s demands in the first place.  
De Búrca makes a strong case in broad terms for the application of subsidiarity to the 
Court as an institutional actor. She challenges the view that the Court does not 
contribute directly to the integration process as a unilateral policy actor.
52
 De Búrca 
argues that the Court is in fact regularly confronted with interpretative choices that 
are comparable – though not identical – to those faced by the Union legislature in the 
exercise of its legislative competences.
53
  For example, she reasons that, although 
negatively worded, the Treaty provisions are „open to a number of interpretations 
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capable of expanding the scope of Community law and, correspondingly, restricting 
the scope of action of Member States.‟
54
 The act of judicial interpretation can 
therefore constitute „the exercise of law-making power by the Court.‟
55
 Importantly, 
de Búrca notes that this finding is entirely overlooked in the Subsidiarity Protocol 
and other guidelines designed to inform the application of the subsidiarity principle 
in EU law.
56
 Recalling the discussion of the revised Protocols and other amendments 
in Chapter 1, this still remains the position at the time of writing. 
De Búrca concludes that there is considerable scope to develop subsidiarity as a legal 
restraint on the Court‟s interpretative freedom.  To this end, she isolates a number of 
possible mechanisms that could be adopted in order to attribute substance to the 
principle.
57
 For example, it is argued that the Treaty could be amended to provide for 
judicial or legislative review of decisions of the Court of Justice on subsidiarity 
grounds. However, de Búrca‟s preferred solution is to develop the principle within 
the Treaty existing framework.  She maintains that: 
„it is incumbent on the ECJ itself to find a way of responding to the complex 
problems which are being brought before it, rather than avoiding 
acknowledgement of the interpretative choices it makes and presenting its 
rulings as the incontrovertible reading of an uncontested text.‟
58
  
Specifically, de Búrca calls for the Court to show „greater responsiveness and 
sensitivity… to the difficult questions which are raised by the issues of subsidiarity 
and proportionality, and [asks] that they are better reflected in [its] reasoning.‟
59
 
Finally, it is important to stress that this line of argument does not challenge the 
Court‟s ultimate authority to interpret the Treaties. This power flows directly from 
the Treaty.
60
 Instead, as de Búrca notes, it simply questions whether the Court should 
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3. The view from the case law 
The previous section reviewed the key literature discussing the potential for applying 
subsidiarity as a restraint on the Court‟s interpretative freedom.  As we have seen, 
different commentators have offered both complementary and competing visions 
about how the principle could be operationalised in this respect. Before engaging 
with these arguments further (section 4), it is necessary first to consider the position 
in the case law. The question here is simple. Are there any indications that 
subsidiarity has already emerged as a brake on the Court‟s own functions as an 
institutional actor?  
The subsidiarity principle has been referred to in a number of the Court‟s decisions.  
Most references to subsidiarity in the case law arise where either the Court or the 
parties to the dispute do nothing more than simply restate particular provisions of 
Union legislation that contain express references to the principle.
62
 In other cases, the 
principle is invoked to support Member State autonomy generally, often in 
combination with references to the principle of proportionality and without any 
explanation of why – and how – subsidiarity is relevant to the resolution of the case 
in point.
63
 This section is not concerned with such fleeting references to subsidiarity.  
Instead, the focus is squarely on those cases in which the parties made a clear attempt 
to invoke subsidiarity as a limit on the Court‟s freedom to determine the distribution 
of regulatory competence between the Union and the Member States through its 
interpretation of EU law. In short, we are looking for evidence of a judicial response 
to de Búrca‟s call for the Court to show „greater responsiveness and sensitivity‟ to 
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the demands of subsidiarity in its own actions.
64
 In the following paragraphs, the case 
law dealing with the Court‟s interpretation of primary (Treaty) and secondary (Union 
legislation) is considered in turn. As we shall see, there is astonishingly little case 
law in either area. To date, subsidiarity has been invoked as a source of restraint on 
the Court‟s interpretative functions in only a handful of isolated cases. This is in spite 
of the fact that, in the relevant substantive areas, the Court‟s case law has been 
subject to intense criticism for encroaching too far on national regulatory autonomy 
in areas of shared responsibility – the precise operating conditions for the 
subsidiarity principle.  
3.1 Primary law 
3.1.1 Case C-415/93 Bosman 
The decision in Bosman remains to date the clearest illustration of an attempt to 
apply subsidiarity as a brake on the Court‟s interpretative freedom.
65
 In this case, the 
applicant, a professional footballer, invoked the Treaty provisions on the free 
movement of workers (now Art 45 TFEU) in order to contest the national and 
international regulatory frameworks governing the transfer and fielding of 
professional footballers by clubs established within the Union. In particular, Mr 
Bosman challenged the requirement for the payment of a transfer fee by his previous 
employer before he could contract with a football club established in another 
Member State. In this context, the German Government, intervening in the case in 
support of the UEFA, the defendant regulatory body, invoked subsidiarity in an 
attempt to shield the contested rules from judicial scrutiny at Union level. It argued 
that, according to the principle of subsidiarity, intervention by the Union (including, 
by implication, the Court itself) in the area at issue – the regulation of sporting 
activities – should be limited to what was „strictly necessary.‟
66
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At first sight, the Bosman ruling does not appear to offer much support for the 
operation of subsidiarity as a legal principle outside the review of Union legislation. 
In that case, the ECJ swiftly rejected the German Government‟s subsidiarity-based 
arguments. The Court stated that: 
„subsidiarity, as interpreted by the German Government to the effect that 
intervention by public authorities, and particularly [Union] authorities, in the 
area in question must be confined to what is strictly necessary, cannot lead to 
a situation in which the freedom of private associations to adopt sporting 
rules restricts the exercise of rights conferred on individuals by the Treaty.‟
67
  
In other words, the Court made it clear that subsidiarity had no effect on its 
competence to review the contested regulations against the Treaty as an obstacle to 
the free movement of workers within the internal market. However, it would be 
incorrect to conclude from this statement that the Court refused outright to accept, in 
principle, that subsidiarity might operate as a broader restraint in EU law. In fact, the 
reverse is probably true. On one view, the Court‟s observation in Bosman that 
subsidiarity „cannot lead to a situation‟ actually masks an implicit acceptance of the 
principle‟s operation in this context.  
The real problem in Bosman was that the German Government asked the wrong 
question. In its submission to the Court, the German Government appeared to 
confuse subsidiarity with the related, but distinct, principle of proportionality.
68
 As 
noted in Chapter 1, the latter principle is designed to regulate the nature and intensity 
of Union intervention after it is established that regulatory competence exists at 
Union level. The German Government‟s argument demonstrates its confusion on this 
important distinction between, on the one hand, the existence of and right to exercise 
competence at Union level (governed by Art 5(2) and 5(3) TEU) and, on the other 
hand, the manner in which that competence is exercised (governed by Art 5(4) TEU). 
In essence, it tried to use subsidiarity to manage the intensity of the Court‟s 
intervention into the regulation of the specific substantive area at issue 
(„intervention… confined to what is strictly necessary‟). Yet, this necessarily 
assumed that the Union (the Court) enjoyed the right, in principle, to exercise 
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competence in the area in question – the very question that subsidiarity is designed to 
contest. 
3.1.2 Case C-174/04 Commission v. Italy (Energy Markets) and Case C-
326/07 Commission v. Italy (Energy Markets) 
The decision in Bosman addressed the Court‟s interpretation of the scope of the 
Treaty provisions on intra-EU movement. The concern here is with the definition of 
what constitutes an obstacle to free movement within the internal market. As will be 
discussed further in Chapter 3, this question forms only the first part of the Court‟s 
review of national measures against the Treaty rules on free movement. Subsidiarity 
also features in the case law on the justification of obstacles to intra-EU movement. 
This forms the second limb of the Court‟s review of national rules against the Treaty 
freedoms. At this stage of inquiry, the Court must determine whether or not national 
rules that are found to fall within the scope of the Treaty freedoms can be justified in 
EU law.  This involves, first and foremost, reviewing the Member State‟s choice of 
the specific ground(s) for derogating from the Treaty freedoms.
69
 
The decision in Commission v. Italy (Energy Markets) and the subsequent ruling of 
the same name provide isolated examples of attempts to invoke subsidiarity in 
connection with the justification of obstacles to intra-EU movement.
70
 Both cases 
concerned Italian legislation affecting the rights of persons holding shares in certain 
recently privatised energy companies established in that State. In the first case, the 
contested Italian measure provided for the suspension of the voting rights of a 
defined category of investor. The second ruling addressed Italian legislation that 
reserved to the competent national minister special powers to veto important 
corporate decisions. In both cases, the Court concluded that the rules at issue 
constituted obstacles to the free movement of capital and the freedom of 
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establishment. The issue was whether or not the Italian rules could be justified under 
EU law. To support this view, the Italian Government referred expressly to the 
subsidiarity principle in both cases. It argued that this principle operated to protect its 
right to maintain the aforementioned restrictions on the rights of shareholders in the 
undertakings concerned. 
In the first of the two decisions, the Italian Government picked up on the reference to 
subsidiarity set out in Directives 96/92 and 98/30 on energy market liberalisation.
71
 
According to these instruments: 
„Member States shall ensure, on the basis of their institutional organisation 
and with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity, that, without prejudice 
to paragraph 2, electricity undertakings are operated in accordance with the 
principles of this Directive with a view to achieving a competitive market in 
electricity, and shall not discriminate between these undertakings as regards 
either rights or obligations.‟
72
  
For the Italian Government, the reference to subsidiarity in these instruments was 
taken to denote the right on its part to take temporary action at national level in order 
to correct difficulties arising in the process of liberalising energy markets within the 
Union.
73
 Specifically, it sought to argue that the contested national law was 
necessary in order to prevent recently privatised national energy companies from 
being acquired and thereby controlled by energy companies that remained in public 
control.
74
 In the second Commission v. Italy (Energy Markets) ruling, the Italian 
Government again sought to rely on the principle of subsidiarity at the justification 
stage. However, on this occasion, it argued that the prohibited national rules were 
required to safeguard public security within that State. According to the Italian 
Government, „the principle of subsidiarity must apply. Domestic legislation is more 
suitable than Community legislation for regulating situations presenting a real risk to 
the vital interests of the State, situations that only the State can evaluate directly and 
in good time.‟
75
 Moreover, it submitted that it – as a Member State – should enjoy 
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broad discretion in this connection, „for [Member States] are best placed to deal with 
emergencies affecting the vital interests of the State.‟
76
  
In contrast to the ruling in Bosman, the Court did not respond directly to the Italian 
Government‟s efforts to invoke subsidiarity as a limit on its freedom to determine 
whether or not the contested rules could be justified in EU law.  In both cases, the 
principle was discussed only by the Advocates General. In relation to the first 
decision, Advocate General Kokott rejected the arguments of the Italian 
Government. She concluded that „not even the principle of subsidiarity can ever 
justify national measures in breach of the fundamental freedoms.‟
77
 The Italian 
Government received an equally blunt reply from Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo 
Colomer in the second ruling. However, in this case, the rejection was based on the 
manner in which the Italian Government presented its subsidiarity argument. In the 
opinion of the Advocate General, the Italian Government‟s subsidiarity plea was not 
sufficiently defined. He concluded that, „using the principle of subsidiarity in such 
imprecise terms is contrary to the legal certainty required by the Court of Justice.‟
78
 
Notwithstanding the views of the Advocates General, it is submitted that it is 
possible to interpret the Court‟s silence on subsidiarity in both cases rather more 
favourably. In fact, the subsidiarity principle arguably improves our understanding of 
the Court‟s final conclusions in each case. This is particularly true with respect to the 
first of the two decisions. In this case, the subsidiarity principle supports the Court‟s 
clear rejection of the Italian Government‟s efforts to justify its restrictive measure. In 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, the Italian Government could not 
assume responsibility for the specific „overriding interest‟ it sought to use in order to 
justify its legislation. The specific justification advanced – the protection of 
competition for the supply of energy within the internal market – could not be 
achieved through unilateral Member State action. This is an issue with clear 
transnational effects. On this interpretation, the subsidiarity principle was therefore 
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not inapplicable in that case, but instead provided a stronger normative basis to 
support the Court‟s decision to exclude unilateral Member State intervention on this 
specific ground.
79
    
Similarly, the conclusions of the Court in the subsequent ruling in Commission v. 
Italy (Energy Markets) sit comfortably alongside the logic of subsidiarity.  In 
contrast to the earlier decision, the Court accepted, in principle, the Italian 
Government‟s proposed derogation ground.  The Court concluded that the defendant 
Member State could seek to justify its legislation on the grounds advanced, 
specifically, the maintenance of a minimum supply of energy resources and goods 
essential to the public as a whole, national defence and the continuity of public 
service.
80
  In so doing, the ECJ recognised these specific objectives as distinctly 
national interests that the Member State was capable of securing unilaterally.  
Admittedly, the Court then concluded, in the final analysis, that the contested rules 
could not in fact be considered to be justified.
81
 However, this finding does not 
undermine the subsidiarity analysis discussed here. The Court‟s conclusion was in 
fact solely based on the disproportionate nature of the rules in question.
82
  As has 
already been noted on several occasions, this proportionality assessment forms a 
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3.2 Secondary legislation 
3.2.1 Case C-332/00 Commission v. Belgium (Butter) and Case C-103/01 
Commission v. Germany (Personal Protective Equipment)  
As we have seen, subsidiarity is very rarely invoked as a restraint on the Court‟s 
freedom to determine the distribution of regulatory competence between the Union 
and the Member States through its interpretation of primary Union law. The position 
with respect to secondary law (Union legislation) is no different. In this context, 
litigants – and the Member States in particular – are also yet to exploit subsidiarity‟s 
potential as a brake on the Court‟s freedom, under certain circumstances,
83
 to 
adjudicate on the distribution of competence between the Union and the Member 
States through the exercise of its interpretative functions. Generally speaking, in the 
isolated cases where subsidiarity is raised by the Member States, the principle is 
simply used to defend Member State autonomy per se. For example, in Commission 
v. Germany (Personal Protective Equipment), it was argued that the subsidiarity 
principle granted the Member States (greater) discretion to determine the scope of a 
particular derogation set out within Directive 89/686.
84
 Similarly, in the earlier case 
of Commission v. Belgium (Butter), the Belgian Government argued that, under the 
principle subsidiarity, it retained competence to determine the products covered by 
the term „butter‟ for the purposes of a particular Regulation.
85
 
In a further blow to its function as a legal principle, there are strong grounds to 
question the merits of the defendants‟ arguments in the above isolated cases. First, in 
the latter case (Commission v. Belgium (Butter)), the subsidiarity principle was 
invoked to support Member State competence in an area of exclusive Union 
competence. However, it will be recalled from Chapter 1 that the principle does not 
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apply in this sphere.
86
 Secondly, there also doubts about the arguments of the 
German Government in Commission v. Germany (Personal Protective Equipment). 
Although rightly invoking subsidiarity in an area of shared regulatory responsibility 
(the Directive was enacted using Art 100a (now Art 114 TFEU)), the defendant 
failed to operationalise the principle correctly. The German Government did not rely 
on subsidiarity to contest the decision of the Union legislature to exercise 
competence under Art 100a to enact legislation regulating the characteristics of 
personal protective equipment within the internal market.
87
 Instead, the defendant 
was simply seeking to contest the interpretation of the phrase „designed and 
manufactured specifically for the forces which maintain law and order.‟ It sought to 
argue that the duties of its fire-fighters fell within the scope of that exemption. It is 
unclear what subsidiarity had to offer here.
88
 
3.2.2 Case C-518/08 Fundación Gala-Salvador Dali 
Notwithstanding the above, the case law on secondary legislation is not all bad news 
in so far as subsidiarity is concerned. There is in fact some implicit support for the 
view that the Court has, of its own accord, shown sensitivity to the principle‟s impact 
on its freedom to interpret the scope of Union legislation. The ruling in Fundación 
Gala-Salvador Dalí provides an isolated, but clear example of this point.
89
 In this 
case, the Court was asked to rule on the scope of Directive 2001/84 on the resale 
right for the benefit of the author of an original work of art.
90
 This Directive was 
adopted under Art 95 EC (Art 114 TFEU), the legal basis for intervention by the 
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Union legislature in the regulation of the internal market. As such, it represented an 
exercise of competence by the Union legislature in an area of shared regulatory 
responsibility. On the strength of the conclusions in Chapter 1, it is submitted that 
this decision to intervene by the Union legislature was subject to the demands of the 
subsidiarity principle in Art 5(2) EC (Art 5(3) TEU). 
Against the above background, the Court was asked to determine whether Directive 
2001/84 precluded a provision of French law which reserved the benefit of the right 
of resale – introduced by the Directive – to the artist‟s heirs alone. In effect, the 
contested French measure excluded testamentary legatees from enjoying the benefits 
of the Directive. In its reply to the referring court, the ECJ concluded that the French 
legislation was not contrary to EU law. For present purposes, it is the reasoning 
leading to this conclusion that is particularly interesting. In its review of the scope of 
the Directive, the Court noted that the Union legislature „did not, in accordance with 
the principle of subsidiarity, consider it appropriate to take action through that 
Directive in relation to Member States‟ laws of succession.‟
91
 This was based on the 
legislature‟s assessment that there was no need to eliminate differences between 
national laws, such as those on succession, which cannot be expected to affect the 
functioning of the internal market.
92
 Importantly, the Court did not challenge the 
Union legislature‟s assessment of the appropriate scope for intervention at Union 
level in the substantive area at issue. It simply accepted that, applying the principle 
of subsidiarity, the Union legislature had already concluded that it was not 
appropriate to take action at Union level to harmonise national rules on succession. 
Taken in its most favourable light, it is argued that this finding provides evidence of 
the Court‟s own sensitivity to the demands of subsidiarity in connection with its 
interpretation of secondary EU law. Put simply, the Court did not exercise its 
interpretative freedom in a manner that contested the subsidiarity assessment that the 
Union legislature had already made. It could have done so, but it did not. 
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4.  The normative dimension 
4.1 Should subsidiarity bind the Court? 
The above review provides some evidence to support the view that the subsidiarity 
principle is already operating implicitly as a restraint on the Court of Justice as an 
institutional actor.
93
 In connection with its interpretation of both primary and 
secondary Union law, it is possible to argue, at the very least, that the Court is not 
going against the logic of subsidiarity in cases where the principle is invoked 
expressly. However, it is important to stress that we are dealing with a handful of 
isolated cases. Furthermore, in order to square these examples with the subsidiarity 
principle, it is admittedly necessary to engage in a certain degree of intellectual 
gymnastics. The Court does not always respond expressly to appeals to subsidiarity, 
leaving much to implication. Equally, the Member States do not yet seem to have 
worked out how and when to operationalise subsidiarity as a restraint on the Court‟s 
interpretative functions – with respect to both primary and secondary Union law. 
This is very much in line with their attempts to challenge the validity of Union 
legislation enacted under Art 114 TFEU on subsidiarity grounds (see Chapter 1). In 
this context, it was argued that the Member States continue to struggle with 
subsidiarity and, in particular, have difficulties in understanding how the principle 
relates to the principles of conferral and proportionality. However, discussion of the 
current state of play in the case law can only take us so far. The fundamental 
question is normative. It is now necessary to ask whether or not subsidiarity should 
restrain the Court in its own functions. Only if this is the case is there a need 
thereafter to work out the detail of how exactly the subsidiarity principle should 
unfold its effects in particular areas. 
Following the arguments of Bermann, Schilling and de Búrca, it is difficult to see 
why the Court should be immune, in principle, from the demands of the subsidiarity 
principle in connection with its interpretation of EU law. In line with the views of 
those commentators, and the arguments of de Búrca in particular, the Court makes an 
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important contribution to the integration process as an independent policy actor – at 
least in certain circumstances. Although its role remains distinct from that of the 
Union legislature, the Court is often confronted with choices that are comparable to 
those faced by the former institution. This fact should now be apparent from the 
discussion of the case law in the preceding section. As de Búrca rightly notes, when 
faced with questions about the appropriate interpretation of Union law, the Court is 
effectively engaging in acts of judicial law-making. This can have important 
implications for the distribution of competence between the Union and the Member 
States. To the extent that such acts of interpretation affect the balance of power in 
areas of shared regulatory responsibility, the conditions for the application of the 
subsidiarity principle would appear to be met. 
The wording of the core subsidiarity provision, Art 5(3) TEU, also lends normative 
support to the application of subsidiarity to the Court.
94
 That provision states clearly 
that subsidiarity applies to the exercise of competences shared by „the Union‟ and the 
Member States. Art 13 TEU then expressly lists the „Court of Justice‟ as part of the 
institutional framework of the Union. Paragraph 3 of this provision provides further 
that „each institution shall act within the limits of the powers conferred on it in the 
Treaties, and in conformity with the procedures, conditions and objectives set out in 
them.‟
95
 Art 5(3) TEU and Art 13 TEU thereby establish the key link between 
principle and institution.
96
 In strict legal terms, this is a sufficiently clear argument in 
favour of subsidiarity‟s application to the Court in its capacity as an institution of the 
Union.  
Of course, one may argue that the detail of Art 5(3) TEU precludes the application of 
subsidiarity as a brake on the Court‟s interpretative functions. For example, the 
wording of both Art 5(3) TEU and, in particular, the Protocol on Subsidiarity (as 
amended) is framed in language that speaks directly to the principle‟s effect as a 
brake on the Union legislature.
97
 Equally, one could argue that the exercise of the 
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Court‟s own functions does not meet the key criterion in Art 5(3) TEU. This refers to 
the requirement for (voluntary) „action‟ on the part of the Union institutions 
concerned.
98
 On this point, it could be argued that, unlike the Union legislature, the 
Court does not „act‟ when exercising its interpretative functions. On one view, the 
Court is in fact simply required to respond to requests for interpretations of points of 
EU law that are brought before it. This absence of any independent right of policy 
initiation, comparable to that enjoyed by the Union‟s legislative branch, could be 
viewed as fatal to the application of subsidiarity to the Court. As will be discussed in 
section 4.2 below, the above concerns present important challenges to subsidiarity‟s 
functions as a restraint on the Court qua Union institution. However, it will be 
argued that none of the above points are fatal to the core arguments. Instead, they 
simply illustrate the need to construct, from first principles, a clear and detailed 
analysis of subsidiarity‟s implications for the Court in connection with the exercise 
of its own functions.  
Finally, it is important to stress that there are good reasons to submit the Court‟s 
functions to the demands of the subsidiarity principle. Extending the application of 
subsidiarity in this way (where appropriate) can only strengthen the integration 
process. Ensuring the Court‟s compliance with subsidiarity through its actions as an 
institutional actor would serve to bolster its legitimacy and, in addition, inject 
additional normative support for the interpretative choices it makes in its rulings. 
This would correct a clear imbalance that exists between the Union institutions.  It 
will be recalled from Chapter 1 that the actions of the Union legislature are now 
subject to increased scrutiny on subsidiarity grounds in an attempt to enhance the 
protection of Member State competences. There is no reason why the Court should 
escape similar controls – at least to the extent that the operating conditions for the 
subsidiarity principle are met.   
4.2 How should subsidiarity function? 
From the above starting point, it is submitted here that the decisive issue is not 
whether subsidiarity binds the Court. Instead, it is about determining what that 
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principle means for the Court outside its review of legislative acts for compliance 
with subsidiarity (discussed in Chapter 1).
99
 In this connection, there are two key 
points to address. The first relates to the scope of the principle‟s application, in other 
words, to the extent to which the Court is in fact bound by the demands of 
subsidiarity. Put simply, is subsidiarity relevant to every interpretative act of the 
Court or is its application as a restraint on the Court‟s functions limited to specific 
contexts? The second concern addresses the mechanics of the principle‟s application. 
Once the scope of its application is confirmed, how should the Court actually engage 
with the demands of the subsidiarity principle in practice?  
The remainder of this chapter is concerned with the first of these two important 
issues. It focuses on determining the principle‟s scope of application as a brake on 
the Court‟s interpretive functions. In particular, it discusses how subsidiarity 
interacts with other core constitutional principles of EU integration such as the 
principles of attributed powers and proportionality. As we have seen already, there 
appears to be some confusion over the relationship between subsidiarity and the 
latter principle. Although listed as distinct legal principles in Art 5 TEU, the three 
principles of conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality are frequently conflated. 
After discussing subsidiarity‟s scope of application in broad terms, this chapter 
concludes by identifying a specific substantive area of EU law to test the practical 
implications of subsidiarity as a restraint on the Court‟s functions. The remainder of 
this thesis then focuses on how the mechanics of subsidiarity could be developed in 
the chosen area. 
4.2.1 Determining subsidiarity’s scope of application  
In terms of scope, the application of the subsidiarity principle to the interpretative 
functions of the Court would appear to be subject to two preconditions. Both 
conditions are broadly comparable to those governing the principle‟s application as a 
restraint on the actions of the Union legislature, as discussed in Chapter 1. First, the 
Court itself must have competence to act. In other words, the Court must enjoy a 
right of interpretation. Secondly, and more importantly, for subsidiarity to apply, the 
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Court must actually be engaged in the review of a substantive policy area that is held 
concurrently by the Member States and the Union. 
This first requirement, the existence of the Court‟s competence to act, is a matter for 
the attribution of powers. This is governed by Art 5(2) TEU. According to this 
provision, the „Union shall act only within the limits of the competences conferred 
upon it by the Member States in the Treaties.‟ In Chapter 1, it was noted that the 
attribution of powers defines substantive areas in which the Union legislature enjoys, 
in principle, the right to enact legislative measures. For example, Art 114 TFEU 
grants the Union legislature competence to enact measures in order to contribute to 
the establishment of a functioning internal market. Of course, as was argued in 
Chapter 1, the existence of this specific competence does not mean that the Union 
legislature may exercise it without restraint. Indeed, it was argued that recourse to 
Art 114 TFEU is subject to the demands of the subsidiarity principle. This key 
distinction between the existence and exercise of Union competences now finds 
expression, post-Lisbon, in Art 5(1) TEU. This new provision states that „the limits 
of Union competences are governed by the principle of conferral. The use of Union 
competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.‟
100
 
Transposed to the present discussion, the first criterion for the application of 
subsidiarity, the attribution of powers, refers to the legal basis for judicial 
interpretation set out in the Treaties. Art 19 TEU provides, in broad terms, that the 
Court of Justice „shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties 
the law is observed.‟
101
 The individual judicial procedures are set out in Part 6 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and in the Statute of the Court of 
Justice.
102
 These include, for example, the direct action for the annulment of 
legislative acts of the Union (Art 263 TFEU), infringement proceedings instigated by 
the Commission or Member States against Member States for alleged infringements 
of EU law (Arts. 258, 259 and 260 TFEU) and the preliminary reference procedure 
(Art 267 TFEU). It is important to stress that the subsidiarity principle does not 
                                                          
100
 Art 5(1) TEU (this author‟s emphasis). 
101
 Ex Art 220 EC. 
102
 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2010] OJ C 83/47 
and Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union [2010] OJ C 83/210.  
2. Subsidiarity: more than just a restrain on the Union legislature? 
 
  89 
challenge the existence of Court‟s competence to interpret the Treaties under any of 
these proceedings. Recalling de Búrca‟s conclusions noted earlier, subsidiarity 
simply questions whether the Court should be constrained in the exercise of this 
interpretative freedom within the contexts of the specific judicial proceedings 
outlined in the Treaty.
103
 
The second of the two preconditions is therefore the most important. This refers to 
the substance of the legal dispute before the Court in any one of the judicial 
procedures set out in the Treaty. In short, for the subsidiarity principle to apply, it is 
submitted that the Court must be engaged in the review of a substantive policy area 
that is held concurrently by the Member States and the Union. This second 
requirement sets out the core limit of the principle‟s application as a restraint on the 
Court‟s interpretative functions. Subsidiarity is only relevant in cases where the 
Court is faced with an interpretative choice over the limits of Union intervention in 
areas of shared regulatory competence. In other words, the Court should be required 
to engage with the demands of subsidiarity exclusively in cases where it is 
confronted with a decision about whether or not it should exercise competence at 
Union level in an area of shared competence. It is in this particular sphere of activity 
that the Court can properly be said to be free to „act‟ for the purposes of Art 5(3) 
TEU. 
In the above context, the Court is effectively confronted with a comparable decision 
to that faced by the Union legislature when the latter is contemplating exercising its 
competence to regulate in an area of shared responsibility.  The Court must decide 
whether there is a need for Union intervention in the area of shared responsibility 
concerned. Importantly, it is argued that this requirement on the Court to determine 
whether or not there is a need for it to exercise its competence in an area of shared 
responsibility can arise in different contexts. For example, the Court may be 
confronted with a subsidiarity issue when requested to interpret a provision of the 
Treaty, such as Art 34 TFEU on the free movement of goods. Alternatively, the 
Court may be subject to the demands of subsidiarity when requested to interpret 
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provisions of secondary Union legislation (see here eg Fundación Gala-Salvador 
Dali). Finally, the Court may be required to engage with the subsidiarity principle in 
cases where provisions of primary and secondary Union law co-exist. In the latter 
two cases, the Court‟s obligation to act in accordance with the demands of Art 5(3) 
TEU may come into conflict with the subsidiarity assessment already conducted by 
other Union institutions, notably the Union legislature. This adds an interesting 
further intra-institutional dimension to the application of the subsidiarity principle to 
the Court.  
Clearly, there is a need to discuss in more concrete terms how the Court should 
engage with this subsidiarity obligation in specific substantive areas. However, this is 
a matter for subsequent chapters. The remainder of this chapter comments on the 
limits of the subsidiarity test as applied to the Court and also addresses some possible 
objections to the core argument. 
4.2.2 The limits of subsidiarity 
With the scope of its application defined, it is now possible to comment on the limits 
of subsidiarity as a restraint on the Court‟s interpretative freedom. In this connection, 
the first point to note is that subsidiarity is not a principle that favours Member State 
autonomy generally. Its operation is restricted to cases in which the Court is required 
to make interpretative choices in areas of shared responsibility. The principle is 
therefore wholly irrelevant where the Court is dealing with the interpretation of areas 
of exclusive Union competence. In such cases, only the proportionality principle in 
Art 5(4) TFEU can be invoked to safeguard Member State autonomy. This principle 
protects Member States by restricting the form and intensity of all Union action.
104
  
In line with the above conclusions on subsidiarity, there is no reason not to consider 
proportionality as being relevant to the Court‟s actions as a Union institution either. 
Art 5(4) TEU again clearly states that Union action is subject to the proportionality 
principle.  
                                                          
104
 On this point, see also eg Toth op. cit. at note 96 at p. 270. 
2. Subsidiarity: more than just a restrain on the Union legislature? 
 
  91 
In a similar vein, the principle of subsidiarity is of no help to the Member States in 
cases where there are doubts over the existence of any competence to regulate 
specific substantive areas at Union level. This scenario also presents a problem that 
subsidiarity is incapable of resolving. In such cases, the Court is effectively making a 
decision about whether or not to extend the scope of Union competences into new 
substantive areas that are (clearly) outwith the scope of the Treaties.
105
 This 
interpretative choice is broadly comparable to any attempt by the Union legislature to 
harmonise national laws on, inter alia, crime prevention;
106
 education, vocational 











each of these areas, the Union legislature enjoys only a lesser degree of „supporting‟ 
or „co-ordinating competence‟ and, importantly, is expressly excluded from 
harmonising the laws and regulations of the Member States.
112
  
Interestingly, there is in fact some evidence in the case law to suggest that the Court 
is aware – or at least has at times been aware – of limits to the existence of Union 
competence in connection with the exercise of its own interpretative authority. The 
Court‟s pre-citizenship judgments on education and vocational policy provide a clear 
illustration of this point. For example, in Brown, the Court expressly acknowledged 
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and respected the existence of limits – at the material time – to the scope of Union 
competence to regulate national rules on financial assistance for university studies.
113
 
In that case, the Court was requested to determine whether or not student 
maintenance grants fell within the scope of Community law.
114
 The Court‟s 
conclusion was that they did not. Significantly, this finding was reached after the 
Court had assessed the Community‟s competence to regulate national rules on 
education and vocational training.
115
 On this key point, the Court noted that: 
„at the present stage of development of Community law, assistance given to 
students for maintenance and for training falls in principle outside the scope 
of the EEC Treaty.‟
116
  
The Court‟s review of discriminatory rules on maintenance grants has of course 
moved on since the ruling in Brown.
117
 This reflects changes in the Union‟s 
competence in the substantive area concerned, together with the introduction of the 
new legal status of Union citizenship.
118
 However, for present purposes, the ruling 
remains important.
119
 It provides a clear (historical) example of an awareness on the 
part of the Court about the existence of inherent limits to the scope of its own 
interpretative freedom. The fact that the example used here concerned the attribution 
of powers (Art 5(2) TEU) rather than the subsidiarity principle (Art 5(3) TEU) is of 
no great significance. It has already been argued that both provisions, together with 
the related principle of proportionality in Art 5(4) TEU, operate to restrain the Court 
qua Union institution in the exercise of its own interpretative functions.  The Court‟s 
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ruling in Brown is therefore relevant to the present analysis of subsidiarity by direct 
analogy. 
4.3 Possible objections to the application of subsidiarity as a restraint 
on the Court’s interpretive functions 
The previous section discussed, in broad terms, the implications of the subsidiarity 
principle as a restraint on the Court‟s actions. It was argued, first, that there are no 
real obstacles to the application of subsidiarity in this manner. It was then argued, 
secondly, that subsidiarity should only be considered relevant to certain interpretative 
acts of the Court. Specifically, the principle operates to protect Member State 
autonomy in cases where the Court is confronted with a decision about whether or 
not it should exercise competence at Union level in an area of shared responsibility. 
It is only in this specific sphere of activity that the Court must ensure that its 
interpretative freedom is exercised in accordance with the demands of Art 5(3) TEU. 
Those conclusions notwithstanding, there are a number of possible concerns 
surrounding the application of subsidiarity as a brake on the Court‟s interpretative 
functions. To strengthen the main line of argument, these points should be openly 
acknowledged. The first possible concern relates to the definition of areas of „shared 
regulatory competence‟. As noted earlier, this, of course, delimits the scope of the 
principle‟s application as a restraint on the Court. This follows from the fact that, 
according to Art 5(3) TEU, subsidiarity is only relevant in connection with the 
exercise of „non-exclusive‟ competences. In spite of the changes introduced by the 
Lisbon Treaty,
120
 it remains possible to argue that the lack of more precisely defined 
areas of shared competences weakens the case for applying subsidiarity in this 
manner. The Treaty now sets out, for the first time, broad areas of shared regulatory 
competences in Art 4 TFEU. However, although helpful, this new attempt to 
categorise Union competences more clearly in Title 1 of the TFEU does not 
guarantee a precise division of competences. For example, where is the boundary 
between „economic, social and territorial cohesion‟ (a shared competence, subject to 
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Art 5(3) TEU) and „education, vocational training, youth and sport‟ (a supporting 
competence only, not subject to Art 5(3) TEU)?   
Secondly, even where areas of shared competence can be agreed on, the application 
of the subsidiarity principle may seem entirely inappropriate in certain contexts. In 
short, the principle‟s logic may challenge core – or even „fundamental‟ – policy 
objectives set out in the Treaties. These include, for example, the elimination of 
discrimination on the grounds of nationality (Art 18 TFEU), sex, racial or ethnic 
origin, and religion (Art 10 TFEU); the promotion of gender equality (Art 8 TFEU) 
or environmental protection (Art 11 TFEU). In areas of shared competence, it may 
well be the case that Member States are perfectly capable, in principle, of meeting 
these objectives at the national level. Does this mean that the Court is precluded from 
intervening to secure these important flanking policy objectives except in cases that 
meet the criteria for intervention at Union level in Art 5(3) TEU? For example, does 
subsidiarity restrict the Court‟s review of discriminatory national rules to those 
measures that exhibit sufficient transnational effects? Such an approach would mark 
a radical departure from the Court‟s existing case law in certain fields.
121
 
Thirdly, the application of subsidiarity to the Court‟s exercise of shared competences 
is also arguably obstructed by practical problems. Recalling the discussion in 
Chapter 1 above, the subsidiarity principle now requires the Union legislature to 
make complex political and economic assessments about the nature and transnational 
effects of specific national polices when it seeks to exercise its legislative 
competences in areas of shared regulatory responsibility (e.g. Art 114 TFEU). 
According to Art 5 of the revised Subsidiarity Protocol, the Union legislature must 
set out its „reasons for concluding that a Union objective can be better achieved at 
Union level.
122
 Furthermore, these grounds for legislative intervention must be 
„substantiated by qualitative and, wherever possible, quantitative indicators.‟
123
 It is 
certainly open to question whether or not the Court is capable of making a similar 
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assessment in order to overturn subsidiarity‟s presumption in favour of Member State 
autonomy. We shall return to address this objection, together with the preceeding 
concerns over the appropriateness of applying subsidiarity in certain policy areas, in 
chapter 6. 
Finally, there is also the secondary but important issue of enforcement. Even if we 
accept that subsidiarity extends to bind the Court in the exercise of its interpretative 
functions, this leaves open the question of how the principle should be enforced. Is it 
enough to argue that subsidiarity should be considered as a self-enforcing limit on 
the actions of the Court or does proper compliance-monitoring demand the 
introduction of additional (ex post) review mechanisms? In previous studies 
(discussed in section 2 above), enforcement was generally left to the Court. De 
Búrca, for example, concluded that, „it is incumbent on the ECJ itself to find a way 
of responding to the complex problems which are being brought before it, rather than 
avoiding acknowledgement of the interpretative choices it makes and presenting its 
rulings as the incontrovertible reading of an uncontested text.‟
124
 This suggestion 
appears to be based on the view that the Court is capable of adjusting its approach to 
the exercise of its own interpretative functions to meet the demands of the 
subsidiarity principle. Equally, it is also underpinned by the sense that the Court risks 
undermining its own legitimacy as a Union institution should it choose not to do so. 
4.3.1 Too many difficulties to overcome? 
In sum, the above concerns may leave the distinct impression that the application of 
subsidiarity to the Court‟s interpretative functions is confronted by too many 
obstacles. For this reason, it may seem more appropriate to fall back on alternative 
mechanisms to ensure that the Court does not violate the subsidiarity principle 
through the exercise of its own interpretative functions.
125
 For example, one option 
would be to leave things as they are and argue instead for a Treaty amendment to 
empower the Union legislature to override individual Court decisions on subsidiarity 
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grounds.
126
 This could provide the missing check on the Court‟s contribution to 
integration in areas of shared competence. This particular proposal would also 
resolve the secondary issue of ensuring the principle‟s enforcement as a restraint on 
the Court. Similarly, the Treaty could be amended to provide for the judicial review 
of decisions of the Court of Justice.
127
 This review could be conducted by the Full 
Court or specialised judicial panels created for this purpose.  
Another alternative would be to abandon the subsidiarity principle altogether and 
focus instead on developing the proportionality principle as a restraint on the Court‟s 
interpretative functions. Again, this particular constitutional principle could be 
developed in isolation as a self-enforcing restraint on the Court‟s actions or, 
alternatively, it could be combined with a new system of ex post legislative override 
along the lines discussed above. As noted earlier, proportionality is also a general 
constitutional principle of European integration. Moreover, it was also argued that, in 
common with the subsidiarity principle, there are no obvious obstacles to its 
application as a restraint on the Court‟s own interpretative functions. Indeed, the 
principle could be used to protect Member State autonomy from disproportionate 
interferences at the hands of the Court in a much broader sphere. Recalling the 
discussion above, the proportionality principle applies to govern the intensity of all 
Union action and not just its action in areas of shared regulatory competence. As 
such, its scope of application as a restraint on the Court of Justice is potentially much 
broader.  
In recent years, the proportionality principle has also found increasing favour 
amongst commentators as the appropriate key limit on the scope of Union action.
128
 
In most cases, the concern is, of course, with the scope of intervention by the Union 
legislature. However, this line of argument could again be transposed to an 
assessment of the nature and intensity of the Court‟s interpretative decisions. 
Davies‟s critique of the subsidiarity principle as an effective restraint on the Union 
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 See esp. Davies op. cit. at note 3. See also eg G. A. Bermann, „Proportionality and Subsidiarity‟ in 
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legislature (discussed in Chapter 1) provides an example of a proportionality-based 
approach to the protection of Member State autonomy that could be transposed and 
applied to guide the exercise of the Court‟s interpretative freedom.
129
 For Davies, in 
its review of acts of the Union legislature, the Court should focus on questions of 
proportionality not subsidiarity. Specifically, he argues that the Court should „ask 




Even those who continue to view subsidiarity more favourably have resorted to 
proportionality in an attempt to bolster the effectiveness of the former principle.
131
 
For example, Schütze argues that subsidiarity should be reconceived as a principle of 
„federal proportionality.‟
132
 This would involve asking the Court to examine whether 
or not the Union legislature has „unnecessarily restricted national autonomy in the 
exercise of its legislative competences.‟
133
 Support for this broader reading of 
subsidiarity can of course be found in the wording of Art 5(3) TEU itself. It is 
possible to argue that this provision extends to include an assessment of the 
proportionality of Union intervention in areas of shared competence. It provides that, 
according to the principle of subsidiarity, „the Union shall act only if and insofar as 
the objectives of the proposed action.‟‟
134
  
However, notwithstanding the wording of Art 5(3) TEU, it is submitted that the 
related, but distinct, principles of subsidiarity and proportionality should not be 
conflated. Whilst it is correct that Art 5(3) TEU would appear to contain its own 
reference to proportionality („and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action‟), 
this should not be used to undermine the subsidiarity test at the core of that 
provision. The assessment of the nature and intensity of Union intervention in an 
area of shared responsibility (the proportionality assessment) is only relevant after it 
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has been established, in accordance with the demands of the subsidiarity test, that the 
Union enjoys the right to exercise competence in the first place. Both Davies and 
Schütze overlook this fundamental distinction between subsidiarity and 
proportionality. In essence, they (wrongly) seek to use proportionality to address 
what remains a matter for the subsidiarity principle: determining whether or not there 
is a need for Union intervention in an area of shared responsibility.  
4.3.2 Summary 
In spite of potential difficulties associated with its application and the lure of the 
proportionality principle as a potential alternative, it is argued that subsidiarity‟s 
function as a restraint on the Court‟s own interpretative functions is still worth 
exploring. The Court should not be excused from the requirements of the principle 
simply because its application may, at first sight, appear challenging. The Court of 
Justice continues to make a vital contribution to the process of European integration 
through its interpretation of EU law. This role presents the Court with opportunities 
to steer policies in particular directions or to fill gaps in existing legislative acts. The 
existence of such interpretative choices was apparent through discussion of the 
existing subsidiarity case law in section 2 above. In its capacity as the ultimate 
interpreter of the Treaties, the Court is often faced with decisions over whether or not 
there is a need for it to exercise its competence at Union level in areas of shared 
regulatory responsibility. For this reason, its action should be reviewed against 
subsidiarity where the conditions for the principle‟s application are met.  
Equally, it is further argued that we should not simply fall back on the 
proportionality principle as a suitable safeguard of Member State autonomy from the 
excesses of judicial interpretation. It is of course absolutely true that proportionality 
is a key principle of integration. However, proportionality cannot be relied upon as a 
suitable catch-all principle. Its function as a safety valve to protect Member State 
autonomy is actually rather restricted. In particular, the principle cannot be used to 
challenge the decision of either the Court or the Union legislature to exercise 
regulatory competence at Union level in an area of shared responsibility. 
Proportionality can only deal with the effects of that decision once taken. 
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Subsidiarity, on the other hand, scrutinises the prior decision to exercise competence 
at Union level in the first place – at least where this is held concurrently with the 
Member States. Subsidiarity therefore has its own distinctive role to play and should 
be explored separately and in greater detail. 
4.3 Is subsidiarity only relevant to the Court’s substantive functions? 
The preceding sections have examined the implications of subsidiarity for the 
Court‟s freedom to interpret Union law within the context of the proceedings before 
it. It has been argued that the principle has an important role to play in this sphere. 
Specifically, subsidiarity applies to restrain the Court when it is faced with 
interpretative choices that affect the distribution of regulatory (i.e. substantive) 
competences between the Union and the Member States in areas of shared 
responsibility. The application of subsidiarity to the Court in this manner represents 
the logical complement to the principle‟s use as a brake on the functions of the Union 
legislature, discussed in Chapter 1. It also reflects the way in which subsidiarity was 
discussed in broader terms by Bermann, Schilling and de Búrca (see section 2 
above). However, it is also important to consider whether there are other, additional, 
roles for subsidiarity outside of this specific context. 
The preliminary reference procedure in Art 267 TFEU (ex Art 234 EC) is perhaps 
the most obvious candidate for scrutiny against the subsidiarity principle outside of 
the substantive context. This particular procedure establishes a sphere of shared 
adjudicative competence. Under Art 267 TFEU, competence to resolve legal disputes 
requiring (a) the interpretation of a point of Union law and/or (b) the assessment of 
the validity of acts of the Union institutions is shared by the Court of Justice and the 
referring Member State courts and tribunals. Neither the Court of Justice nor the 
national referring courts enjoy, therefore, exclusive competence to settle the 
categories of dispute in question. The preliminary reference procedure continues to 
play a key role in Union law.
135
 It feeds a diverse range of disputes into the Union 
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judicial system (some would argue too many).
136
 It is also the principal framework 
within which the Court contributes to the development of substantive Union law as 
an institutional actor.  
In line with the discussion of its substantive dimension in the preceding sections, the 
subsidiarity principle poses no threat whatsoever to the existence of the Court‟s 
adjudicative competences under Art 267 TFEU. The existence of this power flows 
from the wording of that provision itself. This provides that the Court of Justice 
„shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings‟ on both the interpretation of the 
Treaties and validity of Union measures. However, there is a strong argument that 
subsidiarity should be considered in connection with the Court‟s exercise of its 
interpretative functions under this provision. When exercising its competence under 
Art 267 TFEU, the Court of Justice is engaged with the national referring court in a 
shared adjudicative process. For that reason, it should be aware of the need to ensure 
that its own interpretative choices meet the demands of the subsidiarity principle. 
This is the logical complement to the obligation on the same Court to ensure that its 
actions as a Union institution in the substantive sphere do not encroach unnecessarily 
on the regulatory autonomy of the Member States in areas of shared responsibility.  
By way of illustration, it is possible to point to one obvious area of tension in the 
Court‟s current approach to the preliminary reference procedure. This concerns the 
Court‟s particular view of the term „interpretation‟ in Art 267 TFEU. As others have 
argued, this task is, for want of a better description, itself open to different 
interpretations.
137
 For example, the Court of Justice could adopt a rather narrow 
approach. It could simply formulate abstract legal propositions and leave the national 
courts to apply these to the facts at issue. Alternatively, the Court of Justice could 
adopt a much broader view of its own adjudicative competence. It could understand 
the concept of interpretation in Art 267 TFEU as denoting a requirement for an 
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assessment of the Treaty rules in light of the facts in particular cases.
138
 As Davies 




„Building judgments around the way national rules work and their 
consequences, and discussing and deciding these, is the norm. There is no 
sense of a court whose competence is in any sense confined to the Treaty.‟
140
 
It is submitted that subsidiarity could certainly be invoked to bolster criticisms of the 
Court‟s preference, in a considerable number of cases, to „decide‟ individual cases. 
This approach leaves referring courts with little scope for unilateral action. In effect, 
it may simply leave the national court with nothing more to do than to approve 
formally the Court‟s ruling at the national level. On this basis, subsidiarity could be 
relied upon to question the need for this level of judicial intervention at Union level. 
In particular, the Court‟s expansive reading of its shared adjudicative role in the 
preliminary reference procedure sits uncomfortably alongside the principle‟s 
normative claim in favour of taking decisions „as closely as possible to the citizens 
they affect.‟ Of course, the Court of Justice may have its own reasons for 
monopolising the preliminary reference procedure. Micro-managing the detail of 
individual cases is an excellent way of ensuring that Union law is applied throughout 
the Union as the Court intends.
141
 However, there is a good argument that this benefit 
– if there is one – comes at the expense of the increased proximity of localised 
adjudication, which subsidiarity is designed to protect. 
In summary, the preliminary reference procedure offers an excellent arena within 
which to explore subsidiarity‟s function as a brake on the Court‟s adjudicative 
competences. Furthermore, it also demonstrates the breadth of subsidiarity‟s 
potential impact as legal tool to structure the relationship between the EU and 
national legal orders in areas of shared responsibility. However, for reasons of scope, 
this thesis must leave the subsidiarity‟s adjudicative dimension to one side. Instead, 
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as explained more fully below, the Court‟s case law on the interpretation of the 
Treaty provisions on intra-EU movement is chosen as a suitable – and arguably more 
pressing – case study to test subsidiarity‟s impact on the exercise of the Court‟s 
functions. 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed subsidiarity‟s broader implications as a legal principle in 
EU law. The specific focus has been on whether or not subsidiarity should also have 
a role to play as a brake on the actions of the Court of Justice as an institutional actor 
in European integration. The first part of the chapter reviewed the existing references 
to this broader and underdeveloped dimension of subsidiarity in the commentary. 
Though rarely discussed, it was argued that there is some academic support for the 
use of the subsidiarity principle to guide the Court in the exercise of its own 
functions. This is also supported, at least to some degree, by the Court‟s responses to 
efforts to invoke subsidiarity expressly in this manner. On one (rather generous) 
interpretation, the Court‟s reasoning in several isolated cases masks its implicit 
acceptance of subsidiarity as a limit on its interpretative freedom. 
Section 4 then addressed the normative issue. In this section, it was argued that 
subsidiarity should also be considered to bind the Court as a Union institution. This 
conclusion builds on the earlier analyses of Bermann, Schilling and, in particular, de 
Búrca.  Developing these isolated attempts to explore the broader implications of 
subsidiarity beyond its function as a restraint on the Union legislature, it was argued 
that subsidiarity also has important consequences for the Court qua Union institution. 
Specifically, it was argued that the principle does not challenge the existence of the 
Court‟s competences under the Treaties. However, subsidiarity was shown to be 
applicable in connection with the exercise of these powers.  In summary, it was 
argued, in broad terms, that the principle operates to restrain the Court‟s freedom to 
make interpretative choices about the need for Union intervention in areas of shared 
responsibility. Furthermore, it was noted that the relevant areas of shared competence 
may be both substantive and adjudicative. In both cases, subsidiarity requires the 
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Court to engage with the principle‟s demands when exercising its interpretative 
functions.  
Moving forward, the question is now about how to apply this new dimension of 
subsidiarity in practice. It is one thing to conclude, in broad terms, that the Court 
must integrate subsidiarity analysis into its legal reasoning or adjudicative choices 
where the conditions for the principle‟s application are met. However, it is something 
quite different to set out the practical implications of this abstract conclusion in 
concrete cases. The next question, therefore, is this: how should the Court engage 
with subsidiarity in specific „real life‟ situations?  
This thesis will now explore subsidiarity‟s function as brake on the Court‟s freedom 
to interpret the concept of an „obstacle to intra-EU movement‟ in EU free movement 
law.
142
 This specific case study is selected for several key reasons. First, the Court‟s 
interpretation of obstacles to intra-EU movement across the Treaty provisions on the 
free movement of goods, services, persons and capital meets the perquisites of the 
subsidiarity test developed in this chapter. When requested to interpret the scope of 
these provisions, the Court is directly engaged in the regulation of the internal market 
as an area of shared responsibility. Specifically, through its reading of the obstacle 
concept, the Court determines the extent to which Member States are free to regulate 
without any interference at Union level. After all, only where national rules are found 
to fall within the scope of the Treaty freedoms as obstacles to intra-EU movement 
are Member States obliged to subsume and defend their regulatory preferences 
within the Treaty justification framework.  
Secondly, the case law on obstacles to intra-EU movement presents an obvious 
complement to the analysis of subsidiarity‟s function as a restraint on the Union 
legislature. It will be recalled from Chapter 1 that subsidiarity operates as a brake on 
the Union legislature‟s use of Art 114 TFEU – the legal basis for legislative 
intervention in the same area of shared regulatory responsibility, the internal market. 
In particular, subsidiarity precludes the Union legislature from using that provision 
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 The term „obstacle to intra-EU movement‟ is synonymous with the definition of the scope of the 
Treaty freedoms. 
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as a „general power to regulate the internal market.‟ The principle restricts the Union 
legislature‟s exercise of its competence under Art 114 TFEU to the regulation of two 
categories of measure: (1) obstacles to intra-EU movement and (2) appreciable 
distortions of intra-EU competition. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is a genuine „subsidiarity problem‟ to 
resolve in the case law on obstacles to intra-EU movement. As we shall see in 
Chapters 3-5, the Court interprets the scope of the Treaty freedoms broadly and in a 
manner that sits uncomfortably alongside the demands of Art 5(3) TEU. Moreover, it 
continues to face strong criticism on the ground that it encroaches too far on Member 
State autonomy. Criticism on this ground is, of course, the natural domain of the 
subsidiarity principle. 
The remainder of this thesis is divided into two parts.  The first part (Chapters 3, 4 
and 5) analyses the Court‟s current approach to the interpretation of the Treaty free 
movement provisions. Chapter 3 begins by examining the Court‟s evolving case law 
on obstacles to intra-EU movement across the individual Treaty freedoms. It is 
argued that the Court‟s approach is now converging around the broadest possible 
reading of this term, which, applied literally, could bring virtually any national 
measure within the scope of its review. This finding is clearly at odds with the 
subsidiarity principle. Chapter 4 then scrutinises the Court‟s own solution to the 
problem of managing the outer limits of the obstacle concept. This chapter 
demonstrates that the Court is aware of the need to delimit the scope of the Treaty 
freedoms and has developed some judicial tools in order to do so. However, it is 
argued that, on closer inspection, these devices are ill-defined, incoherent and 
inconsistently applied. Moreover, in practice, they also have little calming effect on 
the definition of the obstacle concept. Chapter 5 then completes the critical review of 
the current state of play by examining the key schools of thought in the literature. In 
this chapter, it is argued that there is a problem on all sides of the debate. On the one 
hand, those commentators who advocate a narrower reading of the scope of the 
Treaty freedoms (based on discrimination/mutual recognition) fail to connect their 
argument to the subsidiarity principle. Furthermore, on closer inspection, the strict 
discrimination/mutual recognition approach would appear to hand back too much 
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autonomy to the Member States – even in the eyes of its own supporters. On the 
other hand, those writers who seek to defend the Court‟s evolving, expansive 
approach to the definition of an obstacle to intra-EU movement overlook 
subsidiarity‟s function as a key source of restraint on the Court‟s interpretative 
freedom. In short, they simply assume that the Court is free to exploit its 
interpretative freedom to various ends. 
The conclusions reached in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 form the basis of the final part of the 
thesis. In this part (Chapter 6), we return, with the benefits of the analysis in 
Chapters 3-5, to consider how subsidiarity affects the Court‟s current interpretation 
of the scope of the Treaty freedoms. In conclusion, it is submitted that subsidiarity is 
the missing link in the critique of the Court‟s reading of obstacles to intra-EU 
movement. Applied to the case law, it is argued that subsidiarity calls for an 
adjustment of the Court‟s current approach. This has, in turn, a positive effect on 
Member State autonomy, ensuring that, in the process of establishing and managing 
a functioning internal market, they retain appropriate space to breathe.
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The previous chapter discussed the implications of the subsidiarity principle for the 
Court of Justice in connection with its functions as a Union institution. It was argued, 
in broad terms, that the Court should be considered to be bound by the demands of 
subsidiarity in the exercise of both its substantive and adjudicative competences. 
Specifically, the conclusion reached was that subsidiarity must be integrated into the 
Court‟s interpretative choices where these involve decisions over whether or not 
there is a need for intervention at Union level in the exercise of regulatory or 
adjudicative competences that are shared with Member State institutions. The 
remainder of this thesis examines the implications of that broad conclusion through 
the lens of a particular case study. The Court‟s interpretation of the term „obstacle to 
intra-EU movement‟ (which is synonymous with the definition of the scope of the 
Treaty freedoms on intra-EU movement)
1
 is chosen as an ideal testing ground for the 
subsidiarity argument developed in Chapter 2.
2
 
This chapter sketches out the Court‟s current approach to the definition of an 
obstacle to intra-EU movement across the Treaty freedoms on goods, services, 
persons and capital. It begins, in section 2, by outlining (briefly) the basic framework 
of the Treaty provisions on intra-EU movement and by emphasising the suitability of 
the term „obstacle to intra-EU movement‟ as a case study to test the practical impact 
of subsidiarity on the exercise of the Court‟s interpretative functions. The section 
also points – as an excursus – to the potential to apply subsidiarity at other stages of 
                                                          
1
 Arts 21, 34, 35, 45, 49, 56 and 63(1) TFEU. 
2
 The chosen case study is concerned exclusively with the Court‟s exercise of its substantive 
competence in this area. The adjudicative dimension, which addresses the exercise of the Court‟s 
shared competence to settle legal disputes involving points of EU law through the preliminary 
reference procedure (Art 267 TFEU), will not, for reasons of scope, be examined further.  
3. Obstacles to intra-EU movement: a converging and expanding framework 
 
  107 
the Court‟s review, specifically at the second-stage justification analysis. Section 3 
then outlines the Court‟s evolving jurisprudence on obstacles to intra-EU movement 
across the individual freedoms. In summary, it is argued that the Court‟s case law is 
now converging around the broadest possible reading of this concept. The Court‟s 
preferred approach to defining the scope of Treaty freedoms increasingly targets 
Member State rules that are liable (actually or potentially) to deter or dissuade intra-
EU movement or affect access to the market. Applied literally, this formula comes 
worryingly close to granting the Court a general power of review over virtually all 
Member State regulation – a position that is irreconcilable with the subsidiarity 
principle.  
2. Obstacles to intra-EU movement 
2.1 Introduction 
The Treaty rules on intra-EU movement are set out in the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union. The individual provisions seek to guarantee the free 
movement of goods (Arts 34 and 35 TFEU), services (Art 56 TFEU), persons (Arts 
45 and 49 TFEU) and capital (Art 63(1) TFEU) within the internal market. In 
addition to these economic rights of movement, the Treaty also provides Member 
State nationals with the right to move and reside freely within the internal market as 
Union Citizens (Art 21 TFEU).  
Analysis of whether or not a national measure is contrary to the above provisions is a 
three-step process. First, the Court must determine whether the contested national 
rule falls within the scope of one of the Treaty provisions as an obstacle to intra-EU 
movement. Assuming a positive answer to this first stage, it must be determined, 
secondly, whether that same national measure can nevertheless be justified against 
the Treaty framework. The obligation to defend national rules that are found to 
constitute obstacles to movement falls to the relevant Member State. That State can 
seek to defend its particular policy choices by using either the express grounds for 
derogation set out in the Treaty or by proposing an additional overriding public 
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interest.
3
 In both cases, the relevant Member State must then demonstrate, thirdly, 
that the contested national measure is both a suitable means of ensuring the objective 
at issue and, more importantly, that it constitutes the least restrictive alternative 
available (the proportionality test).
4
 
This thesis focuses on the first of the three stages – the determination of an obstacle 
to intra-EU movement. It is submitted that this is the ideal point at which to examine 
subsidiarity‟s practical impact on the Court‟s interpretative functions. The term 
„obstacle to intra-EU movement‟ marks a critical dividing line between Member 
State and Union competence in an area of shared competence: the regulation of the 
internal market.
5
 As noted above, Member States are only required to justify their 
particular regulatory preferences to the extent that these preferences constitute 
obstacles to intra-EU movement. In all other cases, the Member States are left to 
contribute to the regulation of the internal market as an area of shared responsibility 
without interference from the Court. From the perspective of subsidiarity, the manner 
in which the Court chooses to define obstacles to intra-EU movement is therefore of 
fundamental importance. If the Court elects to define the term broadly, it thereby 
increases its own power to scrutinise national policy preferences. Pushed too far, 
there is clearly a danger that the Court‟s approach might conflict with the demands of 
subsidiarity. 
                                                          
3
 The express derogations are set out in Arts 36, 45(3), 45(4), 51, 52 and 65 TFEU.  For examples of 
the additional category of mandatory requirements or overriding public interest grounds, see eg Case 
120/78 Cassis de Dijon [1979] ECR I-649 at para. 8 and Case C-55/94 Reinhard Gebhard v Consiglio 
dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano [1995] ECR I-4165 at para. 37. For detailed 
analysis, see C. Barnard, „Derogations, Justifications and The Four Freedoms: Is State Interest Really 
Protected?‟ in C. Barnard and O. Odudu (Eds.) The Outer Limits of European Union Law (Oxford: 
Hart, 2009) 273. According to the Court, the additional category of mandatory 
requirements/overriding public interest grounds can only be used to justify indistinctly applicable 
national measures (i.e. those that apply without distinction to both imports/nationals of other Member 
State and domestic products/economic operators). See eg Joined Cases C-1/90 and C-176/90 
Aragonesa [1991] ECR I-4151 at para. 13. However, on occasion, the Court has strayed from its 
official position. See eg Case C-2/90 Commission v. Belgium (Wallon Waste) [1992] ECR I-4431 at 
paras 29-36. 
4
 Eg Case 261/81 Rau [1982] ECR 3961 at para. 12 and Case C-55/94 Gebhard op. cit. at note 3 at 
para. 37. For discussion of proportionality in EU free movement, see eg J. Jans, „Proportionality 
Revisited‟ (2000) 27(3) LIEI 239. 
5
 See Art 4(2)(a) TFEU. 
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The constitutional significance of finding that a national measure amounts to an 
obstacle to intra-EU movement is well known in the legal scholarship.
6
 As Dougan 
points out, EU lawyers could rightly be accused of „fetishizing‟ their analysis of the 
Court‟s case law on this point.
7
 However, it is worth stressing, as Dougan himself 
does, that the significance of determining what constitutes an obstacle to intra-EU 
movement goes beyond law. If the Court furnishes itself with an extremely broad 
power of review over Member State regulatory choices, then this is not simply a 
legal problem. The Court‟s preferred approach also has direct political and economic 
consequences. In political terms, an inappropriately wide reading of the scope of the 
Treaty freedoms risks undermining the integrity of national political processes.  After 
all, to the extent that it elects to scrutinise national measures as obstacles to intra-EU 
movement, the Court is effectively reviewing the substance of political compromises 
struck at Member State level. Equally, there are also economic risks associated with 
the Court‟s interpretation of the scope of the Treaty freedoms. Again, if developed 
without appropriate limits, the Court‟s review of national measures as obstacles to 
intra-EU movement may undermine the economic benefits of regulatory diversity 
within the internal market.
8
  
The broader political and economic dangers associated with the Court‟s 
interpretation of the obstacle concept emphasise the relevance of subsidiarity to the 
debate. Subsidiarity is a natural focal point in discussions over the Court‟s 
appropriate reading of the scope of the Treaty freedoms. Its primary concern is to 
protect, in so far as possible and for both political and economic reasons, the right of 
citizens to have decisions that affect them taken as closely as possible to them (see 
Chapter 1). As argued above, there is clearly scope for the Court‟s reading of the 
scope of the Treaty freedoms to conflict with this right. Rather surprisingly, the link 
                                                          
6
 See here esp. N. Bernard, „Discrimination and Free Movement in EC Law‟ (1996) 45(1) ICLQ 82 at 
p. 82, M. Poiares Maduro, We the Court: The European Court of Justice & the European Economic 
Constitution (Oxford: Hart, 1999) esp. at p. 58, N. Bernard, Multilevel Governance in the European 
Union (Amsterdam: Kluwer, 2002) at p. 60, J. Snell, Goods and Services in EC Law: A Study in the 
Relationship Between the Freedoms (Oxford: OUP, 2002) at p. 48 and E. Spaventa, Free Movement of 
Persons in the European Union: Barriers to Movement in the Constitutional Context (AH Alphen aan 
den Rijn: Kluwer, 2007) at p. 76. 
7
 M. Dougan, „Legal Developments‟ (2010) 48 JCMS 163 at p. 163. 
8
 See on this same point esp. C. Barnard and S. Deakin, „Market Access and Regualtory Competition‟ 
in C. Barnard and J. Scott (Eds.) The Law of the Single European Market (Oxford: Hart, 2002) p. 197 
at pp 198-202 and Snell op. cit. at note 6 at pp 35-45. 
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between subsidiarity and the Court‟s freedom to interpret the scope of the Treaty 
freedoms is virtually absent in the legal scholarship. This point is discussed further in 
Chapters 5 and 6.  
The remainder of this chapter will now review the state of play in the Court‟s case 
law on obstacles to intra-EU movement. It will also comment, in general terms, on 
whether or not the Court‟s evolving approach seems to fit comfortably alongside the 
logic of the subsidiarity principle. However, before turning our full attention to these 
matters, it is worth illustrating briefly the extent to which subsidiarity might also be 
potentially relevant to the Court‟s exercise of its interpretative freedom at the 
justification stage; in other words, at the point where Member State are obliged to 
defend their regulatory preferences within the EU derogation framework. The 
conclusion reached in this section provides further support for the decision in this 
thesis to focus exclusively on analysing subsidiarity‟s implications for the Court‟s 
freedom to interpret obstacles to intra-EU movement. 
2.2 Excursus: Subsidiarity and the justification of obstacles to intra-EU 
movement 
At first sight, the justification stage may appear to be the most appropriate arena in 
which to apply subsidiarity as a restraint on the Court‟s interpretative freedom. At 
this stage of judicial inquiry, the Court is required to determine whether or not a 
particular national policy objective that conflicts with the Treaty freedoms can be 
defended in EU law. As noted above, there are two ways in which Member States 
can seek to defend their policy preferences. Broadly speaking, Member States can 
rely on one of the express Treaty derogations and/or invoke a supplementary 
„mandatory requirement‟ to the same effect.
9
 In both cases, the Court examines 
whether or not the contested national rule can be saved on the justification ground(s) 
advanced. Assuming a positive answer at this stage, the focus then turns to the 
proportionality of the national rule. To constitute a valid justification in EU law, the 
national rule must be suitable to realise the derogation ground(s) at issue and also not 
go beyond what is strictly necessary to achieve that objective. 
                                                          
9
 See note 3 and the case law and literature cited therein. 
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Although closely tied up with questions about Member State autonomy, it is 
submitted that there is in fact surprisingly little scope to apply subsidiarity as a 
restraint on the Court at the justification stage. Here, the Court is not, strictly 
speaking, faced with interpretative choices that are subject to the demands of the 
subsidiarity principle. At the justification stage, the Court is not asked to decide 
whether or not there is a need to exercise competence at Union level to regulate the 
internal market (the subsidiarity test developed in Chapter 2). The decision to 
intervene in the regulation of the internal market at Union level through the 
interpretation of the Treaty free movement provisions has already been made. The 
issue at the justification stage is rather one of re-regulating the market at Union level. 
Put simply, the Court must decide whether and, if so, the extent to which a particular 
national policy can be squared with the Treaty‟s internal market objective. These 
issues would seem to go beyond subsidiarity.  
Notwithstanding the above, it is submitted that there remains some scope to develop 
subsidiarity as a restraint on the Court‟s interpretative freedom at the justification 
stage. In particular, subsidiarity could be used to scrutinise the selection of suitable 
mandatory requirements. In this connection, the principle would require the Court to 
examine whether or not the relevant Member State is in fact capable of achieving – 
through action at the national level – the objective that it seeks to defend.
10
 In most 
cases, this test will be met, even in the context of a transnational market. For 
example, typical mandatory requirements such as consumer protection,
11
 the 
protection of the environment
12
 and safeguarding fundamental rights
13
 are all 
objectives that Member States are at least capable of contributing to through national 
action. However, the ruling in Commission v. Italy (Energy Markets), discussed in 
                                                          
10
 One could go a step further and argue that subsidiarity is only relevant to the assessment of 
mandatory requirements in so far as these seek to regulate areas of shared competence. However, for 
reasons of scope, it is not possible to explore this point further here. 
11
 Eg Case 120/78 Cassis op. cit. at note 3 at para. 8, Case C-470/93 Mars GmbH [1995] ECR I-1923 
at para. 15, Case C-313/94 Graffione [1996] ECR I-6039 at para. 17 and Case C-12/00 Commission v. 
Spain (Chocolate) [2003] ECR I-459 at para. 83. 
12
 Eg Case 302/86 Commission v. Denmark [1988] ECR 4607 at para. 9, Case C-309/02 Radberger 
Getränkegesellschaft [2004] ECR I-11763 at para. 75 and Case C-320/03 Commission v. Austria 
(Road Transport) [2005] ECR I-9871 at para. 80. 
13
 Eg Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659 at para. 82, Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen 
[2004] ECR I-9609 at para. 33 and Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd [2007] ECR I-11767 at para. 
93. 
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Chapter 2, illustrates that this might not always be the case.
14
 In that case, the Italian 
Government sought to justify its legislation governing the acquisition of shares in 
certain previously nationalised energy companies, which the Court had ruled 
contrary to the freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital. The 
defendant argued that the contested legislation was necessary in order to protect the 
competitiveness of the Union energy market.
15
 Although not referring to subsidiarity, 
the Court‟s rejection of this possible overriding public interest ground sits 
comfortably with the principle‟s logic. The „overriding interest‟ that the Italian 
Government sought to safeguard could not be achieved through unilateral Member 
State action. Rather, as the Court noted, it was for the Commission to take any 




It is important to note that the (limited) scope to apply subsidiarity in the above 
manner departs from the main argument advanced in this thesis. Any attempt to use 
subsidiarity in order to scrutinise the selection of mandatory requirements amounts to 
requiring the Court to apply the principle as a substantive test. In other words, it 
involves asking the Court to make its own assessment of whether or not – according 
to the demands of the subsidiarity principle – a particular policy is, in principle, 
capable of being realised at the national level. This must be distinguished from the 
subsidiarity test set out in Chapter 2. Crucially, this thesis does not seek to develop 
subsidiarity as a distinct test that should be applied by the Court, alongside, for 
example, the proportionality principle. The argument here is different. Following the 
analysis in Chapter 2, this thesis applies subsidiarity to the Court. It examines the 
implications of subsidiarity for the Court in the exercise of its own interpretative 
functions as a Union institution. 
Leaving discussion of subsidiarity‟s broader implications aside, we now turn to the 
detail of the chosen case study: the concept of an obstacle to intra-EU movement. 
This begins, in this chapter, with an overview of the Court‟s evolving approach to 
                                                          
14
 Case C-174/04 Commission v Italy (Energy Markets) [2005] ECR I-4933. 
15
 Ibid., at para. 39. In practice, the contested Italian rules were specifically conceived to prevent 
French State-owned energy companies from acquiring control of newly privatised Italian energy 
undertakings. 
16
 Ibid., at para. 38. 
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defining this term in the case law. The author is aware that this particular issue has 
already been subject to extensive analysis in the legal scholarship.
17
 Moreover, the 
case law discussed here will also be familiar to many readers. For both reasons, this 
section aims to be as succinct as possible, focusing only on the key developments of 
direct relevance to the core argument. In summary, section 3 seeks to emphasise two 
key points. First, it argues that the Court‟s reading of the scope of the Treaty 
freedoms is increasingly converging around a uniform test. Secondly, and more 
importantly, it is argued that, in substance, this test is worryingly broad. According to 
the Court, the term „obstacle to intra-EU movement‟ now extends, in principle, to 
capture any national measure that is liable (actually or potentially) to deter or 
dissuade intra-EU movement or affect access to the market. Applied literally, this 
comes dangerously close to granting the Court a general power to scrutinise Member 
State legislation in the name of establishing a functioning internal market. This is 
clearly out of step with the demands of the subsidiarity principle. 
3. What constitutes an obstacle to intra-EU movement? 
3.1. Goods 
The Treaty contains two provisions addressing non-fiscal barriers to intra-EU trade 
in goods.
18
 Art 34 TFEU prohibits „quantitative restrictions on imports and all 
measures having equivalent effect.‟ Art 35 TFEU repeats the same prohibition with 
respect to the export of goods. The prohibition of quantitative restrictions on both 
imports and exports is straightforward. The term „quantitative restriction‟ refers, for 
both provisions, to national measures that represent a total or partial restraint on 
imports, exports or goods in transit.‟
19
 In practice, this captures national measures 
                                                          
17
 See, from a long list, eg S. Weatherill, „After Keck: Some Thoughts on How to Clarify the 
Clarification‟ (1996) 33(5) CMLRev 885, C. Barnard, „Fitting the Remaining Pieces into the Goods 
and Persons Jigsaw‟ (2001) 26(1) ELRev 34, Poiares Maduro op. cit. at note 6 at esp. pp 35-58, 
Bernard op. cit. at note 6 esp. at pp 15-62, N. Nic Shuibhne, „The Free Movement of Goods and 
Article 28 EC: An Evolving Framework‟ (2002) 27(4) ELRev 408, Snell op. cit. at note 6 at pp 31-
127, G. Davies, Nationality Discrimination in the European Internal Market (The Hague: Kluwer, 
2003) at pp 21-89 and Spaventa op. cit. at note 6 esp. at pp 35-74 and pp 113-134. 
18
 For reasons of scope, this thesis will not examine the Treaty rules on fiscal barriers to the intra-EU 
movement of goods (Art 30 TFEU on custom duties and Art 110 TFEU on internal taxation). 
19
 Case 2/73 Geddo v. Ente Nationale Risi [1973] ECR 865 at para. 7.  
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that impose quotas on the import or export of goods or, in the most extreme form, 
total bans on the same.
20
   
3.1.1 MEQRs - Art 34 TFEU 
The tension in the case law on both Arts 34 and 35 centres on the definition of 
„measures having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction‟ (MEQRs). With 
respect first to imports, the starting point remains the Court‟s formative decision in 
Dassonville.
21
 As Oliver notes, that decision is (and remains) the fons et origo of 
case law on Art 34 TFEU.
22
 In this case, the Court opted for an extremely broad 
reading of the scope of that provision. It interpreted the concept of an MEQR as 
capturing „all trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of 
hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially intra-[EU] trade [in goods].‟
23
 
As the wording of this definition makes clear, the Court‟s approach is focused on the 
effects of national measures on the importation of products from one Member State 




The definition of an MEQR has been subject to repeated instances of clarification. In 
the first instance, the ECJ confirmed in Cassis de Dijon that the term also covers 
indistinctly applicable national rules.
25
 This refers to Member State measures that 
apply to both imported and domestic products alike. This marked a further extension 
in the scope of Art 34 TFEU. In Cassis, the Court concluded that, even where 
indistinctly applicable, national rules prescribing a minimum alcohol content for fruit 
liqueurs infringed Art 34 TEU unless it could be shown that they were necessary in 
                                                          
20
 Eg Case 34/79 Henn and Darby [1972] ECR 3795 at paras 12-13 (Art 34 TFEU), Case C-170/04 
Rosengren v. Riksåklagaren [2007] ECR I-4071 at para. 33 (Art 34 TFEU), Case C-47/90 Delhaize 
Frères [1992] ECR I-3369 at paras 12-14 (Art 35 TFEU), Case C-5/94 Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd 
[1996] ECR I-2553 at para. 12 (Art 35 TFEU) and Case C-1/96 Compassion in World Farming [1998] 
ECR I-1251 at para. 39 (Art 35 TFEU). 
21
 Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837. As recently confirmed by the Grand Chamber of the Court 
in Case C-110/05 Commission v. Italy (Motorcycle Trailers) [2009] ECR 519 at para. 33. 
22
 P. Oliver, „Of Trailers and Jet Skis: Is the Case Law on Article 34 TFEU Hurtling in a New 
Direction?‟ (2010) 33(5) Fordham Int. LJ 1423 at p. 1457. 
23
 Case 8/74 Dassonville op. cit. at note 21 at para. 5. 
24
 For confirmation of this point, see eg Case C-184/96 Commission v. France (Foie Gras) [1998] 
ECR I-6197 at para. 17. In this case, the Court noted that it was sufficient that the contested rule was 
„capable of hindering, at least potentially, intra-State trade‟ (this author‟s emphasis).  
25
 Case 120/78 Cassis op. cit. at note 3.  
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order to satisfy a proportionate mandatory requirement.
26
 The Court‟s reasoning was 
simple: once a product had been lawfully produced and marketed in one of the 
Member States, there was no valid reason, in principle, why it should not be 
introduced into the markets of other Member States.
27
  
Unfortunately for the Court, the breadth of its preferred definition of MEQRs 
returned to haunt it in later case law. This resulted in the second, and most 
controversial, clarification of the Dassonville formula. The particular problem 
centred on traders‟ efforts to rely on the broad scope of Art 34 TFEU in order to 
review indistinctly applicable rules regulating the conditions under which products 
could be marketed within Member States.
28
 The Court‟s initial response to such 
attempts was rather inconsistent. In certain cases, the Court ruled that such measures 
fell outside of the scope of Art 34 TFEU.
29
 However, in other decisions, the Court 
concluded that rules of the same nature required justification as obstacles to intra-EU 
movement.
30
 In Keck, the Court was pressed to clear up this confusion.
31
 In the 
words of Advocate General Léger, this ruling sought „to put an end to the dangers of 
wandering off course inherent in the extremely broad definition of measures having 
effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction.‟
32
 Interestingly, the Court‟s attempt to 
rein in the scope of Art 34 TFEU coincided with the introduction of subsidiarity into 
the Treaty framework at Maastricht.
33
  
                                                          
26
 Ibid., at para. 8. 
27
 Ibid., at para. 14. See here also Commission Communication Concerning the Consequences of the 
Judgment given by the Court of Justice on 20 February 1979 in Case 120/78 (“Cassis de Dijon”) 
[1980] OJ C 256/2.   
28
 Eg Joined Cases 60 and 61/84 Cinéthèque SA and others [1985] ECR 2605, Case 145/88 Torfaen 
Borough Council v B & Q plc [1989] ECR 3851 and C-362/88 GB-INNO-BM v Confédération du 
commerce luxembourgeois [1990] ECR I-667. For background discussion, see eg E. White, „In Search 
of the Limits to Art. 30 of the EEC Treaty‟ (1989) 26 CMLRev 235 and D. Chalmers, „Free Movement 
of Goods within the European Community: An Unhealthy Addiction to Scotch Whisky?‟ (1993) 42(2) 
ICLQ 269. For recent in-depth analysis, see L. Gormley, „Silver Threads Among the Gold… 50 Years 
of the Free Movement of Goods‟ (2007) 31(6) Fordham Int. LJ 1637. 
29
 Case 75/81 Blesgen [1982] ECR 1211 at paras 7-11. See also Case 155/80 Oebel [1981] ECR 1993 
at para. 19 and Case C-69/88 Krantz [1990] ECR I-538 at para. 10. 
30
 See eg Joined Cases 60 and 61/84 Cinéthèque SA and others op. cit. at note 28 at para. 22 and Case 
145/88 Torfaen Borough Council op. cit. at note 28 at para. 12. 
31
 Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Keck and Mithouard [1992] ECR I-6097. See here, in 
particular, the Opinion of AG Tesauro in Case C-292/92 Hünermund [1993] ECR I-6787 at para. 1. 
32
 Opinion of AG Léger in Case C-309/99 Wouters and Others [2002] ECR I-1577 at para. 243. 
33
 The relationship between Art 5(3) TEU and Keck is examined further in Chapter 6. 
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In Keck, the Court sought to manage the scope of Art 34 TFEU by introducing a 
distinction between two different categories of national measure: (1) rules regulating 
product characteristics and (2) those governing certain selling arrangements. With 





In line with its earlier ruling in Cassis, the Court stated that national measures 
prescribing the characteristics to be met by products (eg composition, size, labelling, 
packaging etc) continue to fall automatically within the scope of Art 34 TFEU.
36
 By 
contrast, Member State legislation governing the conditions under which goods may 
be sold in that State (eg shop opening hours or advertising rules), the second 
category, do not constitute obstacles to intra-EU movement provided two cumulative 
conditions are met.
37
 First, they must apply to all traders established on the national 
territory. Secondly, the rules must apply to both domestic and imported goods in the 
same manner in law and in fact. In practice, only the latter limb (the discrimination 
test)
38
 has emerged as a substantive test.  
After a period of relative calm (1992-2005), the Court has recently sought to reassert 
the broadest possible reading of its formative Dassonville formula. In so doing, it 
has, on one view, departed from the spirit of its ruling in Keck and expanded (once 
again) its power to scrutinise the regulatory preferences of the Member States as 
obstacles to intra-EU movement. For example, in Commission v. Netherlands 
(Roadworthiness Test), the Court emphasised that a mere (potential) „deterrent‟ 
effect on intra-EU movement is sufficient to trigger Art 34 TFEU.
39
 Similarly, in 
Radberger Getränkegesellschaft, the Court restated its earlier conclusion that the 
                                                          
34
 See post-Keck eg Case C-470/93 Mars GmbH op. cit. at note 11 at paras 12-13, Case C-368/95 
Heinrich Bauer Verlag [1997] ECR I-3689 at paras 11-12 and Case C-12/00 Commission v. Spain 
(Chocolate) op. cit. at note 11 at paras 71-82. 
35
 Although silent on this point, the Keck ruling also had no effect on the Court‟s case law on national 
rules requiring licences, certificates or other documentation in order to import products from other 
Member States. The same is also true for the case law on import inspections. Both sets of case law 
remain subject to scrutiny against the Dassonville formula. See, post-Keck, eg Case C-189/95 Harry 
Franzén [1997] ECR I-5909 at para. 71 and Case C-170/04 Rosengren and Others op. cit. at note 20 
at para. 36. 
36
 Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Keck and Mithouard op. cit. at note 31 at para. 15. 
37
 Ibid., at para. 16. 
38
 For discussion, see eg D. Wilsher, „Does Keck Discrimination Make Any Sense? An Assessment of 
the Non-discrimination Principle within the European Single Market‟ (2008) 33(1) ELRev 3. 
39
 Case C-297/05 Commission v. Netherlands (Roadworthiness Test) [2007] ECR I-7467 at para. 53. 
See also earlier eg Case 65/05 Commission v. Greece (Electronic Games) [2006] ECR I-10341 at 
para. 28. 
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finding of an obstacle to intra-EU movement does not depend on the magnitude of 
the contested measure‟s effect on intra-EU trade.
40
  
Most recently, the Court (Grand Chamber) has broadened the scope of Art 34 TFEU 
through the application of a market access test. In Commission v Italy (Motorcycle 
Trailers), the Court ruled that the concept of an MEQR extended to include „[a]ny 
other measure which hinders access of products originating in other Member States 
to the market of a Member State.‟
41
 Unfortunately, the Court‟s reasoning does not 
really clarify how the market access test relates to the existing rulings in Dassonville, 
Cassis and Keck.
42
 However, on one view, the new market access test is simply a 
new label for the Dassonville test.
43
 As such, it has opened up a greater sphere of 
Member State regulation to scrutiny – the key point for present purposes. At the very 
least, the Court‟s adjustment in Commission v Italy (Motorcycle Trailers) now 
permits the Court to review indistinctly applicable national measures that do not 
prescribe „product characteristics‟ or govern „certain selling arrangements.‟ 
However, the Court may yet opt to go further. 
 
 
                                                          
40
 Case C-309/02 Radberger Getränkegesellschaft op. cit. at note 11. At para. 68, the Court concluded 
that: „A measure capable of hindering imports must be classified as a measure having equivalent 
effect to a quantitative restriction even though the hindrance is slight.‟ On the same point, see earlier 
eg Joined Cases 177/82 and 178/82 Van de Haar [1984] ECR 1797 at para.14. The existence of a de 
minimis/appreciability test in the case law on obstacles to intra-EU movement is examined in Chapter 
4. 
41
 Case C-110/05 Commission v. Italy (Motorcycle Trailers) op. cit. at note 21 at para. 51. See also 
thereafter Case C-142/05 Mickelsson and Roos [2009] ECR I-4273 at paras 24-26. Market access had 
featured in the Court‟s earlier case law on Art 34 TFEU. However, as will be argued in Chapter 6, 
prior to the ruling in Case C-110/05 Commission v. Italy (Motorcycle Trailers), the term was simply a 
synonym for indirect discrimination. See Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Keck and Mithouard 
op. cit. at note 31 at para. 17 as interpreted in eg Case C-405/98 Gourmet International Products 
[2001] ECR I-1795 at paras 18-21. 
42
 For some, Commission v. Italy (Motorcycle Trailers) is read as confirming the position of market 
access as the basic test for Art 34 TFEU. See eg C. Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: the Four 
Freedoms (3
rd
 Ed.) (Oxford: OUP, 2010) at pp 107-108 and p. 144 and A. Tryfonidou, „Further Steps 
on the Road to Convergence amongst the Market Freedoms‟ (2010) 35(1) ELRev 36 at p. 48. Others 
argue that the ruling is far less significant and characterises more of a consolidation than a revolution 
of the case law on Art 34 TFEU. See eg P. Wennerås and K.B. Moen, „Selling Arrangements, 
Keeping Keck‟ (2009) 35(3) ELRev 387. 
43
 T. Horsley, „Anyone for Keck?‟ (Case Comment) (2009) 46(6) CMLRev 2001. On this point, see 
also Oliver op. cit. at note 22 at p. 1460. 
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3.1.2 MEQRs - Art 35 TFEU  
Although identical in wording, Art 35 TFEU on exports has followed a rather 
different and less dramatic evolutionary trajectory.
44
 Until recently, the Court‟s 
reading of the scope of this provision remained narrower than its interpretation of Art 
34 TFEU. In Groenveld,
45
 the Court stated clearly that Art 35 TFEU prohibited only 
national rules: 
„which have as their specific object or effect the restriction of patterns of 
exports and thereby the establishment of a difference in treatment between 
the domestic trade of a Member State and its export trade in such a way as to 
provide a particular advantage for national production or for the domestic 
market of the State in questions at the expense of the production or of the 
trade of other Member States.‟
46
  
For many years, the Court adhered strictly to its Groenveld formula.
47
 However, 
following earlier hints in this direction,
48
 the Court (Grand Chamber) changed its 
approach in Gysbrechts and opted to expand the scope of Art 35 TFEU.
49
 The 
dispute in Gysbrechts centred on the compatibility with Art 35 TFEU of Belgian 
rules prohibiting suppliers, engaged in cross-border distance selling, from requiring 
an advance or any payment from a consumer before the expiry of a mandatory 
withdrawal period. The applicant, the manager of a Belgian undertaking specialising 
in the sale of food supplements, maintained that this prohibition was contrary to Art 
35 TFEU. Siding with the applicant, the Court broadened its interpretation of that 
provision. It concluded that: 
„even if applicable to all traders active in the national territory, the actual 
effect of the contested measure was greater on goods leaving the market of 
                                                          
44
 For discussion, see eg P. Oliver and S. Enchelmaier, „Free Movement of Goods: Recent 
Developments in the Case Law‟ (2007) 44(3) CMLRev 649 and A. Dawes, „A Freedom Reborn? The 
New Yet Unclear Scope of Art 29 EC‟ (2009) 34(4) ELRev 639. 
45
 Case 15/79 P.B. Groenveld [1979] ECR 3409. 
46
 Ibid., at para. 7. In earlier cases, the Court had concluded that Art 35 TFEU captured export-specific 
measures without ruling, in broad terms, on the scope of that provision. See eg Case 53/76 Bouhelier 
[1977] ECR 197 at para. 16. 
47
 See, from a list of many examples, Case 155/80 Oebel op. cit. at note 29 at para. 15, Case 237/82 
Jongeneel Kaas BV[1984] ECR 483 at para. 22 and Case C-3/91 Exportur [1992] ECR I-5529 at para. 
21 and, more recently, Case C-293/02 Jersey Potatoes [2005] ECR I-9543 at para. 73. 
48
 See eg the Court‟s cumulative reading of Arts 34 and 35 TFEU in Case C-112/02 Schmidberger op. 
cit. at note 13 at paras 55-56. For discussion of this point, see Dawes op. cit. at note 44 at p. 640. 
49
 Case C-205/07 Gysbrechts [2008] ECR I-9947. 
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the exporting Member State than on the marketing of goods in the domestic 
market of that Member State.‟
50
  
In its subsequent case law, the Court has brought its reading of Art 35 TFEU even 
closer in line with its case law on Art 34 TFEU and the ruling in Dassonville in 
particular. In Kakavetsos-Fragkopoulos AE, the Court concluded that Art 35 TFEU 
extended to capture Greek legislation prohibiting a grape processor established in 
one area of that Member State from importing grapes from another part of that same 
State for the purpose of storage, processing and packing for sale – including for 
export to the markets of other Member States.
51
 The Court ruled that this legislation 
was „likely to hamper, at the very least potentially, intra-Community trade and 
therefore constitutes a [MEQR] on exports.‟
52
 This was based on the finding that the 
Greek rule „undoubtedly [had] an impact on that operator‟s volume of exports.‟
53
 The 
reference to the measure‟s impact on the volume of intra-EU trade carries distinct 
echoes of the Court‟s most controversial case law on Art 34 TFEU. Both its pre-Keck 
case law on indistinctly applicable trading rules and now also its post-Keck approach 
to indistinctly applicable Member State rules regulating product use (eg Commission 
v Italy (Motorcycle Trailers) can be reduced to arguments on this same point.
54
 
3.2. Workers, establishment and services 
3.2.1 Overview 
As with goods, the Court‟s interpretation of the scope of the Treaty provisions on the 
free movement of workers (Art 45 TFEU), the freedom of establishment (Art 49 
                                                          
50
 Ibid., at para. 43. In support of this assessment, the Court noted that the effect of the Belgian 
legislation was to deprive traders concluding cross-border distance selling contracts for the sale of 
goods of an „efficient tool with which to guard against the risk of non-payment‟ (see para. 41).  
51
 Case C-161/09 Kakavetsos-Fragkopoulos AE, judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 3 March 
2011 (nyr). As the Advocate General noted in his Opinion, applying the traditional Gysbrechts test, 
the measure would fall outside the scope of Art 35 TFEU. In his view, it was „difficult to argue that 
the effect of the Greek legislation is that the domestic trade of the Hellenic Republic and its export 
trade are treated differently, since the prohibition on internal movement – prior to the prohibition on 
exports – applies to all currants, whether they are intended for export or for the domestic market.‟ See 
the Opinion of AG Mengozzi in Case C-161/09 Kakavetsos-Fragkopoulos AE at para. 51.  However, 
as the AG noted in his Opinion (at paras 49-50), one possible explanation for the Court‟s decision in 
this case is that the measure at issue concerned a regulated market within meaning of Art 40 TFEU. 
The Court has historically adopted a broad approach to Art 35 TFEU (even before Gysbrechts) in such 
cases. See eg Case 94/79 Vriend [1980] ECR 327 at para. 8. 
52
 Case C-161/09 Kakavetsos-Fragkopoulos AE op. cit. at note 51 at para. 29. 
53
 Ibid.. at para. 28. 
54
 Horsley op. cit. at note 43 at pp 2010-2012. 
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TFEU) and the freedom to provide intra-EU services (Art 56 TFEU) poses an 
increasing challenge to the regulatory autonomy of the Member States. The Court‟s 
evolving approach in each of the three areas is now converging around a broad 
effects-based test, which focuses on the (potential) „deterrent‟ or „dissuasive‟ effects 
of national measures on intra-EU movement. Equally, following the case law on Art 
34 TFEU, the Court‟s interpretation of the term „obstacle to intra-EU movement‟ in 
Arts 45, 49 and 56 also targets Member State rules that are liable to have an effect on 
market access. However, although now broadly comparable in result, the case law on 
workers, establishment and services has followed a different evolutionary path to that 
on goods (and Art 34 TFEU in particular). With respect to Arts 45, 49 and 56 TFEU, 
the Court‟s expansion of obstacles to intra-EU movement relied, in the first instance, 
on a broad reading of indirect discrimination. Only through later decisions has the 
Court brought its case law on workers, establishment and services
55
 closer in line 
with its Dassonville test, which makes no reference to discrimination. Finally, the 
Court‟s Keck ruling has not been transposed to the case law on Arts 45, 49 and 56 
TFEU.  
3.2.2 Discrimination 
The wording of Arts 45, 49 and 56 TFEU makes it clear that these provisions are 
concerned – at least in part – with eliminating all discrimination on the grounds of 
Member State nationality. Art 45 TFEU requires „the abolition of any discrimination 
based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, 
remuneration and other conditions of work and employment.‟ Similarly, Art 49 
TFEU provides that the freedom of establishment „shall include the right to take up 
and pursue activities as self-employed persons and to set up and manage 
undertakings…under the conditions laid down for its own nationals by the law of the 
[Member State] where such establishment is effected.‟ Finally, Art 57 TFEU (which 
seeks to define „services‟ for the purposes of the Treaty) states that service providers 
who are nationals of a Member State may „temporarily pursue [their] activity in the 
                                                          
55
 In the case law on services, the expansion of the term „obstacle to intra-EU movement‟ has its 
origins in the formative decision in Case 33/74 van Binsbergen [1974] ECR 1299 at para. 10. This 
point is discussed in section 3.2.3.1. 
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Member State where the service is provided, under the same conditions as are 
imposed by that State on its own nationals.‟ 
The Court has adopted a uniform approach to the prohibition of discrimination on the 
grounds of Member State nationality across Arts 45, 49 and 56 TFEU. It defines 
discrimination in clear terms: „discrimination arises through the application of 
different rules to comparable situations or the application of the same rules to 
different situations.‟
56
 As Spaventa rightly notes, the Court tends to assume that the 
situations of Member State nationals are comparable.
57
 The key exception to this rule 
arises in the area of direct taxation. In this field, the Court has accepted the general 
principle of international tax law that the situations of resident and non-resident 
taxpayer are, in principle, not comparable.
58
 
Discrimination can be both direct and indirect. A national measure is directly 
discriminatory where it employs the prohibited criterion of Member State nationality 
expressly to introduce (usually) a difference in treatment on that basis. For example, 
in Reyners, the Court ruled that Art 49 TFEU prohibited a Belgian rule that permitted 
only nationals of the State to be admitted to the legal bar in Belgium.
59
 Similarly, in 
Commission v. Belgium (Public Sector Employment), the Court concluded that a 
Belgian law restricting a range of public sector posts to Belgian nationals was 
                                                          
56
 See, from a list of many examples, eg Case C-279/93 Schumacker [1995] ECR I-225 at para. 30 
(Art 45 TFEU), Case C-80/94 G. H. E. J. Wielockx [1995] ECR I-2493 at para. 17 (Art 49 TFEU), 
Case C-107/94 P. H. Asscher v Staatssecretaris van Financiën [1996] ECR- I-3089 at para. 40 (Art 49 
TFEU), Case C-391/97 Gschwind [1999] ECR I-5451 at para. 21 (Art 45 TFEU) and Case C-374/04 
Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation v Commissioners of Inland Revenue [2006] 
ECR I-11673 at para. 17 (Art 49 TFEU). 
57
 Spaventa op. cit. at note 6 at p. 17. However, early in the case law, the Court had hinted that this 
might not be the case. In Case 152/73 Giovanni Maria Sotgiu v Deutsche Bundespost [1974] ECR 
153, the Court was reluctant to assume that the situations of resident and non-resident workers were 
automatically comparable. Indeed, it concluded that there may be objective differences between the 
situations of the two categories of workers, which could justify differences in treatment (see paras 11-
12). 
58
 See eg Case C-279/93 Schumacker op. cit. at note 56 at para. 31, Case C-107/94 P. H. Asscher op. 
cit. at note 56 at para. 41, Case C-391/97 Gschwind op. cit. at note 56 at para. 22 and Case C-329/05 
Finanzamt Dinslaken v Gerold Meindl [2007] ECR I-1107 at para. 23. For discussion, see J. Snell, 
„Non-discriminatory Tax Obstacles in Community Law‟ (2007) ICLQ 56(2) 339 at pp 349-335. The 
ECJ scrutinizes the objective comparability of the situations of resident and non-resident taxpayers 
very closely. See eg Case C-234/01 Gerritse [2003] ECR I-5933 esp. at para. 43 and paras 50-53 and 
Case C-290/04 Scorpio [2006] ECR I-9461 at para. 43. 
59
 Case 2/74 Reyners v. Belgian State [1974] ECR 631. 
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contrary to Art 45 TFEU.
60
 Examples of direct discrimination continue to surface in 
the Court‟s case law on workers, establishment and services.
61
 However, more 
frequently, the prohibited discriminatory treatment arises indirectly. Discrimination 
is indirect in cases where the contested national measure employs a criterion other 
than Member State nationality to achieve the same result as a directly discriminatory 
national rule.
62
 Common examples of surrogate criteria from the case law on 





 or requirements for particular qualifications issued by institutions 
established within that Member State.
65
 In each case, the national rules apply without 
reference to the criterion of Member State nationality. However, in effect, they 
favour those persons whose activities are confined to the territory of that Member 
State. By definition, this operates to the advantage of nationals of that State. 
Critically for present purposes, the Court has consistently exploited its freedom to 
define the contours of indirect discrimination in order to increase significantly its 
own powers of review. According to the Court, the prohibition of indirect 
discrimination extends to capture national rules that: 
„although applicable irrespective of nationality,… essentially affect migrant 
workers… or the great majority of those affected are migrant workers,… 
where they are indistinctly applicable but can be more easily satisfied by 
                                                          
60
 Case 149/79 Commission v. Belgium (Public Sector Employment) [1980] ECR 3881. 
61
 See eg Case C-465/01 Commission v Austria (Works Councils) [2004] ECR I-8291 (Art 45 TFEU) 
and Case C-263/99 Commission v Italy (Transport Consultants) [2001] ECR I-4195 (Arts 49 and 56 
TFEU).  
62
 Case 152-73 Sotgiu op. cit. at note 57 at para. 11. 
63
 Eg Case 33/74 van Binsbergen op. cit. at note 55 (Art 56 TFEU), Case 107/83 Onno Klopp [1984] 
ECR 2971 (Art 49 TFEU), Case 220/83 Commission v France (Co-Insurance) [1986] ECR 3663 at 
para. 18 (Art 56 TFEU), Case C-111/91 Commission v Luxembourg (Child Benefits) [1993] ECR I-
817 (Arts 45 and 49 TFEU), Case C-274/96 Bickel and Franz [1998] ECR I-7637 (Art 56 TFEU), 
Case C-224/97 Erich Ciola [1999] ECR I-2517 at para. 14 (Art 56 TFEU), Case C-162/99 
Commission v Italy (Dentistry) [2001] ECR I-541 at para. 21 (Arts 45 and 49 TFEU) and Case C-
456/05 Commission v Germany (Transitional Rules) [2007] ECR I-10517 at paras 56-57 (Art 49 
TFEU).  
64
 Eg Case C-379/89 Groener [1989] ECR 3967 (Art 45 TFEU) and Case C-424/97 Salomone Haim v 
Kassenzahnärztliche Vereinigung Nordrhein [2000] ECR I-5123 (Art 49 TFEU). 
65
 Eg Case 71/76 Jean Thieffry [1977] ECR 765. The leading case in this respect is Case C-340/89 
Irène Vlassopoulou v Ministerium für Justiz, Bundes- und Europaangelegenheiten Baden-
Württemberg [1991] ECR I-2357 at paras 15-20. See thereafter eg Case C-164/94 Georgios Aranitis v 
Land Berlin [1996] ECR I-135 at paras 31-2, Case C-234/97 Teresa Fernández de Bobadilla v Museo 
Nacional del Prado and Others [1999] ECR I-4773 at paras 31-4 and Case C-31/00 Nicolas Dreessen 
[2002] ECR I-663 at para. 31. 
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national workers than by migrant workers… or where there is a risk that they 
may operate to the particular detriment of migrant workers.‟
66
  
Furthermore, the Court has also confirmed that it is not necessary to demonstrate that 
the contested national measure actually affects a substantially higher proportion of 
migrant workers. Instead, it is sufficient if the measure is „liable to have such an 
effect.‟
67
 In result, this broad reading of indirect discrimination comes very close to 
the Court‟s approach to the scope of Art 34 TFEU in Dassonville.
68
  
3.2.3 Further expansion 
In more recent years, the Court has further expanded the scope of Arts 45, 49 and 56 
TFEU in two key ways. First, in a large body of decisions, the Court has abandoned 
its discrimination test in favour of an even more intrusive (from the perspective of 
Member State autonomy) effects-based approach. This targets non-discriminatory 
national measures that are liable to have „deterrent‟ or dissuasive‟ effects on intra-EU 
movement. Secondly, in a separate line of case law, the Court has also introduced a 
market access test. This test, which has subsequently now entered the case law on 
Art 34 TFEU (see section 3.1.1), grants the Court the power to scrutinise any 
national measure that affects access to the markets of the Member States. Both 
developments have considerably broadened the potential for the Court to engage in 
the scrutiny of Member State regulation. 
3.2.3.1 ‘Deterrent’ and ‘dissuasive’ effects 
The Court‟s decision to sideline the discrimination test in favour of an approach 
targeting national rules that exhibit „deterrent‟ or „dissuasive‟ effects marks the most 
significant expansion in the scope of Arts 45, 49 and 56 TFEU. Applied literally, this 
change in perspective effectively grants the Court a power to review virtually any 
Member State rule as an obstacle to intra-EU movement. After all, one can argue that 
                                                          
66
 Case C-237/94 O'Flynn v Adjudication Officer [1996] ECR I-2617 at para. 18. See also earlier, eg 
Case 41/84 Pinna [1986] ECR 1 at para. 24, Case 33/88 Allué and Another v Università degli Studi di 
Venezia [1989] ECR 1591 at para. 12, Case C-349/87 Paraschi v Landesversicherungsanstalt 
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 Case C-237/94 O'Flynn op. cit. at note 66 at para. 21. 
68
 On this point, see also Barnard op. cit. at note 42 at p. 241. 
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nearly all Member State legislation might (actually or potentially) have a negative 
impact on intra-EU movement.
69
 The origins of this expansion can be traced right 
back to the ruling in van Binsbergen.
70
 In this formative decision on the scope of Art 
56 TFEU, the Court opted for a broad reading of Art 56 TFEU. It concluded that this 
provision extended to capture not only discriminatory rules but also those that „may 
prevent or otherwise obstruct the activities of the person providing the service.‟
71
  
Many years later, the ECJ revisited (implicitly) its ruling in van Binsbergen and 
formulated a broad effects-based definition of the scope of the freedom to provide 
services.
72
 In Säger, the Court ruled that Art 56 TFEU required: 
„not only the elimination of all discrimination against a person providing 
services on the ground of his nationality but also the abolition of any 
restriction, even if it applies without distinction to national providers of 
services and to those of other Member States, when it is liable to prohibit or 
otherwise impede the activities of a provider of services established in 
another Member State where he lawfully provides similar services.‟
73
  
Through subsequent rulings, the Court then extended its Säger ruling to the case law 
on workers and establishment. For example, in Kraus, the ECJ concluded that Arts 
45 and 49 TFEU preclude national rules that, although applicable without 
discrimination on grounds of nationality, are „liable to hamper or to render less 
attractive the exercise by Community nationals.‟
74
 In summary, the language of non-
discriminatory obstacles to intra-EU movement now finds expression across the case 
law on workers, establishment and services.
75
 Most recently, the Court (Grand 
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 See eg Case C-439/97 Sandoz GmbH [1999] ECR I-7041 at para. 19. In this case, the Court 
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 Case 33/74 van Binsbergen op. cit. at note 55. 
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 Ibid., at para. 11. 
72
 Case C-76/90 Säger v Dennemeyer [1991] ECR I-4221. 
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 Ibid., at para. 12 (this author‟s emphasis). 
74
 Case C-19/92 Dieter Kraus v Land Baden-Württemberg [1993] ECR I-1663 at para. 32. However, 
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 From a long list of cases see for Art 45 TFEU: eg Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921 at 
para. 96, Case C-109/04 Kranemann [2005] ECR I-2421 at para. 26 and Case C-208/05 ITC [2007] 
ECR I-181 at para. 31; for Art 49 TFEU eg Case C-318/05 Commission v Germany (School Fees) 
[2007] ECR I-6957 at para. 81, Case C-281/06 Jundt [2007] ECR I-12231 at para. 52 and Joined 
Cases C-155/08 and C-157/08 X and Passenheim-van Schoot [2009] ECR I-5093 at para. 32; for Art 
56 TFEU eg Case C-158/96 Kohll [1998] ECR I-1931 at para. 33, Case C-136/00 Danner [2002] ECR 
I-8147 at para. 29 and Joined Cases C-544/03 and C-545/03 Mobistar and Belgacom Mobile [2005] 
ECR I-7723 at para. 30. 
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Chamber) has reaffirmed its commitment to an expansive reading of these 
provisions. In Olympique Lyonnais, it reiterated its view that: 
„national provisions which preclude or deter a national of a Member State 
from leaving his country of origin in order to exercise his right to freedom of 
movement… constitute restrictions on that freedom even if they apply 
without regard to the nationality of the workers concerned‟
76
  
The emergence and proliferation of the Court‟s case law on non-discriminatory 
obstacles to Arts 45, 49 and 56 TFEU has remained unaffected by the developments 
in the case law on goods. The expansion in scope of the Treaty rules on workers, 
services and establishment occurred at a time when the Court was just about to 
narrow (or, in its own words, „clarify‟)
77
 the scope of it case law on Art 34 TFEU in 
Keck. Significantly, the latter ruling appears to have had little subsequent impact on 
the Court‟s case law in these three areas.
78
 The ruling in Keck certainly did not nudge 
the Court back to its earlier discrimination-based reading of the scope of Arts 45, 49 
and 56 TFEU. On the contrary, post-Keck, the Court has continued unabashed with 
its broad effects-based reading of these provisions.
79
 Moreover, its increased focus 
on „deterrent‟ and „dissuasive‟ effects has also been supplemented by the application 
of an additional market access test, which we now turn to consider. 
3.2.3.2 Market access 
The market access test is an integral part of the Court‟s expanding obstacle 
framework on workers, establishment and services.
80
 In the case law in these three 
areas, market access found its first expression in Alpine Investments BV (Art 56 
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3. Obstacles to intra-EU movement: a converging and expanding framework 
 
  126 
TFEU).
81
 This case concerned Dutch legislation prohibiting all undertakings 
established in that State from „cold-calling‟ potential clients in connection with the 
marketing of certain financial products. Although acknowledging that the Dutch 
legislation was of a general and non-discriminatory nature, the ECJ concluded that it 
fell within the scope of Art 56 TFEU.
82
  This finding was based solely on the 
measure‟s effect on the applicant‟s access to the market of other Member States.
83
  
Specifically, the contested legislation prevented the applicant, an undertaking 
established in the Netherlands, from cold-calling potential customers in Germany, 
where this particular marketing technique was lawful. 
The market access test subsequently found its way into the case law on workers and 
establishment. With respect first to the case law on workers, the Court invoked 
market access to support its decision in Bosman to scrutinise non-discriminatory 
rules governing the transfer of professional footballers between clubs established 
within the internal market.
84
 According to the Court:  
„although the rules in issue in the main proceedings apply also to transfers 
between clubs belonging to different national associations within the same 
Member State and are similar to those governing transfers between clubs 
belonging to the same national association, they still directly affect players' 
access to the employment market in other Member States and are thus 
capable of impeding freedom of movement for workers.‟
85
  
After a slight delay, market access then entered the case law on establishment. The 
leading case in this respect is CaixaBank France.
86
 Here, the Court again relied on 
market access in order to scrutinise French legislation prohibiting retail banks 
established in that State from offering remunerated sight accounts. According to the 
Court: 
„[a] prohibition on the remuneration of sight accounts such as that laid down 
by the French legislation constitute[d], for companies from Member States 
other than the French Republic, a serious obstacle to the pursuit of their 
                                                          
81
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Again, it is significant to note that the Court‟s market access case law on workers, 
establishment and services emerged during the post-Keck period. In view of this fact, 
one might have anticipated a degree of cross-pollination between, on the one hand, 
the Court‟s revised case law on the scope of Art 34 TFEU and, on the other hand, its 
interpretation of obstacles to intra-EU movement in Arts 45, 49 and 56 TFEU. Yet, 
there was clearly no such move. Instead, the Court‟s case law on the latter freedoms 
continued along an expansionist path. Attempts to invoke the ruling in Keck as a 
brake on the Court‟s interpretation of the Treaty freedoms on services (Alpine 
Investments) and, thereafter, on workers (Bosman) were swiftly rejected by the 
Court.
88
 In result, this left us with a clear division between the case law on goods and 
that on workers, establishment and services.
89
 Only recently has this gap been 
corrected (at least in part) through the Court‟s decision in Commission v. Italy 
(Motorcycle Trailers).
90
 However, as argued in section 2.2, this correction has not 
brought about any reduction in the scope of the Treaty freedoms. On the contrary, it 
has brought the case law on goods more closely in line with the broader approach 
underpinning Arts 45, 49 and 56 TFEU. 
3.3 Capital  
The Treaty rules on capital movements have followed a very different evolutionary 
trajectory to those on goods, workers, establishment and services and, for that reason, 
warrant separate attention.
91
 The ruling in Casati drove a wedge between the case 
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law on capital and the jurisprudence on the other Treaty freedoms.
92
 In this case, the 
ECJ ruled that, unlike its relations in the Treaty, the original provision governing 
intra-EU capital movements, Art 67(1) EEC, was not directly effective.
93
 It was not 
until the Maastricht Treaty overhauled the provisions on capital movements that this 
position changed. This Treaty integrated the substance of Directive 88/361, which 
required in Art 1(1) the full liberalization of capital movements in the EU, into the 
Treaty framework. The revised Art 63(1) TFEU (ex Art 56 EC) now provides that, 
„within the framework of the provisions set out in this Chapter, all restrictions on the 
movement of capital between Member States… shall be prohibited.‟
94
 In Sanz de 
Lera, the Court confirmed that this provision had direct effect. This move finally 




In terms of scope, the Court has rapidly integrated Art 63(1) TFEU into its existing 
(and expanding) obstacle framework. Following its evolving case law on goods, 
workers, establishment and services, the Court quickly adopted a broad effects-based 
approach to defining the scope of that provision. This can be clearly seen in 
Commission v. Portugal (Golden Shares).
96
 In this case, the Court stated that the 
prohibition in Art 63(1) TFEU „goes beyond the mere elimination of unequal 
treatment, on grounds of nationality, as between operators on the financial 
markets.‟
97
 In the Court‟s view, the scope of that provision extends to capture 
national measures that are simply „liable to impede‟ intra-EU movement or 
„dissuade‟ investors from exercising their rights under Art 63(1) TFEU.
98
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In summary, the Court now interprets Art 63(1) TFEU as prohibiting national rules 
that are liable to „hinder,‟ „impede,‟ „deter‟ or „dissuade‟ intra-EU capital 
movements.
99
 In line with the other freedoms, the language of discrimination now 
features only rarely in the case law on intra-EU capital movements. Exceptions 
include early cases addressing national rules that discriminated directly on the 
prohibited criterion of Member State nationality.
100
 Aside from such cases, the 
language of discrimination also features in the case law dealing with national rules 
on direct taxation.
101
 Again, this is all very much in line with the case law on 
workers, establishment and services discussed above.  
As with the Treaty rules on goods, workers, establishment and services, the Court‟s 
case law on the scope of Art 63(1) TFEU also includes references to the effects of 
national rules on access to the market. In connection with intra-EU capital 
movements, Commission v. Spain (Golden Shares) contains the first reference to 
market access.
102
 In this case, the Court linked its application of the market access 
test to its reasoning based on „deterrent‟ and „dissuasive‟ effects. In connection with 
its review of Member State legislation imposing certain conditions on the acquisition 
of shares in recently privatised undertakings, the Court reached the following 
conclusion: 
„although the relevant restrictions on investment operations apply without 
distinction to both residents and non-residents, it must none the less be held 
that they affect the position of a person acquiring a shareholding as such and 
are thus liable to deter investors from other Member States from making such 
investments and, consequently, affect access to the market.‟
103
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Finally, following its case law on workers, establishment and services, the Court has 
rejected arguments in favour of transposing the decision in Keck to the interpretation 
of Art 63(1) TFEU.
104
 To date, this matter has only arisen in the Court‟s case law on 
golden shares. However, in this context, the Court has made its views very clear. In 
Commission v. Spain, the ECJ simply stated that such rules do not have „comparable 
effects‟ to the measures at issue in Keck.
105
  
3.4 Union citizenship 
In addition to integrating the legislative developments on capital movements into the 
Treaty framework, the Maastricht Treaty introduced an entirely new legal status of 
relevance to the examination of obstacles to intra-EU movement: Union citizenship. 
According to Art 20 TFEU (ex Art 17 EC) „every person holding the nationality of a 
Member State shall be a citizen of the Union.‟ This status complements and does not 
replace Member State citizenship.
106
 However, notwithstanding this express 
qualification, the Court has stated on numerous occasions that „Union citizenship is 
destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States.‟
107
  
The Treaty grants Union citizens a series of substantive rights. These are detailed in 
Arts 22-24 TFEU. This thesis is concerned exclusively with the rights of residency 
and movement that Union citizens enjoy under Art 21 TFEU.
108
 This provision 
provides that „[e]very citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside 
freely within the territories of the Member States, subject to the limitations and 
conditions laid down in this Treaty and by the measures adopted to give it effect.‟ 
The Court has confirmed that Art 21 TFEU is directly effective.
109
 In its purpose, the 
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right of intra-EU movement in this provision differs from those rights set out in Arts 
45, 49 and 56 TFEU. As the Court has observed, the latter rights are instrumental to 
the Treaty‟s fundamental economic objective of establishing a functioning internal 
market in which the free movement of goods, services, persons and capital is ensured 
in accordance with conditions of undistorted competition.
110
 By contrast, the right of 
movement enjoyed by Union citizens in Art 21 TFEU is exercisable on its own merit, 
with no requirement for a link to the aforementioned economic objective.
111 
 
In terms of its substantive scope, that provision affords Union citizens, first and 





 In addition, the Court has also linked Art 21 TFEU to the prohibition of 
discrimination on nationality grounds in Art 18 TFEU.
114
 In so doing, the Court has 
created, for the benefit of Union citizens, a powerful right to equal treatment in 
connection with their (cross-border) non-economic activities. In Martínez Sala, the 
Court concluded that Art 21 TFEU guarantees Union citizens a right to equal 
treatment with Member State nationals in all situations that fall within the material 
scope of the Treaty.
115
 In that particular case, the applicant, a Spanish national 
lawfully resident in Germany, successfully challenged State (Land Bayern) 
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legislation governing the payment of a child-raising allowance. The contested 
legislation required nationals of other Member States, who were ordinarily resident 
in Germany, to produce a formal residency permit in order to claim the allowance. 
The Court ruled that the imposition of this additional requirement was directly 
discriminatory and contrary to Art 21 TFEU.  
Through subsequent case law, the Court has repeated its decision to read that 
provision as guaranteeing Union citizens the right to equal treatment with Member 
State nationals in all situations that fall within the material scope of the Treaty.
116
 
The reference to „all situations that fall within the material scope of the Treaty‟ is 
interpreted broadly. As the Court confirmed in Grezelczyk, it includes the very 
exercise of the right to move and reside freely in another Member State, as conferred 
by Art 21 TFEU of the Treaty itself.
117
 In other words, to trigger the right to equal 
treatment, all a Member State national need do is exercise (or have exercised) their 
right of movement under that provision. This can be achieved simply through 
holding dual Member State nationality.
118
  
Importantly for present purposes, the Court has shifted its focus away from 
discrimination in favour of far broader tests of „discouragement‟ and/or of 
„dissuasive‟ or „deterrent‟ effects.
119
 This can be seen in Tas-Hagen, which 
concerned Dutch legislation governing the payment of benefits to civilian war 
victims.
120
 The contested rules required applicants to be resident in the Netherlands 
at the time of application. The Court concluded that this requirement was contrary to 
Art 21 TFEU. It defined the scope of that provision in the following broad terms:  
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„national legislation which places at a disadvantage certain of the nationals of 
the Member State concerned simply because they have exercised their 
freedom to move and to reside in another Member State is a restriction on the 
freedoms conferred by Article [21 TFEU] on every citizen of the Union.‟
121
 
The broad effects-based restriction formula now finds expression in much of the case 
law on Union citizenship.
122
 The only notable exceptions include cases dealing with 




The same concerns surrounding the Court‟s switch to broad effect-based tests in the 
case law on the economic freedoms apply to its evolving interpretation of Art 21 
TFEU. In both cases, the Court‟s shift away from the discrimination framework has 
resulted in a significant expansion in the scope of the Treaty freedoms. This has the 
potential to enable the Court to engage in close scrutiny of nearly all aspects of 
Member State regulatory policy. 
4. Conclusion: a converging and expanding framework 
As the preceding analysis has demonstrated, the Court‟s interpretation of the scope of 
the individual Treaty freedoms appears to be following an increasingly unitary 
trajectory.
124
  The Court‟s approach is predominately focused on the elimination of 
national rules that are liable to „hinder,‟ „impede,‟ „deter‟ or „dissuade‟ intra-EU 
movements or affect „access to the market.‟ As a result, it is becoming increasingly 
difficult to maintain – on a descriptive level at least
125
 – that there are significant 
differences in the Court‟s basic approach. Previous points of tension that existed both 
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within and between the individual freedoms are being eroded progressively. This 
includes, in the first instance, the distinct approaches to the assessment of national 
measures affecting the import (Art 34 TFEU) and export (Art 35 TFEU) of goods 
between the Member States. As we have seen, the Court has recently taken steps to 
close this gap and align its previously divergent case law on Art 35 TFEU with its 
reading of Art 34 TFEU (Gysbrechts and Kakavetsos-Fragkopoulos AE).  
A similar trend towards convergence can also be seen across the Treaty freedoms. 
Until recently, the ruling in Keck (Art 34 TFEU) stuck out as an obvious point of 
divergence in the case law on the economic freedoms. In a series of decisions, the 
Court had firmly rejected all attempts to transpose the substance of this ruling to its 
case law on workers, establishment, services and capital.
126
 This refusal could be 
taken as indicative of the Court‟s decision to maintain a division between, on the one 
hand, the scope of the Treaty provisions on goods and, on the other hand, the 
remaining economic freedoms.
127
 However, following the ruling of the Grand 
Chamber in Commission v. Italy (Motorcycle Trailers), it is increasingly difficult to 
defend this view. Although Keck remains good law (in the sense that it has not been 
overruled by the Court),
128
 the decision in Commission v. Italy (Motorcycle Trailers) 
has had the effect of reducing that ruling‟s scope of application considerably. The 
ruling in Keck now has all the hallmarks of an isolated „blip‟ in an otherwise 
coherent body of case law. As Spaventa argues, the Keck „selling arrangement‟ 
exception seems to characterise a decision to exclude from the scope of Art 34 TFEU 
a very specific category of national measure (non-discriminatory „selling 
arragements‟) as a matter of policy.
129
  
The Court has not offered any real explanation of why it has sought increasingly to 
align (and expand) the scope of the individual Treaty freedoms. There has been no 
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express acknowledgment of a need for change in the case law. Not since its ruling in 
Keck has the Court uttered the phrase „contrary to what has been previously 
decided.‟
130
 The convergence in the case law on obstacles to intra-EU movement 
could simply reflect the fact that, in many cases, the Court is asked to address several 
individual Treaty provisions in the same case.
131
 This could easily foster greater 
symmetry across the freedoms. On the other hand, it could also be the case that the 
Court is in fact actively engaged in the convergence process. For example, with 
respect to the market freedoms, Tryfonidou refers to the Court‟s „unspoken 
determination‟ to achieve convergence amongst the freedoms.
132
 In her particular 
view, the Court‟s case law is best explained through the lens of Union citizenship.
133
 
She argues that: 
„the Court appears to be in the process of completing an economic 
constitution for the European Union through which Union citizens have the 
right to participate in the market without any unreasonable restrictions 
standing in their way.‟
134
 
Yet, to a great extent, the convergence literature misses the key point. The fact that 
the case law on obstacles to intra-EU movement is increasingly convergent is an 
important finding. However, on one view, this should not surprise – at least in so far 
as the economic freedoms are concerned. After all, these provisions are united by a 
common objective, namely the establishment of a functioning internal market (Art 26 
TFEU). Instead, it is the nature of the convergence that is more fundamental. As the 
analysis in this chapter has sought to argue, the narrative underpinning the Court‟s 
reading of the scope of the Treaty freedoms is one of progressive expansion. The 
case law on obstacles to intra-EU movement is not converging around a narrow 
discrimination-based test, as prescribed by the wording of several of the Treaty 
freedoms. Equally, no attempt has ever been made to universalise the Court‟s ruling 
in Keck, which now appears to mark an isolated example of judicial self-restraint. On 
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the contrary, the general trend is very much in the opposite direction. The Court‟s 
case law appears to be pushing the Dassonville test back into the foreground, albeit 
using the new labels of „deterrent‟ or „dissuasive‟ effects together with the market 
access concept.  
The Court‟s preferred interpretation of the term „obstacle to intra-EU movement‟ 
presents an obvious subsidiarity problem. It would appear to grant the Court a 
general power to scrutinise virtually any Member State measure.
135
 Of course, the 
existence of this powerful right of review does not necessarily mean that it will be 
applied literally in every case. In fact, as will be argued in Chapter 6, in many cases, 
the Court‟s language of „deterrent‟ or „dissuasive‟ effects is over-inclusive (and 
therefore disingenuous). Put simply, the Court‟s effects-based tests are frequently 
applied to review national measures that are simply indirectly discriminatory. 
However, in a growing body of case law, the Court is choosing to apply the full force 
of its „deterrent‟ or „dissuasive‟ tests or, alternatively, the market access concept. In 
so doing, the Court is scrutinising the very substance – and even existence – of 
Member State regulation. The application of the Treaty freedoms in this manner is 
very much out of step with the Union legislature‟s exercise of its competence to 
contribute to the same regulatory sphere: the internal market. In Chapter 1, it was 
argued that subsidiarity has taken hold as a restraint on the Union legislature\s 
exercise of competence under Art 114 TFEU. Specifically, Art 5(3) TEU was shown 
to safeguard an appropriate sphere of Member State autonomy by preventing the 
Union legislature from using that provision as a „general power to regulate the 
internal market.‟  
Crucially, the Court seems to be conscious of the potential dangers of its own case 
law on obstacles to intra-EU movement. In spite of its reluctance to admit officially 
any qualification to its broad effects-based tests, it has developed and applies a series 
of judicial devices to manage the scope of the Treaty freedoms. These include, in 
particular, the wholly internal rule, the criterion of effects „too uncertain and indirect‟ 
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and the de minimis test. Chapter 4 examines these rules in detail and questions 
whether or not these devices, which can be read as the Court‟s own response to the 
problem of judicial overreach, adequately address the subsidiarity problem identified 
in this chapter.  
 
 138  
Chapter 4 
 
Existing responses to the problem of judicial overreach 
 
1. Introduction 
In Chapter 3, it was argued that the Court‟s reading of the term „obstacle to intra-EU 
movement‟ is now increasingly focused on scrutinising national rules with 
„deterrent‟ or „dissuasive‟ effects on intra-EU movement or those that affect market 
access. Applied literally, this expansive effects-based reading of the scope of the 
Treaty freedoms could bring almost any national rule within the scope of the Court‟s 
review. This presents a clear subsidiarity problem. Put simply, the Court‟s 
interpretation of the Treaty freedoms comes very close to affording it a general 
power to regulate the internal market. This is precisely what subsidiarity is designed 
to prevent. Recalling the discussion in Chapter 1, subsidiarity seeks to ensure that the 
Member States retain an appropriate sphere of competence to contribute to the 
regulation of the internal market as an area of shared responsibility. In Chapter 3, it 
was argued that the Court‟s expansion interpretation of the term „obstacle to intra-EU 
movement‟ is very much out of sync with its view of subsidiarity‟s function as a 
restraint on the Union legislature‟s right to exercise its competence in the same area 
of shared responsibility. In the latter context, the Court has made it very clear that 
Art 114 TFEU does not confer upon the Union legislature a „general power to 
regulate the internal market.‟
1
 
This chapter does not yet examine the detail of subsidiarity‟s impact on the Court‟s 
freedom to interpret the scope of the Treaty freedoms. Discussion of this matter is 
reserved for Chapter 6. Instead, our immediate concern is with the Court‟s existing 
response to the dangers of judicial overreach identified in Chapter 3. As we have 
already seen, concerns about the expanding scope of obstacles to intra-EU movement 
have not fallen on deaf ears. In Keck, the Court recognised the need to draw lines 
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between Union and Member State competence in connection with the regulation of 
the internal market.
2
  In that decision, the Court made it clear that it would respect 
the autonomy of the Member States to regulate the conditions under which products 




Alongside the selling arrangement concept introduced in Keck, there is evidence in 
the case law of several other judicial rules that are used to manage the scope of the 
Treaty freedoms. In particular, in connection with its decision to exclude Member 
State measures from the scope of its review of obstacles to intra-EU movement, the 
Court has referred, on occasion, to the criterion of „effects too uncertain and 
indirect‟;
4
 to the „insignificant‟ nature of an alleged obstacle to intra-EU movement;
5
 
to the absence of any „intention‟ on the part of the Member States to regulate intra-
EU trade;
6
 and, finally, to the existence of an „inherent restriction‟ to intra-EU 
movement.
7
 In addition, the Court has placed further limits on its interpretative 
functions by stressing that the Treaty freedoms cannot be applied to situations that 
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Each of the above devices can be cast as evidence of the Court‟s implicit response to 
the subsidiarity problem identified in Chapter 3. The individual judicial rules are all 
of its own creation and, in result, would appear to isolate and protect a sphere of 
Member State competence in connection with the regulation of the internal market. 
Unfortunately, the Court‟s case law is not always clear on the substance and scope of 
application of the above rules. As Spaventa correctly concludes: 
„the co-existence of different strands of case law, together with the use of 
different hermeneutical tools in relation to the same provisions, makes it 
extremely difficult to identify clear boundaries for the Treaty free movement 
provisions. Indeed, when the cases are closely scrutinised one might be 
excused for feeling a slight sense of desperation as to the chaotic picture 
arising from the Court‟s jurisprudence.‟
9
 
This chapter will attempt to present the Court‟s case law in its best light. It begins, in 
section 2, by examining the function of the wholly internal rule as a device to 
safeguard the Member States against the dangers of judicial overreach identified in 
Chapter 3. Section 3 then discusses the Court‟s use of the „inherent restriction‟ 
concept. Section 4 analyses the criterion of „effects too uncertain and indirect.‟ 
Finally, section 5 assesses the impact of the Court‟s references to the „insignificant‟ 
nature of a particular measure‟s effect on intra-EU movement and enquires, more 
broadly, into the existence of a de minimis test in EU free movement law. 
In conclusion, it is submitted that the Court‟s existing case law provides clear 
evidence of judicial sensitivity to the expansive scope of the Treaty freedoms. 
However, even when presented in their best light, the Court‟s existing attempts to 
manage the scope of the Treaty freedoms fail to address adequately the problem 
identified in Chapter 3. In the final analysis, it submitted that the breadth of the 
Court‟s preferred effects-based reading of the term „obstacle to intra-EU movement‟ 
is really curtailed only by a qualitative de minimis test (within which Keck itself can 
also be subsumed). However, even here the operative threshold is set far too low to 
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make any measurable impact on the Court‟s competence. Furthermore, the Court‟s 
persistent refusal to acknowledge its implicit application of such a test makes it 
rather difficult to sustain the view that it has identified workable limits to it case law 
on obstacles to intra-EU movement. 
2. The wholly internal rule 
2.1 Origins and function  
The wholly internal rule emerged early on in the case law as a possible source of 
restraint on the Court‟s understanding of obstacles to intra-EU movement.
10
 In 
Saunders, the Court concluded that a British national could not invoke the Treaty 
provisions on intra-EU movement (specifically: Art 45 TFEU) in order to contest a 
judicial order restricting her movements within the territory of that State for a set 
duration.
11
 According to the Court, Art 45 TFEU (ex Art 39 EC) „cannot… be 
applied to situations which are wholly internal to a Member State, in other words, 
where there is no factor connecting them to any of the situations envisaged by 
[Union] law.‟
12
 Thereafter in Gauchard, the Court ruled in similar terms that „the 
absence of any element going beyond a purely national setting in a given case… 
means, in matters of freedom of establishment just as in any other sphere, that the 
provisions of [Union] law are not applicable to such a situation.‟
13
  
The classic connecting factor bringing a situation within the scope of the Treaty is, of 
course, the exercise of intra-EU movement in connection with economic activity.
14
 
Thus, in order to rely on the Treaty freedoms on, for example, workers or 
establishment, a Member State national had to move to the territory of another 
Member State. Alternatively, Member State nationals could seek to invoke the 
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4. Existing repsonses to the problem of judicial overreach 
 
  142 
protection of the Treaty freedoms against their home Member State after having 
exercised economic activity elsewhere within the Union. In this latter case, the 
applicant‟s situation could be „assimilated to that of another person enjoying their 
rights and liberties guaranteed by the Treaty.‟
15
  
2.2 Evaluating the impact of the wholly internal rule 
Strictly speaking, the wholly internal rule does not alter the substance of the Court‟s 
case law on obstacles to intra-EU movement. Its function is instead to protect 
Member State autonomy by ensuring that the Court‟s case law on the scope of the 
Treaty freedoms is applied only to situations that exhibit a sufficient connecting 
factor to EU law. However, as a rule designed to control the scope of application of 
the Treaty and, in particular, manage the distribution of competence between the 
Union and the Member States, it goes to the core of the discussion in this chapter and 
is, for that reason, worth evaluating.  
Applied strictly, the wholly internal rule would certainly carve out a sphere of 
protected Member State influence in connection with regulation of the internal 
market as a shared area of responsibility. However, the Court appears to be accepting 
ever more tenuous links to intra-EU movement – or no movement at all – as 
sufficient to trigger the review of national measures as obstacles to intra-EU 
movement. In so doing, it has diluted the (limited) protective benefits of the wholly 
internal rule for Member State autonomy.  
2.2.1 Previous and actual intra-EU movement 
In the first instance, the Court has adopted a rather broad view of both previous and 
actual cross-border movement. For example, in Singh, the Court seized upon a period 
of economic activity in another Member State in order to review, several years later, 
a decision of the United Kingdom immigration authorities to deport the third country 
national (almost-former) spouse of a British national.
16
 Thereafter, in Carpenter, the 
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Court accepted as a sufficient connecting factor to EU law the fact that a British 
national provided services to clients established in other Member States.
17
  
The decisions in Singh and Carpenter really test the requirement for actual or 
previous intra-EU movement in connection with economic activity. The ruling in 
Singh on previous intra-EU movement seems far removed from the logic 
underpinning the decision in Knoors, in which the Court first recognised the right of 
returning migrants to invoke the Treaty provisions against the Member State of 
origin. In that earlier case, the applicant sought to rely on their experience (and, in 
particular, a qualification recognised by Union law) acquired in another Member 
State in order to take up and pursue economic activity in their State or origin – a 
situation clearly related to the objective of establishing a functioning internal 
market.
18
 With respect to Carpenter, one might also express doubts about the 
strength of the connecting factor to intra-EU movement. Although the applicant‟s 
spouse was exercising cross-border economic activity in this case, the link to the 
dispute in hand was rather tenuous.
19
  
2.2.2 Potential intra-EU movement 
In a further challenge to the wholly internal rule, the Court has also permitted 
Member State nationals to invoke the Treaty freedoms against their home Member 
State (or State of establishment) on the basis of some potential effect on intra-EU 
movement. The term „obstacle to intra-EU movement‟ is, of course, broad enough to 
capture such effects. In Chapter 3, it has already been shown that the Court reads the 
scope of the Treaty freedoms as extending to include national measures that might 
have a potential effect on intra-EU movement.
20
 However, on a narrow reading of the 
wholly internal rule, we might not have expected the Court to permit Member State 
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nationals to rely on the potential effects of a measure on intra-EU movement in 
situations in which the facts are otherwise confined to the territory of that Member 
States.
21
 If this were the case, then virtually any national rule could be exposed to the 
full force of the Court‟s obstacle case law, rendering the rule all but meaningless. 
Yet it is clear from the case law that some potential effects on intra-EU movement 
are acceptable in order to establish a link to EU law. For example, in numerous cases 
dealing with Art 34 TFEU, the Court has accepted the fact that a particular measure 
was liable, within the meaning of the Dassonville formula, to have a potential impact 
on intra-EU trade in order to establish a connecting factor to EU law. For example, 
the defendants in Keck successfully appealed to the potential impact of a French rule 
prohibiting, within that State, the sale of products at a loss in order to establish (at 
least implicitly) the necessary intra-EU dimension required to trigger the application 
of the Treaty freedoms.
22
 Similarly, in TK-Heimdienst, the applicant, an Austrian 
undertaking engaged in economic activity within that State, relied on a similar 
argument. In that case, the applicant argued that Austrian legislation prohibiting them 
from offering goods for sale on rounds in districts other than those in which they 




In its case law on services, the Court has also relied on the fact that Art 56 TFEU 
extends to protect the right of Member State nationals established/resident in other 
Member State to receive services from providers based in another Member State to 
bring factual scenarios within the scope of the Treaty. For example, in Alpine 
Investments, the Court permitted an undertaking to contest legislation applicable 
within its State of establishment by virtue of its effect on that undertaking‟s ability to 
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offer services to potential clients based in other Member States.
24
 Similarly, in 
Gourmet International Products, the Court upheld the right of providers of 
advertising services to contest, as an obstacle to intra-EU movement, non-
discriminatory legislation enacted by the Member State in which they were 
established.
25
 Again, this finding was based on the fact that the contested measure 
might have an impact on the ability of undertakings established in that State to 
contract with potential clients based in other Member States.
26
  
As the above examples demonstrate, the wholly internal rule is pretty ineffective as a 
device to protect a sphere of Member State autonomy from the Court‟s case law on 
obstacles to intra-EU movement. To the extent that the Court accepts a potential 
effect on intra-EU movement as sufficient to trigger the scope of the Treaty freedoms 
in situations that are otherwise confined to the territory of a Member State, the 
wholly internal rule is basically redundant. It has simply merged with the Court‟s 
broad effects-based test, which alone will determine whether or not a particular 
national measure constitutes an obstacle to intra-EU movement. 
2.2.3 Union citizenship 
The introduction of Union citizenship at Maastricht, and Art 21 TFEU in particular, 
has also undermined the effectiveness of the wholly internal rule. For a start, it is no 
longer necessary to exercise intra-EU movement in connection with economic 
activity.
27
 This has opened up an entirely new set of factual constellations to the 
Court‟s scrutiny. However, and more importantly, in this area of case law, the Court 
has further eroded the orthodox requirement for intra-EU movement. In the first 
instance, the Court has ruled that, irrespective of whether or not they have actually 
moved, the situation of a Member State national who resides in another Member 
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State falls automatically within the scope of the Treaty.
28
 This constructive view of 
intra-EU movement has dealt an additional blow to Member State autonomy. For 
example, in Garcia Avello, Member State nationals holding dual Belgian and 
Spanish nationality and resident in Belgium were able to invoke the protection 
afforded to Union citizens under the Treaty against the Belgian State.
29
 The fact that 
they had never resided in Spain was considered irrelevant. Similarly, in the earlier 
ruling in Chen, the Court accepted that a minor Member State national with Irish 
nationality was entitled to rely on her status as a Union citizen against the United 




2.2.4 Rottmann, Ruiz Zambrano and McCarthy 
In its most recent case law on Union citizenship, the Court appears to be in the 
process of doing away with the requirement for any need for intra-EU movement 
(previous, actual, potential or constructive) in order to bring a situation within the 
scope of the Treaty. The Court‟s conclusions in Rottmann suggest that, in so far as 
Union citizenship is concerned, the simple fact that an individual holds the 
nationality of one of the Member States may be sufficient to establish a connecting 
factor to the Treaty.
31
 Briefly summarised, Rottmann addressed the situation of a 
German national who had acquired German nationality fraudulently. In response, the 
German authorities sought to strip the applicant of his German nationality. However, 
this would render him stateless and, in so doing, force him to forfeit his rights as a 
Union citizen. Although both the Commission and several of the intervening 
Governments maintained that the applicant‟s situation was internal to the German 
State, the Court took a different view. According to the Court, the applicant‟s 
situation fell squarely within the scope of the Treaty. This followed from the fact 
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that, „the loss of the nationality of a Member State, was capable of causing [the 
applicant] to lose the status conferred by Article 20 TFEU and the rights attaching.‟
32
 
At present, it remains unclear what impact the Court‟s most recent qualification of 
the wholly internal rule will have on the case law on obstacles to intra-EU movement 
– the focus of the analysis here. In Rottmann, the Court did not refer expressly to the 
effects of the contested measure on the applicant‟s exercise of the rights conferred by 
Art 21 TFEU. Instead, it referred to the loss of the status of Union citizenship (Art 20 
TFEU) and, only in much more general terms, to the „right attaching thereto,‟ which 
include, of course, Art 21 TFEU.
33
 Likewise, in the subsequent case of Ruiz 
Zambrano, the Court also referred only to Art 20 TFEU.
34
 In that case, the applicant 
sought to rely on his children‟s status as Belgian nationals, and thus Union citizens, 
in order to found for himself and his wife a right of residency in that same Member 
State. The Court upheld the applicant‟s case. It ruled that the Belgian authorities‟ 
decision to deport the applicant (and his wife), Columbian nationals, from that State 
would have the effect of depriving his Belgian children of the genuine enjoyment of 
the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of [Art 20 TFEU].‟
35
 The Court stated 
that, in effect, it would require the family to leave the territory of the Union.
36
 
However, as in Rottmann, no express reference was made to Art 21 TFEU. 
Only in McCarthy did the Court engage expressly with Art 21 TFEU.
37
 In that case, 
the applicant, a British national resident in that State, sought to rely on her dual 
(Irish) nationality to establish a right of residency under EU law in the United 
Kingdom for her Jamaican spouse. Importantly, for present purposes, the Court‟s 
approach in McCarthy suggests that the Court has not (yet) opened up new 
possibilities for Member State nationals to review national measures – including 
those enacted by one‟s home Member State – in light of the specific right of intra-EU 
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movement in Art 21 TFEU. Although restating its conclusions in Rottmann and Ruiz 
Zambrano about the need to protect „the genuine enjoyment of the rights of Union 
citizens,‟ the Court concluded, in the final analysis, that the applicant‟s situation did 
not exhibit a sufficient connecting factor to EU law. It stated that: 
„Article 21 TFEU [was] not applicable to a Union citizen who has never 
exercised his right of free movement, who has always resided in a Member 
State of which he is a national and who is also a national of another Member 
State, provided that the situation of that citizen does not include the 
application of measures by a Member State that would have the effect of 
depriving him of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights 
conferred by virtue of his status as a Union citizen or of impeding the 




This finding sits uncomfortably alongside the Court‟s constructive reading of intra-
EU movement. In particular, in Chen the ECJ had concluded that the situation of a 
Member State national holding the nationality of another Member State fell within 
the scope of Art 21 TFEU.
39
 This was notwithstanding the fact that, like Mrs 
McCarthy, the applicant had never lived in the Republic of Ireland. How then do we 
explain this difference in approach? Space precludes detailed analysis of this case 
law. However, in brief, everything appears now to turn on the Court‟s understanding 
of the phrase „genuine enjoyment of the substantive rights of [Union citizenship].‟
40
 
As things stand, it would seem that the Court is only prepared to establish a sufficient 
connecting factor to EU law in cases where a Union citizen‟s right of residency in 
their home Member State is under direct threat. However, this may yet change, with 
further detrimental effects on Member State autonomy. 
2.2.5 Summary 
Interpreted strictly, the wholly internal rule would offer some respite to the Member 
States. It would ensure that the Court‟s case law on obstacles to intra-EU movement 
was applied only to situations in which there had been actual or previous movement 
between the territories of the Member States in connection with either economic or 
non-economic activity. However, far from adhering to a narrow reading of the 
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wholly internal rule, the Court has progressively loosened the requirement for a 
connecting factor and, in particular, the requirement for intra-EU movement. In 
places, such as the case law on goods and services, the wholly internal rule appears 
to have simply merged with the Court‟s broad effects-based interpretation of the term 
„obstacle to intra-EU movement.‟ As such, it has become entirely redundant. In other 
areas, its substance has also been affected by subsequent developments in the case 
law. These include, in the case law on Union citizenship, the Court‟s acceptance of 
constructive intra-EU movement as a sufficient connecting factor and, most recently, 
the Court‟s move to ensure the protection of the genuine enjoyment of the rights of 
Union citizenship, irrespective of any movement (previous, actual, potential or 
constructive). 
The remainder of this chapter will now evaluate the effectiveness of some of the 
other judicial devices that the Court has developed in order to manage the scope of 
the Treaty freedoms. These are: (1) the notion of an inherent obstacle to intra-EU 
movement, (2) the criterion of effects too uncertain and indirect and, finally, (3) the 
de minimis test.  
3. Inherent obstacles to intra-EU movement 
3.1 Overview 
The first of the remaining three judicial devices that we shall consider in the 
remainder of this chapter is the notion of an inherent obstruction to intra-EU 
movement. To date, the term inherent obstruction appears to have featured expressly 
only once in the case law.
41
 However, its logic can be seen to underpin several of the 
Court‟s rulings.
42
 In summary, the notion of an inherent obstacle protects Member 
State autonomy by removing certain national measures from the scope of the Treaty 
freedoms by reason of the fact that their obstructive effects on intra-EU movement 
are so closely tied up with their very purpose. Whilst offering a degree of protection 
to Member States, it is submitted that the inherent obstacle concept adds little to our 
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existing understanding of the Court‟s EU free movement framework. In the end, the 
inherent obstacle concept can be shown to be nothing other than a „rule of reason‟ 
approach to the application of the Treaty freedoms. Under this approach, the Court 
combines its assessment of whether or not a particular national measure constitutes 
an obstacle to intra-EU movement with its subsequent examination of whether that 
same national measure can be justified in EU law. This fact perhaps explains why 
very little has become of the inherent obstacle concept in the case law. 
3.2 Joined Cases C-51/96 and C-191/97 Deliège 
The Court‟s use of this concept can be seen in Deliège.
43
 In that case, the ECJ was 
asked for guidance on the compatibility with Art 56 TFEU (ex Art 49 EC) (services) 
of regulations governing the selection of athletes for international sporting events. 
The contested regulations allowed only athletes who had been selected by the 
national federation to participate in high-level international sporting competitions. 
The applicant, Ms Deliège, was a Belgian judo player who had not been selected to 
participate in several international competitions by the Belgian federation. She 
sought to challenge this decision by arguing that the selection rules constituted an 
obstacle to Art 56 TFEU. In its reply to the referring court, the ECJ first confirmed 
that the factual situations giving rise to the main proceedings could fall within the 
scope of the Treaty (and Art 56 TFEU in particular).
44
 However, turning to the crux 
of the matter, the Court then concluded that contested regulation did not constitute an 
obstacle to the applicant‟s freedom to provide intra-EU services. For the Court: 
„although selection rules like those at issue in the main proceedings inevitably 
have the effect of limiting the number of participants in a tournament, such a 
limitation is inherent in the conduct of an international high-level sports 
event, which necessarily involves certain selection rules or criteria being 
adopted. Such rules may not therefore in themselves be regarded as 
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The same approach to the application of the Treaty freedoms can be seen in several 
other cases, though without express reference to the inherent obstacle concept. For 
example, in the same substantive area (the regulation of professional sporting activity 
within the Union), the Court had already concluded that the Treaty provisions 
concerning freedom of movement for persons:  
„do not prevent the adoption of rules or practices excluding foreign players 
from certain matches for reasons which are not of an economic nature, which 
relate to the particular nature and context of such matches and are thus of 
sporting interest only, such as, for example, matches between national teams 
from different countries. This restriction on the scope of [the Treaty 
freedoms] must however remain limited to its proper objective.‟
46
 
There is also evidence of a similar approach in the case law on establishment and 
capital. In Vereniging Veronica, the Court was requested to examine a Dutch law 
prohibiting a broadcasting body established in that State from investing in media 
undertakings established in other Member States.
47
 On the strength of the Court‟s 
own test, this measure constituted an obstacle to intra-EU movement. However, the 
Court did not state this finding expressly. Instead, it focused immediately on the 
legitimacy of the national cultural policy objectives behind the contested legislation 
and, on that basis, concluded that the Dutch legislation could „not be regarded as 
incompatible with [Arts 56 TFEU and 63(1) TFEU].‟
48
 
3.3 Evaluating the inherent obstacle device 
Spaventa has suggested that the Court‟s application of the inherent obstacle formula 
in Deliège can be viewed alongside its ruling in Keck and the criterion of effects too 
uncertain and indirect (discussed below) as a judicial device that is designed to 
manage the scope of the term obstacle to intra-EU movement.
49
 In her opinion, the 
device operates to remove national measures from the scope of the Treaty freedoms 
„when the alleged barrier to [intra-EU movement] coincides with the very purpose of 
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the rules.‟
50
 In other words, she argues that, so long as the aim pursued by the 
specific rule in question is legitimate, the Deliège exception applies to protect 
Member State (or, where relevant, private regulatory autonomy)
51
 from the Court‟s 
scrutiny at Union level.
52
  
Spaventa‟s analysis of Deliège is an interesting one, and certainly offers some scope 
to increase the protection of Member State autonomy. However, at the same time, it 
does not offer a solution to the problem examined in this chapter – the need to 
control the breadth of the Court‟s interpretation of the scope of the Treaty freedoms. 
Crucially, in Deliège, the Court did not actually say that the contested selection rules 
do not constitute obstacles to intra-EU movement.
53
 On the contrary, the Court noted 
that the contested rules fell within the scope of Union law and, further, that the 
applicant‟s activities could be considered to be economic in nature.
54
 Instead, the 
ECJ seemed only to find that the obstructive effects of the measure could be 
reconciled with the demands of EU free movement law. This finding was reached by 
combining the analysis of whether or not a particular measure falls within the scope 
of the Treaty freedoms with the subsequent (second-stage) assessment of whether 
that measure can be justified in EU law.  
This combined approach to the application of the Treaty freedoms can used to 
rationalise the Court‟s findings in other cases cited in the previous sub-section.
55
 For 
example, in Donà v Mantero, the Court‟s analysis of rules governing national 
football teams follows the natural rhythm of the justification framework.
56
 In that 
case, the ECJ noted that such rules served a non-economic objective and applied the 
proportionality test. However, for present purposes, the key point is that the above 
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approach to the review of national measures does not actually limit the scope of the 
term „obstacle to intra-EU movement.‟ It simply provides an alternative mechanism 
through which to conclude that particular rules that fall within the scope of the 
Treaty freedoms constitute justified (and proportionate) obstacles to intra-EU 
movement. Interestingly, the alternative inherent obstacle approach has been used 
exclusively to address discriminatory measures that would have otherwise been 
difficult to square with the Treaty. 
3.4 Summary 
As with the wholly internal rule, the Court‟s approach to the management of the 
scope of the Treaty freedoms in Deliège and other decisions does not offer a solution 
to the problem of judicial overreach identified in Chapter 3 – though for different 
reasons. In short, the Deliège test does not challenge the Court‟s competence to 
review national measures at Union level as obstacles to intra-EU movement. Instead, 
it simply provides an alternative way of applying the Treaty freedoms. It allows the 
Court to reconcile national policy objectives with those of the Union at the point at 
which the Court would usually simply conclude that the contested measure falls 
within the scope of the Treaty freedoms. The search for effective limits to the case 
law on obstacles to intra-EU movement continues in the next section with a review 
of the criterion of effects too uncertain and indirect. 
4. ‘Effects too uncertain and indirect’ 
4.1 Overview 
The criterion of „effects too uncertain and indirect‟
57
 first appeared in connection 
with the Court‟s interpretation of Art 34 TFEU (ex Art 28 EC) on goods. However, it 
has since found expression in other areas of EU free movement law. On one view, 
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the criterion of effects too uncertain and indirect is a causation test.
58
 In this guise, it 
is argued that the criterion protects Member State autonomy by ensuring that there is 
always a causal link between a particular national measure and the alleged obstacle 
to intra-EU movement.
59
 However, on closer inspection it is argued that this reading 
of the criterion of effects too uncertain and indirect is incapable of adequately 
explaining the case law. Whilst it is absolutely correct to maintain that this criterion 
offers some degree of protection to Member State autonomy, it is submitted that it 
does not appear to do so through a test of causation. Instead, it is argued that the 
criterion of effects too uncertain and indirect provides evidence of a qualitative de 
minimis test, which now seems to permeate the case law across the freedoms under 
several different labels. This de minimis test is considered separately in section 5. 
4.2 Case C-69/88 Krantz GmbH 
The Court first referred to the criterion of effects too uncertain and indirect in 
Krantz.
60
 That case concerned Dutch legislation, which granted the tax authorities in 
that State the power to seize movable property in order to recover tax debts. The 
applicant (Krantz GmbH) had sold machines (with reserved title pending full 
payment) to a Dutch company that had subsequently been declared insolvent. Krantz 
sought to contest the Dutch authorities‟ decision to seize these machines to recover 
the cost of unpaid taxes. It maintained that, had it been aware of the contested Dutch 
legislation, it would not have contracted with the defendant on instalment terms. The 
Court disagreed. It ruled that: 
„the possibility that nationals of other Member States would hesitate to sell 
goods on instalment terms to purchasers in the Member State concerned 
because such goods would be liable to seizure by the collector of taxes if the 
                                                          
58
 See eg the Opinion of AG La Pergola in Case C-44/98 BASF op. cit. at note 10 at para. 18, A. 
Biondi, „In and Out of the Internal Market: Recent Developments on the Principle of Free Movement‟ 
(1999-2000) 19 YEL 469 at pp 487-8, Doukas op. cit. at note 10 at p.206 and Spaventa op. cit. at note 
9 at pp 250-254 and esp. at p. 253. However, for Spaventa, the causation test is restricted to the 
assessment of national measures that are not intended to regulate intra-EU trade. 
59
 Opinion of AG La Pergola in Case C-44/98 BASF op. cit. at note 4 at para. 18. 
60
 Case C-69/88 Krantz op. cit. at note 4 at para. 11. See thereafter Case C-93/92 CMC 
Motorradcenter op. cit. at note 4 at para. 12, Case C-379/92 Peralta op. cit. at note 4 at para. 24, Case 
C-96/94 Centro Servizi Spediporto Srl op. cit. at note 4 at para. 41, Joined Cases C-140/94, C-141/94 
and C-142/94 DIP SpA op. cit. at note 4 at para. 29, Case C-44/98 BASF op. cit. at note 4 at para.21, 
Case C-266/96 Corsica Ferries France op. cit. at note 4 at para. 31, Case C-412/97 Ed Srl op. cit. at 
note 4 at para. 11, Case 190/98 Graf op. cit. at note 4 at para. 25 and Case C-291/09 Francesco op. cit. 
at note 4 at para. 17. 
4. Existing repsonses to the problem of judicial overreach 
 
  155 
purchasers failed to discharge their Netherlands tax debts is too uncertain and 
indirect to warrant the conclusion that a national provision authorising such 
seizure is liable to hinder trade between Member States.‟
61
 
Crucially for present purposes, the ruling Krantz provides us with clear evidence to 
support the view that the Court‟s reading of the obstacle concept is subject to some 
qualification. At the time when the ruling was delivered, the Court was yet to 
„clarify‟ its case law on the scope of Art 34 TFEU through its Keck ruling.
62
 Its 
approach to the definition of „measures having equivalent effect to quantitative 
restrictions‟ was therefore governed solely by its rulings in Dassonville and Cassis 
de Dijon.
63
 Applying this case law literally, it would have been perfectly conceivable 
for the Court to conclude that the contested Dutch legislation fell within the scope of 
Art 34 TFEU as an obstacle to intra-EU movement. The Dassonville formula is 
certainly broad enough to have captured the applicant‟s assertion that the rules in 
question were capable of hindering directly or indirectly, actually or potentially intra-
EU trade in the products concerned.
64
 However, the Court chose not to apply the full 
force of this test. Instead, it opted to qualify its use, and thereby offer some degree of 
protection to Member State autonomy. 
4.3 Krantz as a causation test 
On one view, the ruling in Krantz introduced (or simply applied) a test of causation 
to the Court‟s reading of the scope of the Treaty freedoms.
65
 For example, Spaventa 
argues that the criterion of effects too uncertain and indirect requires the applicant, 
first and foremost, to demonstrate a link between the rule and the alleged barrier to 
intra-EU movement.
66
 Similarly, Doukas also maintains that:  
„[u]nlike a de minimis test, which would include within the scope of the 
Treaty only measures having appreciable effects on intra-Community trade, 
                                                          
61
 Ibid., at para. 11. 
62
 Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Keck and Mithouard op. cit. at note 2. 
63
 Case 8/74 Dassonville op. cit. at note 20 and Case 120/78 Cassis [1979] ECR 649. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, the Court‟s interpretation of the scope of Art 34 TFEU has been subjected to subsequent 
qualification. See here, in particular, the rulings in Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Keck and 
Mithouard op. cit. at note 2 and Case C-110/05 Commission v. Italy (Motorcycle Trailers) [2009] 
ECR 519. 
64
 Case 8/74 Dassonville op. cit. at note 20 at para. 5. 
65
 See eg the Opinion of AG La Pergola in Case C-44/98 BASF op. cit. at note 4 at para. 18, Biondi 
op. cit. at note 58 at pp 487-488, Doukas op. cit. at note 57 at p. 206 and Spaventa op. cit. at note 9 at 
pp 250-254 and esp. at p. 253. 
66
 Spaventa op. cit. at note 9 at p. 253.  
4. Existing repsonses to the problem of judicial overreach 
 
  156 
the remoteness test excludes from the ambit of the free movement provisions 
any situation where there is no causal link between the measures concerned 
and the impact on intra-Community trade, which is either lacking or 
dependant on unforeseen circumstances.‟
67
 
On this reading of Krantz, the contested Dutch rules on the seizure of moveable 
assets fell therefore outside of the scope of Art 34 TFEU by reason of the fact that 
their effect on intra-EU trade was conditional upon another (independent) variable: 
the insolvency of the purchaser. 
At first sight, the causation test seems to provide a convincing means of rationalising 
the criterion of effects too uncertain and indirect. It seems to make sense to require a 
link between the existence of the contested national measure and the alleged obstacle 
to intra-EU trade. However, the problem with this approach is that is cannot deal 
with the applicant‟s core argument. In Krantz, the applicant objected to the very 
existence of the Dutch legislation. In his eyes, the contested Dutch rules had a 
deterrent effect on his decision to conclude intra-EU contracts with buyers 
established in that State.
68
 The issue of whether or not contracting buyers in the 
Netherlands subsequently entered into insolvency proceedings was irrelevant. Rather, 
on one view, it was the fact that, should they do so, the Dutch tax authorities may 
then (lawfully) seize any goods supplied to them by the applicant. It was this 
potential risk that was liable to deter the applicant from exploiting the market for his 
products in that Member State.  
As a test of causation, the criterion of effects too uncertain and indirect does not 
really tell us why the above deterrent effects on intra-EU trade do not fall within the 
scope of the (then) applicable Dassonville formula. After all, on the above 
interpretation, was the contested Dutch legislation not liable to hinder directly or 
indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-EU trade? At the very least, it might have led 
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4.3 Case 190/98 Graf v. Filzmoser Maschinenbau GmbH 
The tension between the causation test and the application of the Court‟s broad 
effects-based interpretation of obstacles to intra-EU movement can also be seen in 
the subsequent ruling in Graf.
70
 In that case, the Court made express reference to the 
criterion of effects too uncertain and indirect in connection with its decision to 
exclude Austrian employment legislation from the scope of Art 45 TFEU (ex Art 39 
EC). In Graf, the applicant, a German national working in Austria, had decided that 
he wished to cease his employment in Austria and return to his home Member State. 
However, he objected to the fact that, in so doing, he would necessarily forfeit his 
entitlement to specific employment benefits guaranteed under Austrian legislation. In 
particular, Mr Graf objected to the loss of insurance cover for involuntary 
redundancy. 
In its reply to the referring court, the ECJ concluded that the contested Austrian 
legislation did not fall within the scope of Art 45 TFEU. Again, in support of this 
conclusion, it invoked the criterion of effects too uncertain and indirect. Moreover, 
the Court‟s reasoning provides further support to the views of those interpreting this 
criterion through the lens of causation. The Court concluded: 
„the legislation of the kind at issue… is not such as to preclude or deter a 
worker from ending his contract of employment in order to take a job with 
another employer, because the entitlement to compensation on termination of 
employment is not dependent on the worker‟s choosing whether to stay with 
his current employer but on a future and hypothetical event, namely the 
subsequent termination of his contract without such termination being at his 
own initiative or attributable to him.‟
71
 
The ruling in Graf can, on one view, be explained through the lens of causation.
72
 As 
the Court noted, the payment of the contested insurance benefit was not dependant 
on whether or not the applicant opted to remain in employment in Austria. Instead, it 
was conditional upon a future event that may never materialise.  
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Yet, as in Krantz, there are difficulties with the above line of argument. It is certainly 
true that realisation of the employment benefit at issue depended on a future 
hypothetical event (involuntary redundancy). However, this fact does not defeat the 
applicant‟s argument that, by choosing to exercise his rights to intra-EU movement, 
he was forced to forego what was, in effect, a valuable form of employment 
insurance. This same benefit may not be available in other Member States and, for 
that reason, may in fact have a considerable impact on the applicant‟s decision to 
move. Applying the Court‟s own test, the loss of this right was liable „to preclude or 
deter [Mr Graf] from ending his contract of employment in order to take a job with 
another employer.‟
73
 In the end, the causation test cannot really explain why this 
particular „deterrent‟ effect does not fall within the scope of the Court‟s definition of 
the scope of Art 45 TFEU.  
4.4 Summary 
The case law on effects too uncertain and indirect strongly indicates the existence of 
(some) limits to the scope of the Court‟s broad effects-based reading of the term 
obstacle to intra-EU movement. It can be taken as evidence that, by its own 
admission, the Court‟s expansive interpretation of the term „obstacle to intra-EU 
movement‟ is subject to some limits. However, the fundamental problem is that it 
remains rather unclear why certain measures do not fall within the scope of the 
Court‟s own reading of obstacles to intra-EU movement. Why, for example, does a 
national measure that was liable to have an impact (actually or potentially, directly or 
indirectly) on intra-EU trade not fall within the scope of Art 34 TFEU? Equally, why 
did the Court overlook Mr Graf‟s argument that the loss of a valuable insurance 
benefit was not liable to deter him from exercising his rights to intra-EU movement? 
The causation test offers one possible explanation. However, when pressed, this 
approach has been shown to be incapable of rationalising the case law adequately.  
Rather than applying a test of causation, it is argued that the case law on effects too 
uncertain and indirect is better viewed as providing early indications of a qualitative 
de minimis test, which can now be seen to permeate the case law on obstacle to intra-
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EU movement.
74
 Under this test, the Court is effectively opting to exclude certain 
national measures from the scope of the Treaty freedoms. This decision is based on 
the Court‟s own view of the qualitatively insignificant effects that the measures in 
question have on intra-EU movement. The emergence and substance of the de 
minimis test are considered in the next section. 
5. A de minimis test? 
5.1 Overview 
The Court has stated repeatedly that the term „obstacle to intra-EU movement‟ is not 
subject to a de miminis test.
75
 Yet, on closer analysis, there is irrefutable evidence of 
such a test in the case law. Support for the operation of this test is not only to be 
found in those cases in which the Court refers to the „insignificant‟ or „modest‟ 
impact of particular Member State rules on intra-EU movement.
76
 On the contrary, 
the de minimis test can also be seen to permeate the case law under a variety of 
different labels, including the criterion of effects too uncertain and indirect discussed 
in section 4. In substance, the de minimis test is qualitative as opposed to 
quantitative. The Court is not concerned with the number of subjects affected by 
particular national measures. Instead, it focuses on the qualitative nature of their 
effects on intra-EU movement. In short, the evidence in the case law strongly 
suggests that the Court has formed specific views regarding the insignificance of 
certain non-discriminatory national rules. In electing not to review such national 
measures as obstacles to intra-EU movement, the Court is, of course, making 
important judgments on the scope of Treaty freedoms and, ultimately, the appropriate 
division of competence between the Union and the Member States in connection 
with the regulation of the internal market. Unfortunately, the qualitative threshold is 
                                                          
74
 Chapter 6 will reconsider this argument in light of the subsidiarity principle. 
75
 Eg Joined Cases 177 and 178/82 van de Haar [1984] ECR 1797 at para. 13, Case 167/73 
Commission v France (Maritime Regulations) [1974] ECR 359 at para. 44, Case C-49/89 Corsica 
Ferries France [1989] ECR 4441 at para. 8, Case C-9/02 Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant v Ministère 
de l’Économie, des Finances et de l’Industrie [2004] ECR I-2409 at para. 43, Case C-309/02 
Radlberger Getränkegesellschaft [2004] ECR I-11763 at para. 68 and Case C-170/05 Denkavit 
Internationaal BV [2006] ECR I-11949 at para. 22. 
76
 Eg Case C-20/03 Burmanjer op. cit. at note 5 at para. 31, Case C-134/03 Viacom Outdoor Srl op. 
cit. at note 5 at paras 36-37 and Joined Cases C-544/03 and C-545/03 Mobistar SA op. cit. at note 5 at 
para. 31. 
 
4. Existing repsonses to the problem of judicial overreach 
 
  160 
currently set too low to offer an adequate solution to the problem of judicial 
overreach identified in Chapter 3.  
5.2 The Court’s rejection of the de minimis test  
The Court has firmly rejected the application of a de minimis test as a device to limit 
the scope of the Treaty rules on intra-EU movement. The Court first made this point 
in its ruling in van den Haar.
77
 In this case, the Court stated in clear terms that Art 34 
TFEU:  
„does not distinguish between measures having an effect equivalent to 
quantitative restrictions according to the degree to which trade between 
Member States is affected. If a national measure is capable of hindering 
imports it must be regarded as a measure having an effect equivalent to a 
quantitative restriction, even though the hindrance is slight.‟
78
  
The Court has since reiterated its rejection of the de minimis test across the Treaty 
freedoms. For example, in Commission v France (Maritime Regulations), the Court 
stated that Art 45 TFEU (workers) demanded „the abolition of any discrimination 
based on nationality, whatever be its nature or extent, between workers of the 
Member States as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work 
and employment.‟
79
 Similarly, the Court has repeatedly stated that „a restriction on 
freedom of establishment is prohibited by [Art 49 TFEU] even if of limited scope or 
minor importance.‟
80
 The Court‟s rejection of the de minimis test is perhaps best 
summarised in its first Corsica Ferries ruling.
81
 In this case, the Court concluded, in 
broad cross-freedom terms, that „the articles of the [TFEU] concerning the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital are fundamental Community 
provisions and any restriction, even minor, of that freedom is prohibited.‟
82
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There are arguably good reasons behind the Court‟s principled rejection of a de 
minimis test in EU free movement law.  First and foremost, it would be difficult to 
apply.
83
 As a quantitative (i.e. numerical) criterion, the de minimis test would require 
much more precise economic analysis. In order to trigger the protection of the Treaty 
freedoms in individual cases, relevant product or services markets would have to be 
defined and volumes of intra-EU trade quantified. This could be criticised for 
increasing the cost and complexity of judicial proceedings. Furthermore, it might 
also place considerable strain on individual applicants, who would be required to 
conduct such assessments in the first instance. Of course, one might argue that the 
position is no different in the field of competition law. The application of the Treaty 
rules on anti-competitive agreements (Art 101 TFEU) and the abuse of a dominant 
position (Art 102 TFEU) are also subject to a quantitative de minimis test requiring 
detailed market analysis.
84
 However, in competition proceedings, the burden of 
demonstrating that the de minimis threshold is met falls primarily to specialist public 




A qualitative approach to de minimis in EU free movement law could also be 
attacked – though for different reasons.
86
 Under this approach to the de minimis 
threshold, national measures would be removed from the scope of the Treaty 
freedoms as a matter of policy. For example, the Court might take the view that the 
Treaty freedoms should not be applied to particular categories of Member State 
legislation (as in Keck). Equally, it may seek to remove from the scope of the term 
„obstacle to intra-EU movement‟ national rules that simply translate into a marginal 
increase in the cost of conducting economic activity for all parties concerned. The 
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principal criticism of the qualitative reading of de minimis is that, in the end, it 
ultimately grants the Court of Justice a further policy-making function. It enables the 
Court to make judgments about how its own interpretation of obstacles to intra-EU 
movement should be applied. This risks undermining the function of the justification 




5.3 The Court’s implicit de minimis test 
Although the Court has consistently rejected the operation of a de minimis test in EU 
free movement law, its case law tells a rather different story.
88
 In the first instance, 
the Court has made clear reference, on several occasions, to the insignificance or 
insufficient effects of particular measures on intra-EU movement in connection with 
its decision to exclude such rules from the scope of the Treaty freedoms. For 
example, in Viacom Outdoor, the Court pointed to the „modest‟ nature of a non-
discriminatory municipal tax imposed on outdoor advertising in connection with its 
decision not to scrutinise that measure as an obstacle to the freedom to provide 
services.
89
 Similarly, in Mobistar SA, the ECJ concluded that a non-discriminatory 
tax on mobile phone infrastructure installed on the national territory, the only effect 
of which was to create „additional costs in respect of the [provision of] the service in 
question,‟ did not fall within the scope of the broad effects-based reading of Art 56 
TFEU (ex Art 49 EC).
90
 
Further evidence of a de minimis test can be detected in the case law on persons. This 
includes, in particular, a relatively early example from the case law on Art 49 TFEU 
(ex Art 43 EC). In Konstantindis, a Greek national who was engaged in economic 
activity in Germany sought to contest the refusal of the German Registry Office to 
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correct the spelling of his surname.
91
 For the Court, this refusal constituted an 
obstacle to intra-EU movement. Importantly, in reaching this finding, the Court 
imposed a de minimis threshold. According to the Court, the German registry rules 
were to be regarded as incompatibile with the freedom of establishment: 
„only in so far as their application causes a Greek national such a degree of 
inconvenience as in fact to interfere with his freedom to exercise the right of 
establishment enshrined in that article.‟
92
  
In the final analysis, the ECJ directed the referring court to find the German rules 
contrary to Art 49 TFEU by reason of the fact that the misspelling of his surname 
might lead potential clients to confuse the applicant with other persons.
93
 In its more 
recent case law on Union citizenship, the ECJ has followed a similar approach. 
Moreover, since Konstantindis, it would appear to have raised the operative de 
minimis threshold considerably. For example, in Runevič-Vardyn, the Court 
concluded that the refusal of the Lithuanian authorities to permit changes to the 
spelling of their surname on official documents would only constitute an obstacle to 
Art 21 TFEU where this caused the applicant „serious inconvenience.‟
94
  
Finally, in the case law on goods, particularly strong support for the application of a 
de minimis test can be found in Burmanjer.
95
 In that case, the Court was requested to 
examine Belgian legislation prohibiting itinerant selling. The defendants were 
charged with offering subscriptions to Dutch and German periodicals, but sought to 
argue in their defence that the Belgian prohibition was contrary to Art 34 TFEU. In 
its reply to the referring court, the ECJ turned to consider the selling arrangement test 
in Keck. On the basis of the available information, the Court concluded that it was 
unable to determine whether or not the Belgian measure was liable to have a greater 
impact on imported publications (the selling arrangement discrimination test). This 
was left for the referring court to consider. However, and crucially for present 
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purposes, the Court stated clearly that, even if it were proven that the contested 
measure was discriminatory, it might nonetheless fall outside of the scope of Art 34 
TFEU by reason of its insignificant effects on intra-EU trade.
96
 
5.4 De minimis: qualitative not quantitative 
On the strength of the above examples, the de minimis test in EU free movement law 
would appear to be qualitative rather than quantitative.
97
 In other words, the Court is 
excluding national measures from the scope of the Treaty freedoms according to its 
particular view on their insignificance in so far as the establishment of a functioning 
internal market is concerned. Specifically, Viacom Outdoor suggests that the Court is 
prepared to overlook non-discriminatory national measures that simply increase the 
cost of economic activity marginally;
98
 Konstantindis can be taken as evidence that 
the Court is not concerned with non-discriminatory rules that cause Member State 
nationals no real inconvenience in connection with their economic and non-economic 
activities within the internal market;
99
 finally, Burmanjer would appear to 
demonstrate the Court‟s desire to exclude from the scope of Art 34 TFEU national 




The Court‟s approach in the above decisions can be contrasted with its response to 
attempts to invoke the de minimis threshold in Bluhme.
101
 In that case, the defendant 
Member State‟s application of the criterion was more quantitative than qualitative. 
The Danish Government had sought to argue that a prohibition on the importation 
(and keeping) of non-native bee species on a particular island within the national 
territory did not constitute an obstacle to intra-EU movement. Specifically, it had 
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argued that the relevant geographical market was too small to trigger the application 
of Art 34 TFEU. As the facts of the case set out, the island in question was that of 
Læsø, with a geographical footprint of only 114 km
2
 and a population (at the time) of 
a mere 2365 souls.
102
 Crucially, the Court rejected this quantitative reading of de 
minimis. It stated explicitly that the application of the Dassonville test was not 
conditional on the size of the relevant market.
103
 
5.5 The explanatory force of the qualitative de minimis test 
Evidence of the qualitative de minimis test in EU free movement law is not only to 
be found in those cases in which the Court speaks expressly of „insignificant‟ or 
„modest‟ effects on intra-EU movement or matters of „serious inconvenience‟ to 
Member State nationals. Instead, it appears to underpin and better explain a much 
broader body of decisions. In particular, it is argued that the qualitative de minimis 
test can be used to improve our understanding of the case law on effects too 
uncertain and indirect discussed in section 4 above.
104
 Rather than applying a test of 
causation, it is submitted that this criterion is, in effect, really just another expression 
of the implicit qualitative de minimis test.
105
 Put another way, the Court is also using 
the „effects too uncertain and indirect‟ test to remove from the scope of the Treaty 
freedoms national measures that it considers – as a matter of policy – of no 
importance to the establishment of a functioning internal market. 
On the above view, it is possible to explain the Court‟s decision not to review the 
national measures in Krantz and Graf as obstacles to intra-EU movement.
106
 As 
discussed in section 4 above, in both cases, the Court invoked the criterion of effects 
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too uncertain and indirect in support of this finding. Yet, as argued earlier, it 
remained unclear why the contested Member State regulations were not caught by the 
scope of the Treaty freedoms. After all, in Krantz, the Dutch legislation on asset 
seizure could clearly impact on intra-EU trade within the meaning of the Dassonville 
formula. Likewise, the loss of the statutory employment insurance benefit at issue in 
Graf could very well have had a deterrent effect on the decision of a Member State 
national to exercise their rights under Art 45 TFEU. However, viewed through the 
lens of a qualitative de minimis test, it is submitted that the Court‟s decisions in both 
might make considerably more sense.  
First, with respect to Krantz, it is possible to argue that the contested Dutch rules fell 
outside of the scope of Art 34 TFEU by reason of the fact that they had nothing other 
than an abstract effect on the volume of intra-EU trade. The rules on the seizure of 
assets applied without any discrimination as regards either the nationality of the 
contracting parties or the origin of the products concerned. In this sense, the rules 
were directly comparable to the non-discriminatory trading rules that the Court also 
chose to exclude, shortly thereafter, from the scope of the same provision through the 
selling arrangement concept in Keck.
107
 This latter decision can also be read as an 
expression of the same qualitative de minimis test, according to which the Court has 
sought (at least at one stage in its case law) to exclude from the scope of the 
Dassonville test genuinely non-discriminatory Member State legislation that is, at 
worst, simply liable to have an impact on the volume of intra-EU trade.
108
 
With respect to Graf, it is suggested that the Court‟s decision not to bring the 
contested statutory benefit within the scope of Art 45 TFEU can also be reinterpreted 
through the lens of the qualitative de minimis test. This case can be viewed on the 
same spectrum as Konstantindis and (now) Runevič-Vardyn discussed above.
109
 In 
other words, it is suggested that the Court chose not to accept the applicant‟s loss of 
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his Austrian redundancy insurance as sufficient to trigger the application of Art 45 
TFEU, notwithstanding its deterrent effects on intra-EU movement, by reason of the 
fact that it did not cause him „(serious) inconvenience.‟  
In several other cases, the Court‟s use of the criterion of effects too uncertain and 
indirect can also be better explained through the de minimis lens. Corsica Ferries 
offers the clearest illustration of this point.
110
 That case addressed Italian rules 
requiring all vessels docking in ports within that Member State to make use of 
compulsory mooring services. These services, it was argued, were charged at above 
cost price. The applicant argued, on one of a number of grounds, that this legislation 
was contrary to Art 34 TFEU. The Court rejected this argument quickly, referring 
expressly to the fact that any effects on intra-EU trade in goods were „too uncertain 
and indirect.‟
111
 Crucially, this finding was not based on the absence of any causal 
link between the contested measure and the alleged obstacle to intra-EU trade. It is 
absolutely clear that any increase in transportation costs could, within the meaning of 
the Dassonville formula, hinder intra-EU trade in goods. Instead, in order to shield 
them from the Dassonville formula, the Court appeared to rely solely on the fact that 
the only effect of the contested mooring services was to increase the cost of 
economic activity marginally.
112
 This is the same qualitiative de minimis test that can 
be seen in the subsequent decisions in Viacom Outdoor/Mobistar SA, discussed 
above. 
6. Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to evaluate the Court‟s existing responses to the problem of 
judicial overreach identified in Chapter 3. Presenting the case law in its best light, it 
is submitted that the Court‟s qualitative de minimis test is the only judicial device 
that has had any real impact on delimiting the scope of the Court‟s expansive reading 
of the scope of the Treaty freedoms. The wholly internal rule has done little to 
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safeguard Member State autonomy. On the contrary, its gradual erosion by the Court 
has actually accompanied and indeed bolstered the expansion of the term „obstacle to 
intra-EU movement.‟ In so doing, a greater not lesser sphere of Member State 
autonomy is now exposed to the full force of the Court‟s obstacles case law. Equally, 
it has been argued that neither the concept of an inherent obstacle to intra-EU 
movement nor the criterion of effects too uncertain and indirect have contributed to 
the management of the outer limits of the Treaty freedoms – though for different 
reasons. The first device, the inherent obstacle concept, does not actually challenge 
the Court‟s decision to intervene in the regulation of the internal market in the first 
place – the key subsidiarity problem identified in Chapter 3. Instead, it simply 
provides an alternative framework to justify Member State measures at Union level.  
With respect to the latter device, the criterion of effects to uncertain and indirect, this 
was shown, in effect, to add nothing to the substance of the qualitative de minimis 
test. 
In summary, the qualitative de minimis test would appear to exclude from the scope 
of the term „obstacle to intra-EU movement‟ three distinct categories of non-
discriminatory national measures. These are: non-discriminatory Member State rules 
that (1) are liable only to have an abstract effect on the volume of intra-EU trade in 
goods;
113
 (2) simply increase marginally the cost of economic activity;
114
 or (3) cause 
Member State nationals no serious inconvenience in connection with their economic 
and non-economic activities within the internal market.
115
  
Yet, although offering some protection to Member State autonomy, the Court‟s 
qualitative de minimis test cannot be taken as an adequate solution to the subsidiarity 
                                                          
113
 See, from a list of many, eg Case 75/81 Blesgen op. cit. at note 47, Case C-69/88 Krantz op. cit. at 
note 4, Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Keck and Mithouard op. cit. at note 2, Joined cases C-
69/93 and C-258/93 Punto Casa SpA [1994] ECR I-2355, Case C-20/03 Burmanjer op. cit. at note 5, 
Case C-441/04 A-Punkt Schmuckhandel v. Schmidt [2006] ECR I-2043. Contrast here, of course, the 
recent ruling in Case C-110/05 Commission v. Italy (Motorcycle Trailers) op. cit. at note 20 and Case 
C-142/05 Åklagaren v Percy Mickelsson and Joakim Roos [2009] ECR I-4273. The tension between 
these two competing lines of case law is analysed further in Chapter 6. 
114
 Eg, Case C-379/92 Peralta op. cit. at note 4, Case C-134/94 Esso Española SA [1995] op. cit. at 
note 109, and Joined Cases C-140-2/94 DIP SpA op. cit. at note 4, Case C-266/96 Corsica Ferries op. 
cit. at note 4, Case C-134/03 Viacom Outdoor Srl op. cit. at note 5 and Joined Cases C-544/03 and C-
545/03 Mobistar SA op. cit. at note 5. 
115
 Eg Case C-168/91 Konstantinidis op. cit. at note 91, Case C-190/98 Graf op. cit. at note 4, Case C-
148/02 Garcia Avello op. cit. at note 94 and Case C-353/06 Grunkin and Paul op. cit. at note 94 and 
C‑208/09 Sayn-Wittgenstein op. cit. at note 94. 
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concerns associated with the Court‟s interpretation of the scope of the Treaty 
freedoms. For a start, the de minimis test is buried in a body of openly contradictory 
decisions. Indeed, it is rather difficult to hold up this test as a workable solution to 
the problem of judicial overreach identified in Chapter 3 when the Court itself 
persists in reiterating that its case law on obstacles to intra-EU movement applies 
even where the obstacle is slight. Moreover, even when presented in its best light, 
there is still a fatal problem with the qualitative de minimis test. In short, the 
threshold is set far too low to have any measurable impact on the Court‟s broad 
effects-based reading of the obstacle concept. For that reason, we must conclude that, 
from the perspective of the subsidiarity principle, there is still a real problem in the 
case law on obstacles to intra-EU movement. The Court‟s reading of the latter term 
remains dangerously close to affording that institution a „general power to regulate‟ 
the internal market. 
In the next chapter, attention shifts to the competing interpretative models that have 
been developed in response to the need to provide a workable framework to manage 
the scope of the Treaty freedoms.  Briefly summarised, there are two general schools 
of thought in the literature. On the one hand, several commentators favour a narrow 
reading of the term obstacle to intra-EU movement. Under this approach, it is argued 
that the Court should focus on the elimination of discrimination on nationality 
grounds and/or guaranteeing mutual recognition within the internal market.
116
 On the 
other hand, several writers argue that the Court should adopt a much broader 
approach to its interpretative task. For them, the Court should use the Treaty 
freedoms as tools to the scrutinise Member State measures that, inter alia, affect 
market access or interfere disproportionately with the economic and/or personal 
freedom of Union citizens.
117
 The purpose of the Chapter 5 is to critique both the 
narrow and broader conceptual models.  
                                                          
116
 Those supporting the narrower view include, eg N. Bernard, Multilevel Governance in the 
European Union (Amsterdam: Kluwer, 2002), Snell op. cit. at note 83 and Davies op. cit. at note 83. 
117
 Those supporting the broader view include, eg AG Jacobs in Case C-412/93 Leclerc-Siplec op. cit. 
at note 88, Weatherill op. cit. at note 88, AG Maduro in Joined Cases C-158/04 and C-159/04 Alfa 
Vita Vassilopoulos [2006] ECR I-8135, E. Spaventa, Free Movement of Persons in the European 
Union: Barriers to Movement in the Constitutional Context (AH Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer, 2007) 
and Barnard op. cit. at note 57. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Obstacles to intra-EU movement: the view from the literature 
 
1. Introduction 
Chapter 4 presented a critical analysis of the key judicial devices that the Court has 
developed to manage its increasingly broad effects-based definition of obstacles to 
intra-EU movement. Four key devices were identified: (1) the wholly internal rule; 
(2) the inherent obstacle concept; (3) the criterion of effects too uncertain and 
indirect and (4) the de minimis test. It was argued that, of these four judicial devices, 
only the de minimis test offers a solution to the problem of judicial overreach 
identified in Chapter 3. In summary, the Court‟s implicit de minimis test removes 
from the scope of the Treaty freedoms national measures with effects on intra-EU 
movement that the Court considers to be qualitatively insignificant. This includes 
three distinct categories of non-discriminatory national measures. These are: non-
discriminatory Member State rules that (1) have only abstract effects on the volume 
of intra-EU trade in goods; (2) simply increase marginally the cost of economic 
activity; or (3) cause Member State nationals no serious inconvenience in connection 
with their economic and non-economic activities within the internal market. In 
conclusion, it was argued that, although offering the Member States a degree of 
protection, the threshold is set too low for the qualitative de minimis test to function 
as an effective brake on the Court‟s case law on obstacles to intra-EU movement. 
This chapter turns to examine the key interpretative models that are used to 
rationalise the Court‟s case law on the scope of the Treaty freedoms. As things 
currently stand, the case law on intra-EU movement has been examined through a 
number of different lenses. These include, in particular: (1) non-discrimination on 
nationality grounds;
1
 (2) mutual recognition
2
 and (3) market access.
3
 In addition to 
                                                          
1
 Eg N. Bernard, „Discrimination and Free Movement in EC Law‟ (1996) 45(1) ICLQ 82, G. Davies, 
Nationality Discrimination in the European Internal Market (The Hague: Kluwer, 2003), K. Banks, 
„The Application of the Fundamental Freedoms to Member State Tax Measures: Guarding against 
Protectionism or Second-guessing National Policy Choices?‟ (2008) 33(4) ELRev 482 and D. Wilsher, 
„Does Keck Discrimination Make Any Sense? An Assessment of the Non-discrimination Principle 
within the European Single Market‟ (2008) 33(1) ELRev 3. For an approach that combines 
5. Obstacles to intra-EU movement: the view from the literature 
 
  171 
the aforementioned models, several commentators have developed alternative 
frameworks. For example, Poiares Maduro has argued that the Court should use its 
freedom to interpret the scope of the Treaty freedoms to correct structural biases 
within national democratic processes.
4
 More recently, Spaventa has reassessed the 
case law in light of the evolving status of Union citizenship.
5
  
The purpose of this chapter is both to describe and to critique these competing 
conceptual models. The chapter begins in section two by analysing the narrow view 
of obstacles to intra-EU movement. According to this view, the scope of the Treaty 
freedoms should be limited to the elimination of all discrimination on nationality 
grounds and/or ensuring that Member States respect the principle of mutual 
recognition. Section 3 then turns to consider the broader view. On this interpretation, 
the term „obstacle to intra-EU movement‟ goes beyond the discrimination/mutual 
recognition models. It permits the Court to scrutinise national measures on the basis 
of their effects on (1) market access; (2) the commercial or personal freedom of 
Union citizens; and (3) national democratic processes. 
In summary, it is argued that there are difficulties with both the narrow and broader 
interpretations of obstacles to intra-EU movement. Neither approach is capable of 
providing a coherent framework capable of placing effective limits on the Court‟s 
expansive effects-based tests. The narrow approach, focusing on discrimination and 
mutual recognition, has a certain degree of explanatory force. Moreover, if adopted, 
it would clearly safeguard a greater sphere of Member State autonomy. However, the 
effectivesness of the narrow view is undermined by its own supporters, who end up 
pushing the discrimination/mutual recognition tests beyond breaking point in their 
                                                                                                                                                                    
discrimination with market access. see eg N. Nic Shuibhne, „The Free Movement of Goods and 
Article 28 EC: An Evolving Framework‟ (2002) 27(4) ELRev 408. 
2
 Eg J. Snell Goods and Services in EC Law (Oxford: OUP, 2002) and N. Bernard, Multilevel 
Governance in the European Union (Amsterdam: Kluwer, 2002). 
3
 Eg the Opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-412/93 Leclerc-Siplec [1995] ECR I-179, S. Weatherill, 
„After Keck: Some Thoughts on How to Clarify the Clarification‟ (1996) 33(5) CMLRev 885, C. 
Barnard, „Fitting the Remaining Pieces into the Goods and Persons Jigsaw‟ (2001) 26(1) ELRev 34, C. 
Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: the Four Freedoms (3rd Ed.) (Oxford: OUP, 2010). 
4
 M. Poiares Maduro, We the Court: The European Court of Justice & the European Economic 
Constitution (Oxford: Hart, 1999). 
5
 E. Spaventa, Free Movement of Persons in the European Union: Barriers to Movement in the 
Constitutional Context (AH Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer, 2007). See also thereafter, eg A. 
Tryfonidou, „In Search of the Aim of the EC Free Movement of Persons Provisions: Has the Court of 
Justice Missed the Point? (2009) 46(5) CMLRev 1591. 
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efforts to provide a workable interpretative framework. By contrast, the broader 
models are able to explain fully the evolving case law on obstacles to intra-EU 
movement. However, the weakness of the broader view is that it rests on shaky 
normative foundations. Specifically, those who support a broader reading of the 
scope of the Treaty freedoms rely on a series of untested assumptions regarding both 
the objectives of market integration and also the Court‟s freedom to pursue these 
through its interpretation of obstacles to intra-EU movement.  
2. The narrow view 
2.1 Discrimination and mutual recognition 
The narrow approach to defining obstacles to intra-EU movement centres on the 
principles of non-discrimination and mutual recognition.
6
 However, it may also 
cover the popular „market access‟ approach (discussed separately below), provided 
that this term is understood simply as a more fashionable synonym for 
discrimination.
7
 Under the first alternative (non-discrimination), the Treaty 
provisions are interpreted as interfering with the regulatory autonomy of the Member 
States only to the extent that this treats non-nationals or imported products and 
services differently to those on the national market. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
discrimination requires the elimination of both: (1) differences in treatment on the 
grounds of Member State nationality in objectively comparable situations and (2) 
equalities in treatment in otherwise non-comparable circumstances.
8
  
Under mutual recognition, the second alternative, obstacles to intra-EU movement 
are conceptualised by attributing the primary right to regulate economic or non-
economic activity to a specific Member State.
9
 This is typically the Member State in 
which goods are produced or, for persons, an individual‟s economic activity is 
permanently centred. According to the principle of mutual recognition, the home 
Member State (or Member State of establishment) retains primary competence to 
                                                          
6
 See esp. Bernard op. cit. at note, chapter 2 and Snell op. cit. at note 2 at pp 33-35. For discussion, see 
also Spaventa op. cit. at note 5 at pp 75-88. 
7
 As Nic Shuibhne argues, discrimination and market access are not mutually exclusive. See Nic 
Shuibhne op. cit. at note 1 at p. 417. See further section 2.2 below. 
8
 See Chapter 3 above. 
9
 Snell op. cit. at note 2 at p. 48. 
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regulate the activities of those persons established within its territory. The other 
Member States must recognise this competence and may only apply their own 




The starting point for advocates of the narrow view is the legitimacy of national 
regulation.
11
 Under the principles of both non-discrimination and mutual recognition, 
the Member States retain primary competence for market regulation in the process of 
integration.
12
 Member State legislation is not simply a „temporary stopgap‟ that is 
destined over time to be superseded in its entirety by substantive Union policy 
objectives.
13
 The function of the Treaty freedoms, as interpreted by the Court, is 
instead simply to co-ordinate the exercise of regulatory competence across the 
individual Member States.
14
 Under the discrimination approach, this simply involves 
removing „discriminatory‟ elements from national legislation. As far as mutual 
recognition is concerned, this requires the Court to adjudicate exclusively on the 
extent to which one Member State may apply its own national rules to economic 
activities that have already satisfied the legislation of another Member State.  
Importantly, supporters of the narrow view argue that the Treaty freedoms are not 
intended to grant the Court an additional, broader power to scrutinise the existence or 
quality of national legislation against alternative Union policy objectives.
15
 On the 
contrary, it is argued that the opportunity to reshape national legislation in light of 
the latter is strictly limited to those cases that deal with discriminatory national rules 
or conflicts between the legislation of the home and host Member States (for mutual 
recognition). In both cases, this re-assessment of the substance of national policy 
takes place at the secondary justification stage. To defend their view, advocates of 
the narrow reading of the obstacle concept point, in particular, to the fact that the 
                                                          
10
 Bernard op. cit. at note 2 at pp 17-18. 
11
 Ibid., at p. 17. See also Spaventa op. cit. at note 5 at p. 77. 
12
 Bernard op. cit. at note 2 at p. 17 and, to the same effect, Snell op. cit. at note 2 at p. 35. 
13
 Bernard op. cit. at note 1 at p. 103. 
14
 Snell op. cit. at note 2 at p. 48 and Spaventa op. cit. at note 5 at p. 76 
15 Snell op. cit. at note 2 at p. 45, who argues that: „In the context of the scope of the free movement 
provisions, the Court should be careful not to extend their reach too far and should not embark on a 
project of wholesale negative harmonisation…The Court should [instead] guarantee that products 
from other Member States are able to compete on truly equal terms with domestic products and to 
maintain their competitive advantage.‟ See also Bernard op. cit. at note 1 at p. 105. 
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Treaty does not provide any clear guidance on the specific type of market that is 
being created. As Bernard succinctly notes:  
„the free movement provisions [simply] tell us that there shall be a common 
market and that the obstacles created by the Member States to the existence 
of that market must be removed, but they do not tell us anything about the 
substantive characteristics of that market.‟
16
 
The only substantive characteristic that is clear and uncontested is the prohibition of 
all discrimination on the grounds of Member State nationality.
17
 It is universally 
accepted that the Treaty freedoms are specific expressions of the general prohibition 
of nationality discrimination in Art 18 TFEU. Beyond this, there is, however, no firm 
agreement on the specific policy objectives that are to be achieved through the 
interpretation of the Treaty freedoms. The prevailing view is that the Treaty 
framework (increasingly) reflects an „open economic constitution‟ in which market 
freedom is balanced with other competing non-economic or „non-market‟ interests.
18
 
The above line of reasoning can also be applied to the mutual recognition test. 
Although framed in different language, there is arguably little to distinguish this 
approach from the discrimination test. On one view, it is simply an alternative and 
perhaps more useful way of conceptualising discrimination analysis within the 
internal market.
19
 Rather than discussing the fact that the legislation of another 
Member State may discriminate against goods/economic actors from other Member 
States, the mutual recognition approach focuses on the conflict between the two 
different regulatory regimes. However, this is simply a shift in perspective. The 
discussion is one of „dual regulatory burdens‟ rather than indirect discrimination.
20
 
For example, in its decision in Cassis, the Court famously stated that:  
                                                          
16
 Bernard op. cit. at note 1 at p. 105. See here also Spaventa op. cit. at note 5 at p. 76, who concedes 
that: „[it] is not self-evident that the Court‟s generous interpretation of the free movement provisions 
is supported by the Treaty, which… does not give us any indication of the preferred type of market 
economy.‟  
17
 Spaventa op. cit. at note 5 at p. 76. 
18
 C. Semmelmann, „The European Union‟s Economic Constitution under the Lisbon Treaty: Soul-
Searching Shifts the Focus to Procedure‟ (2010) 35(4) ELRev 516 at p. 518, Spaventa op. cit. at note 5 
at p. 74 and Poiares Maduro op. cit. at note 4 chapters 4, 5 and 6 and esp. at pp 159-161. 
19
 See here esp. Snell op. cit. at note 2 at p. 46: „[discrimination] encompasses situations where a 
Member State applies its rules to circumstances which have already been subject to the regulatory 
system of another Member State. Thus, a double regulatory burden is considered discrimination.‟  
20
 Ibid. 
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„there is… no valid reason why, provided they have been lawfully produced 
and marketed in one of the Member States, alcoholic beverages should not be 
introduced into any other Member State.‟
21
  
This statement is widely taken to denote the origin of the „new approach‟ to market 
regulation based on mutual recognition.
22
 Under this approach, the Court replaced a 
system of dual Member State regulation (by both the home and host States) with a 
single set of regulations (those of the home State).
23
 However, the Cassis ruling can 
just as easily be squared with the prohibition of discrimination.
24
 The contested 
German legislation imposing a minimum alcohol content on all fruit liqueurs was 
indirectly discriminatory. Although it applied to both domestic and imported 
products alike, the contested rules favoured competing national products, which 
necessarily met the prescribed conditions. 
2.2 The strength of the narrow view 
Whether expressed as discrimination or through the lens of mutual recognition, the 
narrow view has significant explanatory force.
25
 This adds to its strength as a 
conceptual model. Notwithstanding the fact that the Court prefers increasingly to 
define the scope of the obstacle concept in broad effects-based language, much of the 
case law still deals with discriminatory national measures. This includes a number of 
the Court‟s apparently groundbreaking rules on the scope of the Treaty freedoms, 
such as Dassonville, Cassis, van Binsbergen, Säger, Kraus and Gourmet.
26
 Each of 
these rulings can be interpreted using the discrimination and/or mutual recognition 
models. Indeed, Davies has argued that there is:  
„very little one can point to as examples of non-discriminatory restrictions 
which have been found to fall within the scope of the Treaty. 
                                                          
21
 Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) 
[1979] ECR 649 at para. 14.  
22
 On this point, see Bernard op. cit. at note 2 at p. 18. See also the „Communication from the 
Commission Regarding the Cassis de Dijon Judgment‟ [1980] OJ C 256/2. 
23
 Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU op. cit. at note 3 at p. 93. 
24
 On this point, see eg Nic Shuibhne op. cit. at note 1 at pp 409-410. 
25
 Spaventa op. cit. at note 5 at p. 76 
26
 Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, Case 120/78 Cassis op. cit. at note 21, Case 33/74 van 
Binsbergen [1974] ECR 1299, Case C-76/90 Manfred Säger v Dennemeyer & Co. Ltd [1991] ECR I-
4221, Case C-19/92 Dieter Kraus v Land Baden-Württemberg [1993] ECR I-1663 and Case C-405/98 
Gourmet International Products AB [2001] ECR I-1795. This argument is developed further in 
chapter 6. 
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Notwithstanding ambiguous language in the judgments the actual results of 
cases fall overwhelmingly within the definition of indirect discrimination.‟
27
  
Similarly, Bernard also maintains that the principle of mutual recognition provides 
the „best fit‟ in the case law on the economic freedoms.
28
 The implication of both 
commentators‟ arguments is that the Court is simply being rather careless or, at 
worst, fundamentally disingenuous in its interpretation of the Treaty freedoms. 
Instead of more accurately adhering to the discrimination model, the Court is instead 
arguably trying to normalise a (potentially) much broader reading of obstacles to 
intra-EU movement.  We shall return to consider this point in Chapter 6. 
2.3 The weakness of the narrow view 
The discrimination and/or mutual recognition approach to obstacles to intra-EU 
movement offers an effective solution to the problem of judicial overreach identified 
in Chapter 3. By re-focusing the Court‟s case law on the elimination of 
discrimination and/or the co-ordination of national policies, the narrow approach 
would certainly increase respect for Member State autonomy. This would also seem 
to sit comfortably alongside the demands of the subsidiarity principle. However, the 
fundamental problem with the narrow view of the scope of the Treaty freedoms is 
that it does not appear to convince even its own supporters. In fact, those writers 
favouring either the discrimination and/or mutual recognition models actually seek to 
take the case law further.  
The weakness of the narrow approach can be seen in Davies‟ analysis of the Bosman 
ruling.
29
 To date, Davies has offered one of the strongest defences of the 
discrimination model. However, in the final analysis, he effectively ends up 
integrating the non-discriminatory Bosman ruling into his obstacle framework. 
According to Davies, the non-discriminatory transfer rules at issue in Bosman 
constituted a „special type of restriction,‟ and he concedes that it might be necessary 
to consider such rules as obstacles to intra-EU movement, which must be justifed in 
EU law.
30
 However, in adopting this position, he ends up undermining his otherwise 
                                                          
27
 Davies op. cit. at note 1 at p. 87. Davies defines indirect discrimination broadly. See esp. pp 55-56. 
28
 Bernard op. cit. at note 2, chapter 2. 
29
 Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921. 
30
 Davies op. cit. at note 1 at pp 87-88. 
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coherent framework. Either the Treaty freedoms extend to capture certain non-
discriminatory national measure or they do not. 
Bernard and Snell also work hard to rationalise the Court‟s decisions in Alpine 
Investments and Bosman with their preferred conceptual model – mutual 
recognition.
31
 Bernard introduces a new criterion into his mutual recognition 
framework in order to distinguish between the Court‟s judgments in Keck (Art 34 
TFEU) and Alpine Investments (Art 56 TFEU).
32
 Under his mutual recognition test, 
competence to regulate product selling arrangements (in Keck) and direct marketing 
methods (in Alpine Investments) falls to the host Member State; in other words, to the 
Member State in which the products were sold or the services marketed. This 
assertion follows from his argument that, under the mutual recognition principle, 
regulatory competence is divided between (1) the Member State of production or 
permanent establishment and (2) the Member State in which goods and services are 
offered on the market.  
As Bernard concedes, the Court‟s ruling in Alpine Investments „creates difficulties‟ 
for the above conceptual framework.
33
 He argues that, in that case, it was the home 
and not the host Member State that was best placed to regulate the manner in which 
services were offered to potential recipients in other Member States. The Court also 
acknowledged this point.
34
 In order to square the circle, Bernard qualifies his mutual 
recognition framework. He does so by arguing that, in each case, it is necessary to 
identify the „country of establishment of the economic operator whose activity is 
being regulated.‟
35
 According to Bernard, it is this Member State of permanent 
establishment that retains primary competence for the regulation of that individual‟s 
economic activities throughout the internal market.
36
  
                                                          
31
 Bernard op. cit. at note 2, Snell op. cit. at note 5. 
32
 Bernard op. cit. at note 2 at pp 22-27. This distinction is drawn from his analysis of Keck, which he 
argues „constitutes a return to an interpretation of the free movement provisions in the Treaty in terms 
of mutual recognition‟ (at p. 22). Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Keck and Mithouard [1992] 
ECR I-6097 and Case C-384/93 Alpine Investments BV v Minister van Financiën [1995] ECR I-1141. 
33
 Bernard op. cit. at note 2 at p. 23. 
34
 Case C-384/93 Alpine Investments op. cit. at note 32 at para. 48. 
35
 Bernard op. cit. at note 2 at p. 25. 
36
 Ibid. 
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Snell goes even further in order to legitimise the Court‟s rulings on non-
discriminatory obstacles in Alpine Investments and Bosman. He abandons his 
otherwise coherent mutual recognition framework entirely. For Snell, the solution to 
the difficulties posed by Alpine Investments and Bosman is found using market 
access. This marks a complete break with the narrow view. To make sense of both 
rulings, Snell argues that the scope of Arts 45 and 56 TFEU should extend beyond 
mutual recognition to capture „[non-discriminatory] national rules creating a direct 
impediment to market access.‟
37
 This additional market access test is simply bolted 
on to the otherwise applicable mutual recognition framework. Again, Snell‟s model 
is open to the same criticism levelled at Davies: either mutual recognition is the 
guiding principle or it is not. 
2.4 Summary 
In principle, the narrow approach to defining the scope of the Treaty offers a possible 
solution to the need to place appropriate limits on the Court‟s case law. However, the 
problem with the non-discrimination and/or mutual recognition models is that they 
would seem to go too far in the opposite direction. In other words, they appear to 
hand back too much regulatory autonomy to the Member States – at least in the eyes 
of their own supporters. Indeed, as the above analysis has shown, those who 
advocate a narrow approach to obstacles to intra-EU movement ultimately abandon 
their own frameworks in order to bring a least certain non-discriminatory national 
measures within the scope of the Court‟s review.
38
 An approach to delimiting the 
Court‟s reading of the Treaty freedoms cannot be based on interpretative models that 
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 Snell op. cit. at note 2 at p. 127. 
38
 The detail of their arguments and suggested motivation is discussed in Chapter 6. 
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3. The broader view 
3.1 Overview 
The broader view of obstacles to intra-EU movement comprises several key models. 
The first model uses market access to manage the scope of the Treaty freedoms.
39
 
Under the market access model, the term „obstacle to intra-EU movement‟ is 
interpreted as prohibiting all national measures that affect access to the market of that 
Member State for goods, services or persons from other Member States. This test is 
usually qualified in the literature by a de minimis test (discussed in chapter 4). 
Alongside the market access approach, Spaventa has offered a second variant based 
on Union citizenship.
40
 The basic argument here is that the Court‟s interpretation of 
obstacles to intra-EU movement must be adjusted to reflect this legal status, which, 
in the Court‟s own words, is now „destined to be the fundamental status of nationals 
of the Member States.‟
41
 Finally, Poiares Maduro has formulated a third proposal.
42
 
He argues that the Court‟s freedom to interpret the scope of the Treaty freedoms 
should be used to correct structural biases within national democratic processes. 
Under the broader view, the Treaty freedoms are interpreted as going beyond the 
mere elimination of discrimination on nationality grounds or the co-ordination of 
regulatory competence across different Member States. It is argued that they should 
also capture genuinely non-discriminatory national rules. In this sense, the Treaty 
freedoms acquire an additional function. They become tools that may be used to 
review of the very existence (i.e. substance) of national legislation against specific 
Union policy objectives. The Treaty freedoms may be used to seek the review of 
genuinely non-discriminatory national rules that simply define the characteristics of 
                                                          
39
 See eg the Opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-412/93 Leclerc-Siplec op. cit. at note 3 at paras 38-49, 
Weatherill op. cit. at note 3, Barnard, „Fitting the Remaining Pieces into the Goods and Services 
Jigsaw‟ op. cit. at note 3, J. Steiner et al EU Law (9
th
 Ed.) (Oxford: OUP, 2009) at p. 388, E. Spaventa, 
„Leaving Keck behind? The Free Movement of Goods after the Rulings in Commission v. Italy and 
Mickelsson and Roos‟ (2009) 36(4) ELRev 914, P. Wennerås and K B Moen, „Selling Arrangements, 
Keeping Keck’ (2009) 35(3) ELRev 387 and Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU op. cit. at note 3 
at p. 144. 
40
 Spaventa op. cit. at note 5, as developed in E. Spaventa, „Seeing the Wood Despite the Trees? On 
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particular Member State markets.
43
 The broader reading of the scope of the Treaty 
freedoms therefore offers far less scope to limit the Court‟s expansive effects-based 
reading of the term „obstacle to intra-EU movement.‟ In fact, it actually supports the 
Court‟s preferred expansive reading of the scope of that term. 
3.2 Market access 
Market access is currently the most favoured interpretative model in EU free 
movement law. A growing body of writers now argue that the Court should interpret 
the scope of the Treaty freedoms as capturing all national measures that affect access 
to the market of that Member State for goods, persons, services and capital lawfully 
circulating/operating elsewhere within the internal market.
44
 Advocate General 
Jacobs forcefully made the case for a market access test in Leclerc-Siplec.
45
 In his 
Opinion, the Advocate General criticised the substance of the Court‟s ruling in Keck. 
He argued against the Court‟s decision to introduce a rigid distinction between two 
different categories of national rule („product measures‟ versus „selling 
arrangements.‟) In his view, certain non-discriminatory national rules regulating 
„selling arrangements,‟ such as rules severely restricting the sale of products, could 
in fact constitute serious obstacles to imports.
46
 To resolve this problem, he argued 
that the Court should alter its approach and interpret Art 34 TFEU as prohibiting all 
national measures that substantially hinder market access.
47
 This test reflected his 
belief in a „guiding principle‟ of market integration, according to which: 
                                                          
43
 It is important to stress the importance of the Court‟s justification analysis in determining the final 
outcome in particular cases. As others have rightly noted, the fact that the Court favours a broader 
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particular substantive view on, say, the importance of economic efficiency. Indeed, it remains open to 
the Court to find genuinely non-discriminatory national rules justified on various grounds.  
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46
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3 at p. 52. 
47
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„all undertakings which engage in a legitimate economic activity in a Member 
State should have unfettered access to the whole of the Community market, 




3.2.1 The strength of market access 
The market access model draws considerable strength from its explanatory force. As 
Spaventa notes, „those who support the market access approach have… a reasonable 
claim that it reflects the state of the law better than the discrimination approach.‟
49
 
Key rulings in this respect include, in particular, the landmark judgments in Alpine 
Investments, Bosman and Commission v. Italy (Motorcycle Trailers).
50
 In each of 
these decisions, the Court placed market access at the centre of its reasoning.
51
  
In addition to its explanatory force, the market access test has other appealing 
features.
52
 First, on one view at least, the test is easier to apply than the 
discriminatory/mutual recognition models.
53
 Unlike the latter tests, there is no need 
to identify comparators or determine the relevant „home‟ and „host‟ Member States. 
For this reason, the market access test can avoid some of the analytical weaknesses 
associated with the narrow view discussed above.
54
  Secondly, it is often argued that 
a single test based on access to the market is desirable, as this would unify the case 
law on obstacles to intra-EU movement.
55
 This would also have the advantage of 
eradicating persisting anomalies in the case law, such as the continued existence of 
the Court‟s „selling arrangement‟ test to remove a very specific category of non-
discriminatory national rule from the scope of Art 34 TFEU. Under a uniform market 
access approach, such non-discriminatory trading rules would fall to be assessed like 
any other measure: on a case-by-case basis, requiring justification by the Member 
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State only to the extent that they affect access to the markets of the Member States 
for imported goods.  
3.2.2 The weakness of market access 
3.2.2.1 Descriptive critique: A ‘concept or a slogan’?56 
For all its popularity, there are serious problems with the market access model. 
Perhaps most obviously, it remains unclear what the term actually means.
57
 To date, 
the Court has stubbornly refused to offer any detailed guidance on this important 
point, even when expressly invited to reflect on this precise issue.
58
 Instead, the ECJ 
continues to present the market access test as a proposition of uncontested doctrinal 
clarity. Yet, the meaning of market access remains far from clear. As others now 
increasingly acknowledge, the term could mean several very different things.
59
 First, 
market access could simply denote a right for goods, persons, services and capital to 
enter the market of a particular Member State; in other words, to „cross the border‟ 
and „access‟ a particular national (Member State) market. Secondly, market access 
might instead (or additionally) refer to a right of equal treatment with national goods 
or economic operators within a Member State (i.e. post-entry). Finally, under a third 
alternative, the same term could be interpreted in terms of a right to pursue an 
economic activity within a Member State free from arbitrary regulation.  
The confusion over the exact meaning of market access is problematic. The scope of 
the Treaty freedoms – and therefore the Court‟s power of review over national 
regulation – is radically different according to each interpretation. Under the first two 
alternatives (the entry and discrimination models), the term „obstacle to intra-EU 
movement‟ does not actually extend beyond the boundaries of the narrow approach 
discussed above (section 2). In this context, market access is therefore simply a 
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„slogan,‟ adding little to our existing understanding of the case law.
60
 By contrast, 
under the third alternative (the economic freedom reading), the scope of the Treaty 
freedoms is potentially far broader. As a right to be free from arbitrary Member State 
regulation, this reading of market access represents a clear step beyond the narrow 
model. Under this approach, the Treaty freedoms may be used to contest genuinely 
non-discriminatory national rules. Interestingly, it is this latter interpretation of 
market access that underpins Advocate General Jacobs‟ view:  
 „all undertakings which engage in a legitimate economic activity in a Member 
State should have unfettered access to the whole of the Community market, 




Crucially, the case law suggests that, at times, the Court has supported all three uses 
of the market access term. For example, in Alpine Investments and Bosman, the 
Court referred to the concept in connection with regulations that actually prevented 
Member State nationals from moving between the markets of two different Member 
States.
62
 By contrast, in several other decisions, market access was concerned with 
ensuring equal treatment with existing market operators within specific national 
markets. This covers the decisions in Gourmet International Products (Art 34 TFEU) 
and CaxiaBank France (Art 49 TFEU).
63
 In the former case, the Court stated clearly 
that the contested ban on the advertising of alcoholic products in that State was liable 
to favour competing national brands with which Swedish consumers were generally 
more familiar.
64
 Similarly, in the latter ruling, the French rules prohibiting banks 
from offering remunerated sight accounts to retail customers protected incumbent 
(French) banks from intra-EU competition. Finally, in another body of case law, the 
Court has used market access as a tool to scrutinise the very existence of market 
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regulation. This includes aspects of the Court‟s case law on „golden shares.‟
65
 As 
noted in Chapter 3, this line of case law deals with national measures that place 
restrictions on the ownership and/or management of previously State-owned 
undertakings. 
To the extent that it is used to scrutinise the very existence of market regulation (the 
third alternative), market access falls down as an effective limit on the Court‟s 
interpretation of obstacles to intra-EU movement. In effect, the use of market access 
in this manner is all but indistinguishable from the Court‟s pre-Keck application of 
the Dassonville approach.
66
 In both cases, the Court is invoking the Treaty freedoms 
in order to review the efficiency or reasonableness of market regulation. Of course, 
under the market access approach, the Court‟s scrutiny of Member State measures is 
now conditioned by the application (at least implicitly) of a qualitative de minimis 
test. However, as argued in Chapter 4, this judicial device does very little in practice 
to curb the scope of the Treaty freedoms. The operative qualitative threshold is set 
far too low for the de minimis test to have any real impact. 
3.2.2.2 Normative weakness 
So far the criticism of the market access model has been essentially descriptive. It 
has been argued that market access is essentially a rather neat judicial device without 
any autonomous meaning.
67
 However, the greater problem for the market access test 
is normative. What justifies the Court‟s use of market access to shift its reading of 
obstacles to intra-EU movement beyond the elimination of discrimination and/or the 
co-ordination of Member State rules to the scrutiny of their very existence on 
efficiency (or other) grounds? It is perfectly possible to argue that the Treaty 
freedoms should guarantee Member State nationals „unfettered access to entire 
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[Union] market.‟
68
 This follows from the inherently open-textured nature of the 
individual Treaty freedoms, many of which refer only to the elimination of 
„restrictions‟ on intra-EU movement.
69
 However, in order to normalise a broader 
view of the scope of these provisions, it is necessary to identify a clear normative 
basis in the Treaty framework to justify the shift beyond the non-
discrimination/mutual recognition models. As Spaventa argues, „the expansion of the 
scope of the [TFEU] at the expense of national regulatory autonomy must be justified 
by sound hermeneutical principles or else its legitimacy might be doubted.‟
70
 
To date, advocates of the market access test have yet to provide a coherent and 
convincing argument to support their view. It remains largely assumed that the 
Treaty supports a broader view of obstacles to intra-EU movement. This is despite of 
the fact that it is far from clear that the Treaty does in fact sanction the use of the 
Treaty freedoms as tools to scrutinise the efficiency or reasonableness of Member 
State regulation. Rather, as noted earlier, the prevailing view is that the Treaty 
reflects an „open economic constitution‟ in which market freedom is balanced with 




The market access test has a number of appealing features, which perhaps explain its 
current popularity amongst commentators. However, in the end, its effectiveness as a 
limit on the Court‟s interpretation of the scope of the Treaty freedoms is 
compromised by both descriptive and normative weaknesses. At the level of 
description, market access adds little to our existing understanding of the case law. 
As Snell observes:  
„when pressed, the notion of market access collapses into economic freedom 
or anti-protectionism, and as a consequence it obscures more than it clarifies. 
The term could be abandoned with little loss to the law.‟
72
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The genius of market access is that it conceals the fact that there is a fundamental 
choice to be made between the narrow and broader readings of the Treaty freedoms. 
It offers the Court a „third way‟ to navigate its way between the two competing 
approaches on a case-by-case basis.
73
 Under the slogan of market access, and using 
the qualitative de minimis test, the Court is able to creep beyond the narrow 
discrimination/mutual recognition model in order to review the efficiency or 
reasonableness of market regulation, whilst avoiding the criticism that is has (once 
again) lost control over the scope of the Treaty freedoms. Yet, this intuitive approach 
still suffers from a key normative problem. Specifically, one may dispute whether 
and, if so the extent to which, the Treaty framework supports use of the Treaty 
freedoms as tools to advance economic freedom within the internal market. 
3.3 Union citizenship 
3.3.1 Overview 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the Court has repeatedly stated that Union citizenship „is 
destined to be the fundamental status of all Member State nationals.‟
74
 Perhaps 
inspired by this judicial pronouncement, several writers and one Advocate General in 
particular have called for a reassessment of the case law on obstacles to intra-EU 
movement in light of this fundamental legal status. Importantly, commentators have 
also turned to Union citizenship in order to inject much needed normative support 
into the broader model.
75
 However, although offering some strong arguments, it is 
submitted that, like market access, the Union citizenship model is also open to 
criticism on normative grounds.  
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3.3.2 The Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro in Joined Cases 
C-158/04 and C-159/04 Alfa Vita Vassilopoulos AE 
In his Opinion in Alfa Vita, Advocate General Poiares Maduro linked the legal status 
of Union citizenship to his argument that the case law on the scope of the Treaty 
freedoms should be harmonised around a single test.
76
 According to his test, the 
Court should review all national measures that, in effect, treat cross-border situations 
less favourably than purely national situations.
77
 In his view, this move was 
„essential in the light of the requirements of genuine Union citizenship.‟
78
 For the 
Advocate General, the economic and non-economic rights of movement conferred by 
the Treaty characterise the „cross-border dimension of the economic and social status 
conferred on European citizens.‟
79
 In his view: 
„the protection of such a status [defined in Art 20 TFEU] requires going 
beyond guaranteeing that there will be no discrimination based on nationality. 
It means Member States taking into account the effect of the measures they 
adopt on the position of all European Union citizens wishing to assert their 
rights to freedom of movement.‟
80
 
In terms of its substance, Advocate General Poiares Maduro‟s citizenship-inspired 
reading of the case law on obstacles to intra-EU movement is more of a 
reconceptualization of existing principles under a new heading. His argument does 
not call for a radical leap in the scope of the Treaty freedoms. He defines his test as 
capturing three categories of national measure: (1) discriminatory national rules; (2) 
national rules that, although indistinctly applicable, impose supplementary costs on 
imports or non-national operators;
81
 and (3) Member State rules that impede access 
to the market. On closer inspection, this tripartite framework does not actually take 
us much further beyond the narrow discrimination model discussed above. At its 
most extreme, the Advocate General‟s model overlaps with the intuitive market 
access test analysed in the previous section. His argument that the Treaty freedoms 
should extend to capture national rules that impede market access could be 
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 The AG makes it clear that this does not capture costs arising merely through the existence of 
disparities between the laws of different Member States. Instead, it is firmly focused on eliminating 
indirectly discriminatory national rules. See para. 44. 
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interpreted to include the review of the reasonableness or efficiency of market 
regulation under the broader model, though this appears unlikely.
82
  
3.3.3 Spaventa’s constitutional thesis 
Spaventa offers a far more revolutionary analysis of the impact of Union citizenship 
on the definition of obstacles to intra-EU movement.
83
 She argues that the status of 
Union citizenship provides a normative basis to justify certain rather more 
controversial developments in the Court‟s case law. Spaventa‟s argument examines 
the Court‟s case law on the economic freedoms. It starts by recognising (rightly) that 
the Court has expanded the scope of the Treaty freedoms beyond the narrow 
discrimination/mutual recognition model. She concludes that, following Gebhard, it 
is possible to use the Treaty provisions „to attack rules…which merely regulate an 
economic activity even though there is no double-burden or any intra-[Union] 
specificity.‟
84
 For Spaventa, this expansion in the case law on obstacles to movement 
represents a „qualitative leap‟ in the content of the Treaty free movement 
provisions.
85
 She notes that: 
„[t]he free movement right is no longer construed as a mere right to move, but 
rather as a right to pursue economic activity in another Member State… [It] 
becomes akin to the claim that citizens have against their own state, in 




Spaventa rightly acknowledges that this shift to a broader view of the scope of the 
Treaty freedoms requires an additional normative justification.
87
 In her view, the 
traditional models based on economic due process or market access (discussed 
above) can – at best – only explain the developments in the case law. Equally, she 
argues that the case law has outgrown the orthodox internal market rationale. To 
justify the expansion of the obstacle concept, Spaventa turns to the status of Union 
citizenship. She argues that:  
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„the legitimacy for the Court‟s extensive interpretation [of the obstacle term] 
might be more convincingly found in a joint teleological interpretation of the 
free movement and citizenship provisions. As a result of the introduction of 
Union citizenship, the telos justifying the Court‟s interpretation has shifted 
from the internal market to include the protection of individual rights.‟
88
  
For Spaventa, Union citizenship is read as granting Member State nationals an 
enhanced right of judicial review. Examining the case law on Art 21 TFEU, Spaventa 
concludes that: 
„the Court has held that any limitation and condition imposed on the right to 
move, on the right to reside in another Member State or on the right to equal 
treatment must comply with the general principles of [Union] law and in 
particular with the principle of proportionality and fundamental rights.‟
89
 
This constitutional approach to the protection of Member State nationals as Union 
citizens is transposed to the analysis of the case law on the economic freedoms.
90
 
Spaventa argues that, drawing on the developments in Union citizenship, the 
economic rights of intra-EU movement can now be reconceptualised (and 
normatively justified) as specific constitutional rights to pursue economic activity in 
another Member State. In her view, any limitation on the right of Member State 
nationals qua Union citizens to exercise this right must now comply with the general 
principles of Union law, including in particular the protection of fundamental rights. 
Spaventa considers this reconceptualisation of the case law on the free movement of 
workers, establishment and services as being broad enough to capture the Court‟s 
expansion of the term „obstacle to intra-EU movement‟ beyond the 
discrimination/mutual recognition model – the key point of interest for present 
purposes.  
Spaventa‟s argument has found favour with other commentators. Tryfonidou 
supports the view that economic freedoms can be reconstituted as substantive rights 
that Member State nationals enjoy as Union citizens to pursue economic activity 
within the internal market.
91
 She also concludes that: 
 „the Court appears to be in the process of completing an economic 
constitution for the European Union through which Union citizens have the 
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right to participate in the market without any unreasonable restriction 
standing in their way.‟
92
  
Moreover, in her view: 
 „[f]ully-fledged citizenship status appears to be requiring the Union to grant a 
number of minimum rights to all its citizens, including the (economic) right 




3.3.3.1 The strength of the Union citizenship model 
The Union citizenship model has a strong appeal. In the first instance, this reading of 
the Court‟s case law on the scope of the Treaty freedoms offers a convincing 
framework capable of rationalising „difficult‟ cases, such as the ruling in 
Carpenter.
94
 As discussed in previous chapters, in that case a British national 
invoked Art 56 TFEU (services) against his home Member State in order to 
challenge a deportation order issued by that State against his third country national 
spouse. The Court ruled that the contested order constituted an obstacle to intra-EU 
movement by reason of the fact that it was liable to deter the applicant from 
providing cross-border advertising services to clients in other Member States.
95
 This 
ruling is rather difficult to square with any of the traditional interpretative paradigms. 
In the first instance, the contested deportation order was genuinely non-
discriminatory. There was also no issue of any dual regulatory burden. Equally, it is 
hard to argue that the order interfered with his access to the market of other Member 
States as an economic operator. The contested measure did not obstruct the 
applicant‟s commercial freedom; for example, by imposing additional compliance 
costs on his activities in other Member States.  
By contrast, interpreted using the Union citizenship model, the ruling makes 
considerably more sense. Applying Spaventa‟s test, any limitation on the right of 
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Member State nationals to exercise their rights to pursue economic activity in 
another Member State must comply with the general principles of Union law, 
including in particular the protection of fundamental rights.
96
 As the Court noted, 
„the separation of Mr and Mrs Carpenter would be detrimental to their family life 
and, therefore, to the conditions under which Mr Carpenter exercises a fundamental 
freedom.‟
97
 On the strength of this effect, Mr Carpenter was entitled to rely on the 
Art 56 TFEU in order to seek the review of the contested deportation order. In result, 
this led the ECJ to conclude that, in his particular case, the contested measure 
constituted a disproportionate interference with his fundamental rights.
98
 For the 
Court: 
„[the] decision to deport Mrs Carpenter, taken in circumstances such as those 
in the main proceedings, [did] not strike a fair balance between competing 
interests, that is, on the one hand the right of Mr Carpenter to respect for his 
family life, and, on the other hand, the maintenance of public order and 
safety.‟
99
   
The Union citizenship model also has a clear normative advantage over the market 
access model. In contrast to the latter, the Union citizenship model enjoys a much 
stronger basis in the Treaty. The status of Union citizenship is set out clearly in Art 
20 TFEU. It is also now generally accepted that this status forms the centre of gravity 
or focal point for the analysis of both the economic and non-economic activities of 
Member State nationals within the internal market (and beyond) – it is the 
„fundamental status of all Member State nationals.‟
100
 On this basis, it is therefore 
much easier to argue that the Court‟s shift to a broader reading of the scope of the 
Treaty freedoms is justified in the name of Union citizenship than for reasons of pure 
economic efficiency (under the market access model). As discussed above, a strict 
deregulatory reading of the Treaty freedoms does not find unambiguous support in 
the Treaty. 
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3.3.3.2 The weakness of the Union citizenship model 
The key difficulty with the Union citizenship model is that, despite appearances, it 
actually suffers from the same basic normative problem as the market access 
approach discussed above. In order for Union citizenship to support the Court‟s shift 
to the broader interpretation of the scope of the Treaty freedoms, it is necessary first 
to accept a particular understanding of that status. To rationalise the case law on 
intra-EU movement in its entirety, Union citizenship must first be taken as granting 
Member State nationals a substantive right not to suffer any disproportionate 
interference in their economic or personal freedom per se. Yet, it is not clear that this 
interpretation necessarily follows from the wording of the Treaty. 
The leap of faith required to accept Spaventa‟s Union citizenship reading of the 
scope of the Treaty freedoms is evident in her reasoning. Indeed, she maintains that:  
„the right not to be constrained in one‟s activity without there being a good 
reason can be seen as an aspect of a more fundamental citizenship right, if 
citizenship is also understood as an empowering status which transforms the 
relationship between government and governed, and inherently limits the 
power of the former over the latter.‟
101
  
This right to protection against disproportionate State interference in individuals‟ 
economic or personal freedom is an important dimension of citizenship in national 
liberal democracies.
102
 It is also the normative basis around which Spaventa builds 
her arguments. However, it does not necessarily follow that the desire to ensure the 
same level of protection at Union level through the status of Union citizenship 
justifies (retrospectively) the Court‟s decision to expand the term „obstacle to intra-
EU movement‟ beyond the narrow model. At best, it is perhaps more accurate to 
state that, like market access, Union citizenship could offer a normative basis to 
rationalise the Court‟s expansion of the scope of the Treaty freedoms beyond the 
requirements of the narrow view.  
Finally, it is also worth noting that accepting the Union citizenship model risks 
introducing new problems into the framework of obstacles to intra-EU movement. In 
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particular, if the scope of the economic Treaty freedoms were interpreted as granting 
Member State nationals (as Union citizens) a right to pursue economic activity 
without disproportionate State interference, then this would create a „two-tier‟ system 
of protection with respect to the free movement of goods and capital.
103
 Specifically, 
Union citizens would enjoy greater protection under Arts 34, 35 and 63(1) TFEU 
than non-Member State nationals, who may also invoke these particular Treaty 
provisions.  
3.3.4 Summary 
The Union citizenship model provides a further possible framework to guide the 
Court‟s interpretation of the term obstacle to intra-EU movement. Under this model, 
the Treaty freedoms are interpreted as granting Member State nationals a substantive 
right not to suffer any disproportionate interference in their economic or personal 
freedom per se. As with the market access model, this approach to the scope of the 
Treaty freedoms does little to protect Member State autonomy from judicial scrutiny 
at Union level.  Similarly, as with market access, the Union citizenship model is also 
open to normative criticism. In particular, supporters of the latter model assume that 
the status of Union citizenship justifies the Court‟s expansive reading of the scope of 
the Treaty freedoms.  
3.4 Poiares Maduro, We the Court  
3.4.1 Overview 
The final interpretative model discussed here approaches the need to place 
appropriate limits on the Court‟s case law on obstacles to intra-EU movement from a 
different angle. In his thesis on Art 34 TFEU (goods), Poiares Maduro adopts an 
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institutional perspective.
104
 Specifically, he argues that the Court should use its 
freedom to interpret the Treaty freedoms in order to correct structural biases within 
national democratic processes. Poiares Maduro‟s thesis is open to the criticism that, 
amongst other things, it is rather difficult to apply. However, its great strength is the 
recognition of the important institutional role played by the Court in connection with 
its interpretation of the Treaty freedoms.  
3.4.2 Poiares Maduro’s institutional approach  
According to Poiares Maduro, the debate over the definition of the scope of the 
Treaty freedoms (specifically: Art 34 TFEU on goods) is more than just a debate 
about substantive policy goals. Instead, he maintains that the interpretation of the 
term „obstacle to intra-EU movement‟ also entails „institutional choices‟. In his view: 
„[w]hen reviewing national measures with an effect on trade under [Art. 34 
TFEU], the Court of Justice must both decide whether there should be 
regulation and – if so – who will have the power to regulate.‟
105
  
For Poiares Maduro, the solution to the problem of defining obstacles to intra-EU 
movement is not simply to find arguments to bolster the first limb: „whether there 
should be regulation.‟ In other words, unlike those defending the market access and 
Union citizenship models discussed above, he does not seek only to legitimise the 
shift to the broader view of the scope of the Treaty freedom by appealing to 
particular substantive Union policy objectives, such as market liberalisation or the 
protection of the personal freedom and fundamental rights of Union citizens. On such 
issues, he remains essentially agnostic. He argues that the (economic) constitution of 
the European Union remains „open‟ and presents the EU constitution as a dynamic 
framework of competing economic and non-economic policy objectives.
106
  
By contrast, Poiares Maduro focuses primarily on the second limb – „who will have 
the power to regulate‟ – in order to justify the move beyond the narrow (non-
discrimination/mutual recognition) model in particular cases. To this end, he 
introduces „institutional choice analysis‟ to help define the scope of the Treaty 
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freedoms. For him, the decision to review national measures against the Treaty 
freedoms involves an a priori judgment about whether or not the cost/benefit 
analysis concluded at the national level should be replaced by the European Court‟s 
own cost/benefit analysis.
107
 In his own words, it is a question of „looking for… a 
test to determine when the State is the best (or legitimate) institution to balance the 




In summary, Poiares Maduro argues that the ECJ may legitimately employ Art 34 
TFEU in order to scrutinise national democratic processes. Specifically, he maintains 
that this provision should be used to correct what he terms „representative 
malfunctions‟ associated with such processes.
109
 For him, Art 34 TFEU should be 
employed as a tool to ensure that „national legislatures have internalised within their 
national political processes all the interests affected by their regulation of the 
common market.‟
110
 This includes, first and foremost, making sure that there is no 
underrepresentation of the interests of nationals of the other Member States.  
Poiares Maduro formulates his arguments into a substantive test. This test jutxaposes 
two categories of interests: „cross-national‟ and „national‟.
111
 The first refers to 
regulatory concerns that are uniform throughout the EU. The latter denotes interests 
that diverge within the Union. In summary, he argues that only measures regulating 
„national interests‟ should fall within the scope of Art 34 TFEU as per se „obstacles 
to intra-EU movement.‟ By contrast, measures regulating „cross-national‟ interests 
should be presumed to fall outside the scope of Art 34 TFEU. Evidence of 
discrimination is required to justify their review as „obstacles to intra-EU 
movement.‟ The presumption of validity for „cross-national‟ interest measures flows 
from the fact that there is no suspicion of bias in the national democratic process to 
the prejudice of „out-of-State‟ actors. 
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In terms of its result, Poiares Maduro‟s thesis does not actually leave us very far 
from the decentralised model set out above in section 2. As the author himself 
stresses, the Treaty freedoms are not tools for the per se review of national policy 
choices.
112
 In particular, his thesis essentially preserves the distinction between 
product characteristic measures and selling arrangements introduced in Keck. Poiares 
Maduro reads national rules on product characteristics to denote „national interests‟ 
that automatically fall within the Court‟s Art 34 TFEU review.  By contrast, he seeks 
to remove from the scope of that article non-discriminatory selling arrangements 
(presently excluded from the scope of Art 34 TFEU through Keck) using the concept 
of „cross-national‟ interests. However, Poiares Maduro‟s thesis does leave the door to 
the broader model open. The test proposed overlaps with the discrimination model, 
but is not limited to the same. At several points in his analysis, he emphasises that 
the Treaty freedoms should no longer be limited to such a strict anti-protectionist 
reading.
113
 In the end, Poiares Maduro‟s primary concern is instead whether or not 
national legislatures have adopted a sufficient „European‟ perspective in the exercise 
of their national regulatory autonomy. 
3.4.3 Assessing the strength of Poiares Maduro’s model 
Poiares Maduro‟s thesis can be criticised for being rather difficult to apply in 
practice. In particular, his distinction between „national‟ and „cross-national‟ interests 
risks collapsing into a subjective judicial assessment. However, the strength of 
Poiares Maduro‟s thesis rests with the valuable institutional insights it brings to the 
debate on the scope of the Treaty freedoms. His argument takes us beyond questions 
about whether or not these provisions may be used to advance specific Union policy 
objectives. Crucially, it exposes and emphasises the role of the Court of Justice as an 
institutional actor. Poiares Maduro‟s thesis reminds us that the Court enjoys 
considerable freedom to make important constitutional choices in connection with its 
interpretation of the scope of the Treaty freedoms.  
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In his thesis, discussion of the Court‟s institutional choices when interpreting the 
scope of the Treaty freedoms is focused on correcting (perceived) democratic 
shortcomings in national democratic processes. However, the same argument can 
also be applied to the Court‟s use of the same provisions to achieve other substantive 
policy objectives. This includes, first and foremost, the liberalisation of national 
markets and the protection of individual freedom and fundamental rights under the 
market access and Union citizenship models considered above. Applied to both 
models, Poiares Maduro‟s thesis emphasises the fact that, to the extent that it shifts 
the interpretation of the term obstacle to intra-EU movement beyond the narrow 
discrimination model, the Court is exercising its freedom to contribute unilaterally to 
the regulation of the internal market as an institutional actor. This is a matter of 
direct concern for the subsidiarity principle – a point which Poiares Maduro 
unfortunately overlooks in his analysis. 
4. Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the competing interpretative models that are presently 
used to rationalise the case law on obstacles to intra-EU movement. It was argued 
that the individual models fall into two distinct categories. Under the narrow view, 
the Treaty freedoms target only discriminatory national measures and/or rules that 
impose a dual burden on imported goods or non-nationals. Under the broader view, 
the Treaty freedoms are interpreted as going beyond the mere elimination of 
discrimination on nationality grounds or the co-ordination of regulatory competence 
between different Member States. It is argued that they should also capture genuinely 
non-discriminatory national rules. In this sense, the Treaty freedoms acquire an 
additional function. They become tools that may be used to review of the very 
existence (i.e. substance) of national legislation against specific Union policy 
objectives. These objectives include the liberalisation of national markets and the 
protection of both the personal freedom and fundamental rights of Member State 
nationals as Union citizens. In addition, Poiares Maduro has argued that the Treaty 
freedoms should be used to correct perceived shortcomings in national democratic 
processes. 
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Reviewing the individual models, it has been argued that no single approach is 
capable of providing a workable framework. Both the narrow and broader models are 
open to criticism. With respect to the narrow approach, the key problem is 
conceptual. Those favouring the narrow view do not themselves seem to be entirely 
convinced of its effectiveness as a solution to the problem of judicial overreach 
identified in Chapter 3. In short, it would appear that the narrow view would require 
the Court to unravel too much of its existing case law; in other words, it affords the 
Member States too much space to breathe. However, the broader view also faces 
(normative) difficulties. In particular, those who support a broad reading of the scope 
of the Treaty freedoms rely on the assumption that the Treaty supports the particular 
substantive Union policy objective they seek to advance. For example, advocates of 
the Union citizenship model read the Treaty as supporting the use of the provisions 
on intra-EU movement as tools to protect Member State nationals from 
disproportionate State interference in the exercise of their rights of economic and 
non-economic movement. However, as has been argued above, the problem here is 
not that this (and other) substantive policies cannot be squared with the Treaty. 
Rather, the difficulty is that such policies characterise at best only possible 
objectives. In contrast to the prohibition of discrimination on nationality grounds, 
these alternative objectives do not find unambiguous support in the text of the 
Treaty. 
Advocates of the broader reading of the obstacle concept rely on a second 
assumption. They assume that, irrespective of the specific Union policy objective at 
issue, the Court is itself free to interpret the Treaty freedoms to that particular end. It 
is simply assumed that the Court is free to „pick and choose‟ between the range of 
policy objectives, such as market liberalisation or the protection of individual 
freedom, that can possibly be squared with the Treaty as the founding basis of an 
open economic constitution. Poiares Maduro‟s thesis brings this important point to 
the fore. His thesis exposes the important institutional role of the Court underpinning 
its interpretation of the scope of the Treaty freedoms. However, whilst stimulating 
and insightful, Poiares Maduro also effectively sidesteps the same underlying issue 
of premise. His framework simply reacts to the problem of choosing between the 
narrow and broad views of the obstacle concept by introducing another normative 
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justification into the mix. He argues that the Court should use the Treaty freedoms as 
tools to correct shortcomings in national democratic processes. However, this 
argument is also based on an assumption that the Court is essentially free to structure 
its own interpretative role from first principles. 
Crucially, the existing debates over the appropriate framework to define the term 
„obstacle to intra-EU movement‟ fail to engage with the demands of the subsidiarity 
principle. This is despite the fact that we have a clear definition of subsidiarity to 
work with and, moreover, a firm Treaty commitment that requires the Court (as a 
Union institution) to adhere to the principle‟s demands. Those favouring the narrow 
view based on discrimination and/or mutual recognition certainly make overtures to 
subsidiarity.
114
 In particular, they point to the economic advantages associated with a 
decentralised approach to market integration. However, there has been no express 
engagement with subsidiarity. The focus has instead centred on unpacking and 
defending the substance of the discrimination/mutual recognition tests. Equally, 
those favouring a broader approach to the definition of the scope of the Treaty 
freedoms overlook subsidiarity‟s implications as a source of restraint on the Court‟s 
interpretative freedoms. Even if we accepted their normative assumptions that the 
Treaty freedoms should be used to advance particular policy objectives, it remains to 
be seen whether or not this extension in scope of the obstacle concept can be squared 
with demands of the subsidiarity principle.  
In the next and final chapter, we turn to consider the detail of subsidiarity‟s impact 
on the Court‟s case law on obstacles to intra-EU movement. This begins with an 
attempt to reduce the scope of the problem. Thereafter, we turn to consider 
subsidiarity‟s impact on the most problematic line of case law and on the Court‟s 
freedom to interpret the scope of the Treaty freedoms more generally.  
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Chapter 6 
 
Subsidiarity and obstacles to intra-EU movement 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter brings together the analysis in the previous chapters and offers a 
conceptual framework to define an obstacle to intra-EU movement in EU law. In 
summary, it is argued that subsidiarity is an important – and to date overlooked – 
source of self-restraint on the exercise of the Court of Justice‟s competence to 
interpret the scope of the Treaty freedoms. Specifically, it is argued that subsidiarity 
precludes the Court from using these provisions to review a specific category of 
national rule: non-discriminatory measures that simply characterise the conditions for 
economic and/or non-economic activity within individual Member States. This 
category of measure is given the label „market circumstances rules‟ throughout.
1
 The 
issue of whether or not the Treaty freedoms extend to capture market circumstances 
rules marks the key point of tension in the case law and legal literature on intra-EU 
movement. Subsidiarity offers a new and normatively sound basis to support the 
view of those writers who argue that the Treaty freedoms should not be used as tools 
to scrutinise such measures at Union level. The end result calls for more of an 
„adjustment‟ than a revolution in the current case law. However, it is submitted that 
this is an adjustment worth making.  
The chapter starts by offering a fresh descriptive critique of the case law and 
literature on obstacles to intra-EU movement. Building on the conclusions in 
Chapters 3-5, this section (section 2) attempts to reduce the scope of the problem. 
Specifically, it isolates the Court‟s case law on market circumstances rules as the key 
source of tension. Section 3 then introduces subsidiarity to the mix. First, this section 
develops subsidiarity as a substantive legal test. Attention then turns to examination 
of the principle‟s implications for the review of market circumstances rules. 
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Thereafter, section 3 reflects on subsidiarity‟s impact on review of less controversial 
national measures (specifically: discriminatory rules) as obstacles to intra-EU 
movement. Finally, the chapter concludes by offering a new conceptual framework 
that is both descriptively and normatively sound (section 4). 
2. Obstacles to intra-EU movement  
2.1 Introduction 
Building on the conclusions of previous chapters, this section offers a descriptive re-
assessment of the case law on obstacles to intra-EU movement. The focus is on non-
discriminatory obstacles. The argument is two-fold. First, it is argued that the Court‟s 
apparent shift to the language of non-discriminatory obstacles is misleading. In the 
vast majority of cases, the Court‟s case law can be adequately explained using 
discrimination analysis. The true scope of the Court‟s case law on genuinely non-
discriminatory obstacles is therefore much narrower that is frequently assumed. 
Secondly, it is argued that the Court‟s case law on genuinely non-discriminatory 
obstacles to intra-EU movement is, on closer inspection, not problematic in its 
entirety. On the contrary, commentators generally accept that the scope of the Treaty 
freedoms should extend to capture non-discriminatory national rules that actually 
block movement between the markets of different Member States. By contrast, there 
is considerable disagreement over the use of the Treaty freedoms to review market 





 (3) „golden shares‟
4
 and (4) rules prescribing the conditions for the taking-
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up of economic activity within Member States.
5
 Significantly, it is the Court‟s use of 
the Treaty rules to scrutinise the above categories of national measures that is most 
problematic from the perspective of the subsidiarity principle.   
2.2 Non-discriminatory obstacles: language versus substance 
The use of the Treaty freedoms to prohibit all discrimination on nationality grounds 
is universally accepted. Even those writers who prefer to reason through alternative 
concepts such as market access and Union citizenship interpret the Treaty freedoms 
as capturing discriminatory national rules.
6
 The tension in the case law is instead 
focused on examining whether, and if so the extent to which, the scope of these 
provisions do – and ultimately should – extend also to permit review of genuinely 
non-discriminatory national rules. On the strength of the Court‟s recent case law, it 
would appear that the debate over whether the Treaty provisions also capture non-
discriminatory national rules is now redundant. As discussed in Chapter 3, the 
Court‟s reading of the scope of the individual freedoms is increasingly converging 
around the broadest possible interpretation. This approach is focused on scrutinising 
any national measure that is liable (actually or potentially) to „deter,‟ „dissuade‟ or 
„discourage‟ intra-EU movement.
7
 However, to a great extent, this effects-based 
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language is misleading. As others have argued, the bulk of the Court‟s case law can 
in fact still be squared with the discrimination framework.
8
  
The gap between the language and substance of the Court‟s case law on obstacles to 
intra-EU movement emerged early on in the case law on goods.
9
 For example, 
despite the Court‟s preference for the language of non-discriminatory obstacles, the 
landmark rulings in Dassonville and Cassis (Art 34 TFEU) can be rationalised 
adequately with the discrimination model.
10
 The contested legislation in both 
decisions was discriminatory. In the former decision, the requirement to produce a 
certificate of origin issued by the exporting Member State applied only to imported 
goods. In the latter ruling, the discriminatory effect arose through an indistinctly 
applicable national rule (i.e. a rule applying to both domestic and imported products 
alike).
11
 In Cassis, the contested German law prescribing „product characteristics‟
12
 
for certain alcoholic drinks operated to prevent products not meeting that description, 
but in lawful circulation elsewhere within the EU market, from entering the market 
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at para. 52; for Art 56 TFEU, see eg Case C-76/90 Manfred Säger v Dennemeyer & Co. Ltd [1991] 
ECR I-4221 at para. 11, Case C-136/00 Danner [2002] ECR I-8147 at para. 29 and Joined Cases C-
544/03 and C-545/03 Mobistar and Belgacom Mobile [2005] ECR I-7723 at para. 30; for Art 63(1) 
TFEU, see eg Case C-35/98 Staatssecretaris van Financiën v B.G.M. Verkooijen [2000] ECR I-4071 
at para. 34, Case C-367/98 Commission v Portugal (Golden Shares) op. cit. at note 4 at para. 45 and 
Joined Cases C-155/08 and C-157/08 X (C-155/08) and E. H. A. Passenheim-van Schoot (C-157/08) 
[2009] ECR I-5093 at para. 39. 
8
 On this point, see also N. Bernard, „Discrimination and Free Movement in EC Law‟ (1996) 45(1) 
ICLQ 82 at p. 97, G. Davies, Nationality Discrimination in the European Internal Market (The 
Hague: Kluwer, 2003) at p. 87, J. Snell, „Non-discriminatory Tax Obstacles in Community Law‟ 
(2007) ICLQ 56(2) 339 at p. 340 and K. Banks, „The Application of the Fundamental Freedoms to 
Member State Tax Measures: Guarding against Protectionism or Second-guessing National Policy 
Choices?‟ (2008) 33(4) ELRev 482 at p. 483.  
9
 Though see also Case 33/74 van Binsbergen [1974] ECR 1299 at para. 10, which appeared to extend 
the scope of Art 56 TFEU beyond discrimination to the elimination of mere „obstacles‟ to intra-EU 
movement. For early discussion of this point, see eg White op. cit. at note 1 esp. at p. 279: „The 
Dassonville reformulation of Art [34 TFEU] cannot be taken literally. Indeed, it is clear from the [case 
law]… that the Court of Justice does not apply this formula literally itself.‟ 
10
 Case 8/74 Dassonville op. cit. at note 7, Case 120/78 Cassis de Dijon [1979] ECR 649 and Case C-
76/90 Säger op. cit. at note 7. 
11
 On this point, see also N. Nic Shuibhne, „The Free Movement of Goods and Article 28 EC: An 
Evolving Framework‟ (2002) 27(4) ELRev 408 esp. at p. 410, and P. Wennerås and K. Bøe Moen, 
„Selling Arrangements, Keeping Keck‟ (2010) 35(3) ELRev 87 at p. 388. 
12
 See now Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Keck and Mithouard [1992] ECR I-6097 at para. 15. 
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of that State.
13
 This necessarily discriminated in favour of competing national 
products, of which there were many.
14
  
The expansive language of the Court in Dassonville and Cassis undoubtedly played 
an important symbolic role in EU integration.
15
 It certainly encouraged economic 
actors to test the scope of Art 34 TFEU.
16
 Indeed, the persistent attempts by traders 
to rely on this particular Treaty provision in order to seek review of all sorts of 
restrictive national trading rules ultimately forced the Court to clarify its own case 
law in its infamous ruling in Keck.
17
 As discussed in Chapter 3, in this decision the 
Court changed its approach to the review of national measures regulating the 
conditions under which goods could be marketed in that Member State. In Keck, the 
Court concluded that such „selling arrangements‟ would only fall within the scope of 
its review as obstacles to intra-EU movement if two cumulative conditions were 
met.
18
 However, for present purposes, what is most important is that, in substance, 
this amounted to a re-introduction of a discrimination requirement in connection 
with the review of this category of marketing rule.
19
 
Discrimination analysis continues to underpin the case law on obstacles to intra-EU 
movement across the freedoms. When interpreting the individual Treaty provisions, 
the Court defaults (increasingly) to the language of non-discriminatory obstacles. 
However, in substance, the Court is in fact simply scrutinising indirectly 
discriminatory national measures.
20
 Again, this finding covers a number of the 
                                                          
13
 The Court in Cassis noted this key point at para. 14: „There is… no valid reason why, provided that 
they have been lawfully produced and marketed in one of the Member States, alcoholic beverages 
should not be introduced into any other Member State.‟ 
14
 Case 120/78 Cassis op. cit. at note 10 at para. 14. 
15
 See, eg J. Weiler, „The Constitution of the Common Market Place‟ in P. Craig and G. de Búrca 
(Eds.) The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford: OUP, 1999) 349. 
16
 See Joined Cases 60 and 61/84 Cinéthèque SA and others [1985] ECR 2605, Case 145/88 Torfaen 
Borough Council v B & Q plc [1989] ECR 3851 and C-362/88 GB-INNO-BM [1990] ECR I-667. 
17
 Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Keck and Mithouard op. cit. at note 12. 
18
 Ibid., at para. 16. 
19
 D. Wilsher, „Does Keck Discrimination Make Any Sense? An Assessment of the Non-
discrimination Principle within the European Single Market‟ (2008) 33(1) ELRev 3 at p. 4. 
20
 From a list of possible examples see: for Art 21 TFEU, eg Case C-406/04 De Cuyper [2006] ECR I-
6947 and Case C-499/06 Nerkowska [2008] ECR I-3993; for Art 34 TFEU eg Case C-405/98 
Gourmet International Products [2001] ECR I-1795, Case C-254/98 TK-Heimdienst Sass [2000] 
ECR-151 and Case C-322/01 DocMorris [2003] ECR I-14887; for Art 35 TFEU, eg Case C-205/07 
Gysbrechts [2008] ECR I-9947; for Art 45 TFEU, eg Case C-18/95 F.C. Terhoeve [1999] ECR I-345, 
Case C-232/01 Criminal proceedings against Hans van Lent [2003] ECR I-11525 and Case C-109/04 
Kranemann op. cit. at note 7; for Art 49 TFEU, eg Case C-442/02 CaixaBank [2004] ECR I-8961 and 
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Court‟s key rulings, which apparently extended the scope of the individual freedoms 
beyond discrimination.
21
 This includes, for example, the decisions in Kraus (Arts 45 
and 49 TFEU), Säger (Art 56 TFEU), Verkooijen (Art 63(1) TFEU) and Tas-Hagen 
(Art 21 TFEU).
22
 In Kraus, Verkooijen and Tas-Hagen, the contested national rules 
introduced a difference in treatment on residency grounds – the classic surrogate 
criterion for Member State nationality.
23
 In Kraus, the contested legislation required 
holders of academic titles awarded by institutions other than those accredited by the 
German Länder to seek prior authorisation for their use in that State.
24
 Similarly, in 
Verkooijen, the Dutch tax rules introduced a difference in treatment according to the 
place of establishment of the undertaking paying dividends to resident taxpayers. 
Finally, in Tas-Hagen, the applicant was treated differently to other recipients of a 
civilian war benefit paid by the Dutch state by sole reason of the fact that they were 
not resident on the national territory at the time of application. In Säger (Art 56 
TFEU), the prohibited discriminatory treatment arose through the equal treatment of 
otherwise non-comparable situations – as is typical in the case law on services.
25
 The 
contested German legislation on patent services imposed the conditions for 
permanent establishment on persons who were already lawfully integrated into the 
economy of another Member State and – importantly – were not seeking to establish 
themselves in that second State.
26
 This equal treatment of non-comparable situations 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer plc [2005] ECR I-10837; for Art 56 TFEU, eg Case C-118/96 
Jessica Safir [1998] ECR I-1897, Case C-58/98 Josef Corsten [2000] ECR I-7919 and Case C-372/04 
Watts [2006] ECR I-4325; and for Art 63(1) TFEU, eg Case C-319/02 Manninen [2004] ECR I-7477, 
Case C-379/05 Amurta SGPS [2007] ECR I-9569 and Case C-256/06 Jäger [2008] ECR I-123. 
21
 See Chapter 3 for discussion of the Court‟s shift to expansive effects-based tests. 
22
 Case C-19/92 Kraus op. cit. at note 7, Case C-76/90 Säger op. cit. at note 7, Case C-35/98 
Verkooijen op. cit. at note 7 and Case C-192/05 Tas-Hagen [2006] ECR I-10451.  
23
 Other criteria include eg linguistic requirements. See eg Case C-379/89 Groener [1989] ECR 3967 
and Case C-424/97 Haim [2000] ECR I-5123. 
24
 Case C-19/92 Kraus op. cit. at note 7 at paras 4 and 5. 
25
 The same logic also explains eg Case 33/74 van Binsbergen op. cit. at note 9, Case 279/80 Webb 
[1981] ECR 3305, Case C-154/89 Commission v. France (Tourist Guides) [1991] ECR I-651, Case C-
67/98 Zenatti [1999] ECR I-7289, Case C-58/98 Corsten op. cit. at note 20, Case C-243/01 Gambelli 
and Others [2003] ECR I-13031 and Case C-215/01 Proceedings against Bruno Schnitzer [2003] 
ECR I-14847. 
26
 On the distinction between establishment and services, see eg Case C-55/94 Gebhard op. cit. at note 
5 at paras 22-26. See also Case C-131/01 Commission v Italy (Patent Agents) [2003] ECR I-1659 in 
which the ECJ noted: „the decisive criterion for the purposes of the application of [Art 56 TFEU] is 
the absence of stable and continuous participation by the person concerned in the economic life of the 
host Member State‟ (para.23). 
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Interestingly, the true scope of the Treaty provisions – as prohibitions of 
discriminatory treatment on nationality grounds – often emerges in cases where 
litigants are actually seeking to rely on the substance of the Court‟s broad effects-
based tests. In such instances, the Court is forced to „reveal its hand‟ and confirm that 
the prohibition of discrimination marks the outer limits of the Treaty freedoms. For 
example, as we have seen already, this was the outcome of the decision in Keck, in 
which the Court effectively re-introduced discrimination analysis in an effort to 
curtail the scope of Art 34 TFEU.
28
 The same approach can also be seen in 
subsequent case law in other areas. For example, in several cases dealing with 
legislation on direct taxation, the Court has been forced to concede that, despite its 
own language to the contrary, the scope of the Treaty provisions on establishment, 




2.3 Genuinely non-discriminatory obstacles to intra-EU movement 
As the discussion in the previous section has shown, discrimination analysis has 
significant explanatory force. In a great number of cases, including key formative 
decisions on the scope of the Treaty freedoms, the substance of the discrimination 
test lurks behind the language of deterrent or dissuasive effects. However, although a 
powerful explanatory tool, discrimination analysis not capable of rationalising all of 
the case law on intra-EU movement. Furthermore, it is now accepted (or at least 
conceded) that, rightly or wrongly, the Court‟s case law extends to capture some 
genuinely non-discriminatory national rules. Significantly, there is also considerable 
agreement in the literature on this point. Even advocates of the narrower reading of 
                                                          
27
 The Court has acknowledged this point expressly in its case law on posted workers. See eg Case C-
113/89 Rush Portuguesa [1990] ECR I-1417 at para. 12. 
28
 Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Keck and Mithouard op. cit. at note 12 at para. 16. 
29
 Eg Case C-391/97 Gschwind [1999] ECR I-5451 (Art 45 TFEU), Case C-387/01 Harald Weigel 
and Ingrid Weigel v Finanzlandesdirektion für Vorarlberg [2004] ECR I-4981 (Art 45 TFEU), Case 
C-403/03 Egon Schempp v. Finanzamt München V [2005] ECR I-6421 (Art 20 TFEU), Case C-298/05 
Columbus Container Services BVBA [2007] ECR I-10451 (Arts. 49 and 63(1) TFEU) and Case C-
284/06 Finanzamt Hamburg-Am Tierpark [2008] ECR I-4571 (Arts. 49 and 63(1) TFEU). The detail 
of this line of case law is discussed further in section 2.3.2.1 below. 
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the scope of the Treaty freedoms, for whom this development is most problematic, 
do not reject this expansion in its entirety.
30
 On the contrary, supporters of the „dual 
burden‟ and/or „mutual recognition‟ approaches would appear to accept the extension 
in scope of the obstacle concept to capture a distinct category of non-discriminatory 
national rule.
31
 The particular category in question refers to non-discriminatory 
national rules that actually block intra-EU movement (i.e. those that actually prevent 
goods, services, persons and capital from entering/exiting the markets of the Member 
States). Furthermore, even Davies, who has argued most forcefully for a 
discrimination-only reading of the scope of the Treaty freedoms, in the end, tries 
extremely hard to legitimise this particular line of case law.
32
  
The tension in the case law and literature centres instead on the Court‟s use of the 
Treaty freedoms to review genuinely non-discriminatory national rules that do not 
block intra-EU movement, but simply define conditions for the pursuit of economic 
and/or non-economic activity within that Member State. It is with respect to this 
specific type of non-discriminatory rule that there is both (increasing) inconsistency 
in the case law of the Court and genuine dispute in the academic commentary. 
Significantly, it is also here that the introduction of subsidiarity analysis will make its 
greatest impact as a principle of judicial self-restraint. The individual strands of the 
Court‟s case law on genuinely non-discriminatory national measures will now be 
examined in turn. This starts with discussion of non-discriminatory rules that block 
intra-EU movement. 
2.3.1 Non-discriminatory obstacles that block intra-EU movement 
In several cases, the Court has extended the scope of the Treaty freedoms to capture 
genuinely non-discriminatory obstacles that block intra-EU movement. Key 
examples include: Alpine Investments (Art 56 TFEU), Bosman (Art 45 TFEU) and 
Commission v. Portugal (Golden Shares) (Art 63(1) TFEU).
33
 In each of these cases, 
                                                          
30
 Those supporting the narrower view include N. Bernard, Multilevel Governance in the European 
Union (Amsterdam: Kluwer, 2002), J. Snell Goods and Services in EC Law (Oxford: OUP, 2002) and 
Davies op. cit. at note 8. 
31
 Bernard op. cit. at note 30 esp. at pp 23-27 and Snell op. cit. at note 30 esp. at p. 127. 
32
 Davies op. cit. at note 8 at pp 87-89. See also earlier, Bernard op. cit. at note 8 at pp 95-98. 
33
 Case C-384/93 Alpine Investments BV [1995] ECR I-1141, Case C-415/93 Bosman op. cit. at note 7 
and Case C-367/98 Commission v Portugal (Golden Shares) op. cit. at note 4. See also eg Case 34/74 
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the contested national rules did not discriminate, directly or indirectly, on the 
grounds of Member State nationality. Yet they operated to block – absolutely – the 
movement of goods, services, persons or capital between national markets. For 
example, in Alpine Investments (Art 56 TFEU), the contested prohibition on cold-
calling prevented the applicant from extending their activities to the market of 
another State in which this marketing technique was lawful. Similarly, in Bosman 
(Art 45 TFEU), the non-discriminatory transfer rules under review blocked the 
applicant‟s right to move between football clubs established in different Member 
States. 
The extension in scope of the Treaty freedoms to capture non-discriminatory 
obstacles that block intra-EU movement is not problematic for advocates of the 
broader view of the obstacle concept.
34
 For example, the above decisions can be 
rationalised neatly within the market access model.
35
 Indeed, that concept is the 
centrepiece of the Court‟s reasoning in each of the above decisions. In terms of 
substance, market access here could be read to denote the first of the three possible 
meanings outlined in Chapter 5: the right for goods, services, persons and capital to 
enter the market of another Member State (and, by implication,
36
 to leave the market 
of a Member State). Similarly, as an alternative to market access, one could invoke 
the Union citizenship model to rationalise aspects of the same case law. For example, 
it could be argued (retrospectively) that the contested non-discriminatory transfer 
rules in Bosman represented a disproportionate interference with the applicant‟s 
freedom to pursue economic activity in another Member State. This would bring the 
Court‟s decision to review the transfer rules in line with Spaventa‟s Union 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Henn and Darby [1979] ECR 3795 (Art 34 TFEU). In this case, we can assume that there was no 
(lawful) domestic market for the production of products in competition with those subject to the 
import ban. For Art 56 TFEU, see eg Case C-275/92 Schindler [1994] ECR I-1039, Case C-3/95 
Reisebüro Broede [1996] ECR I-6511 esp. at paras 26-7, Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen [2004] 
ECR I-9609 and Case C-429/02 Bacardi France SAS [2004] ECR I-6613 at para. 35. With respect to 
the latter case, this applies only in so far as the ECJ‟s finding of an obstacle to intra-EU movement 
addresses the prohibition on the transmission of programmes including bill-board advertisements for 
alcohol that are broadcast lawfully elsewhere within the Union. For Art 63(1) TFEU, see also eg Case 
C-483/99 Commission v France (Golden Shares) [2002] ECR I-4781 esp. at paras 41 and 45. 
34
 Those supporting the broader view include eg AG Jacobs in Case C-412/93 Leclerc-Siplec op. cit. at 
note 6, Weatherill op. cit. at note 6, AG Maduro in Joined Cases C-158/04 and C-159/04 Alfa Vita 
Vassilopoulos op. cit. at note 6, Spaventa op. cit. at note 6 and Barnard op. cit. at note 1.  
35
 See eg Weatherill, op. cit. at note 6 at pp 896-897, AG Jacobs in Case C-412/93 Leclerc-Siplec op. 
cit. at note 6 at paras 38-49 and Barnard op. cit. at note 6 at p. 114. 
36
 Art 35 TFEU guarantees this right expressly with respect to goods. 
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citizenship-inspired reading of the scope of the Treaty freedoms.
37
 However, more 
significant for present purposes is the finding that the Court‟s extension of the Treaty 
freedoms to capture non-discriminatory rules that block intra-EU movement is not 
viewed as problematic by advocates of the narrower approach.
38
 This points to the 
existence of broad consensus in the commentary in so far as the scope of the obstacle 
concept is concerned. It shows that there is a general acceptance of the use of the 
Treaty freedoms beyond the elimination of discriminatory national measures. 
In the first instance, advocates of the dual burden and/or mutual recognition 
approaches have no difficulty with the Court‟s use of the Treaty freedoms to review 
non-discriminatory national rules that block the movement of products or services 
between the markets of different Member States.
39
 This follows from the division of 
regulatory competence between the host and home Member States under Arts 34 and 
56 TFEU. As discussed in Chapter 5, under both conceptual models (dual burden and 
mutual recognition) the primary right to regulate goods and services falls to the home 
Member State; that is, to the State in which goods are produced or the service 
provider is lawfully established.
40
 Accordingly, provided that they are lawfully 
produced or provided in the home Member State, goods and services enjoy, in 
principle, the right to enter the market of all the other Member States in their original 
form. It is not necessary for the legislation of the host Member State to be 
discriminatory in order to interfere with this right, although this is typically the 
case.
41
 To trigger Arts 34 and 56 TFEU, it is simply enough that the contested host 
                                                          
37
 Spaventa op. cit. at note 6. See also thereafter A. Tryfonidou, „In Search of the Aim of the EC Free 
Movement of Persons Provisions: Has the Court of Justice Missed the Point? (2009) 46(5) CMLRev 
1591. 
38
 Eg Bernard op. cit. at note 8 at pp 95-98, Bernard op. cit. at note 30 at pp 24-26, Snell op. cit. at 
note 30 at p. 127 and Davies op. cit. at note 8 at p. 87. 
39
 Snell op. cit. at note 30 at p. 127 and Bernard op. cit. at note 30 at pp 24-26. 
40
 Bernard op. cit. at note 30 at pp 17-18. 
41
 Examples of discriminatory rules that block market entry include Member State legislation 
prescribing product characteristics (for Art 34 TFEU) and national measures making the importation 
of products/provision of services subject to licence or conditional on the production of certifications or 
other documentation. See, from a long list of possible illustrations, for Art 34 TFEU eg Case 8/74 
Dassonville op. cit. at note 7, Case 104/75 Centrafarm BV [1976] ECR 613, Case 120/78 Cassis op. 
cit. at note 10, Case C-470/93 Mars GmbH [1995] ECR I-1923, Case C-12/00 Commission v. Spain 
(Chocolate) [2003] ECR I-459 and Case C-170/04 Rosengren and Others [2007] ECR I-4071; for Art 
56 TFEU see eg Case 279/80 Webb op. cit. at note 25, Case C-154/89 Commission v. France (Tourist 
Guides) op. cit. at note 25, Case C-76/90 Säger op. cit. at note 7, Case C-67/98 Zenatti op. cit. at note 
25, Case C-58/98 Corsten op. cit. at note 20 and Case C-215/01 Schnitzer op. cit. at note 25. 
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State legislation prevents products or services lawfully circulating elsewhere within 
the Union from gaining entry into that market of that State.  
Advocates of the narrower reading of the obstacle concept do, however, struggle 
with the decisions in Bosman (workers) and Alpine Investments (services).
42
 Neither 
case can be squared with the orthodox dual burden or mutual recognition reading of 
the Treaty freedoms. With respect first to Bosman, competence to regulate the 
conditions for the taking-up of employment is not divided between the host and 
home Member States. Instead, in accordance with the rules on workers (and also on 
establishment), the Member State in which the applicant is employed or permanently 
established retains the primary right to regulate the conditions for economic activity 
within that State, subject to the prohibition of discrimination.
43
 In the second case, 
Alpine Investments, the orthodox division between home and host Member State 
regulatory competence discussed in the previous paragraph applies. However, the 
problem in that case is that the contested legislation preventing the service provider 
from entering the market of another Member State was imposed not by the host 
Member State as is typically the case, but instead by the home Member State (i.e. the 
State in which the undertaking concerned was permanently established).  
Yet, in spite of the above difficulties, supporters of the narrow reading of the 
obstacle concept try very hard indeed to square Bosman and Alpine Investments with 
their preferred frameworks. As argued in Chapter 5, this can be read as indicative of 
a clear determination on their part to legitimise this line of case law. For example, as 
discussed in Chapter 5, Davies has argued forcefully that the term obstacle to intra-
EU movement should be limited to the elimination of discriminatory measures. 
However, in the final analysis, he effectively ends up integrating the non-
discriminatory Bosman ruling into his obstacle framework. For Davies, the decisive 
factor in Bosman is the contested measure‟s effect on intra-EU movement. As he 
notes, the transfer rules at issue did not simply impose an „inconvenience‟ or 
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 Bernard op. cit. at note 30, Snell op. cit. at note 30 and Davies op. cit. at note 8.  
43
 For confirmation see eg Case C-61/89 Bouchoucha [1990] ECR I-3551 at para. 12 and Case C-
345/08 Krzysztof Peśla [2009] ECR I-11677 at para. 50. This point is discussed further in section 
2.3.2.2 below. 
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„administrative hurdle‟ on the applicant.
44
 Rather, the rules prevented, without 
concession, Mr Bosman from moving between the markets of two different Member 
States.
45
 On the strength of this finding, Davies therefore concedes that „it may be 
therefore that this special type of restriction, these focussed bans, are always to be 
seen as obstacles which must be justified.‟
46
  
Bernard and Snell also work hard to rationalise the Court‟s case law on non-
discriminatory obstacles that block intra-EU movement with their preferred 
conceptual model – mutual recognition.
47
 For Snell, the solution is found using 
market access. To make sense of the rulings in both Alpine Investments and Bosman, 
he argues that the scope of Arts 45 and 56 TFEU should extend beyond mutual 
recognition to capture „[non-discriminatory] national rules creating a direct 
impediment to market access.‟
48
 Adopting a different view, Bernard focuses on 
rationalising Alpine Investments.
49
 He argues that this decision can in fact be squared 
with a qualified mutual recognition test, according to which primary regulatory 




Interestingly, in his earlier work, Bernard actually went a step further.
51
 He argued, 
without reference to the mutual recognition framework, that the scope of the Treaty 
freedoms should extend beyond the prohibition of discrimination to capture non-
discriminatory obstacles that block intra-EU movement. For Bernard, the Treaty free 
movement provisions „should aim at removing barriers to entry and exit from one 
Member State to another and ensure equal treatment once inside the territory/market 
of each Member State.‟
52
 As such, he argued that the Treaty provisions on intra-EU 
movement should not imply „a right to be free from regulation.‟
53
 Significantly for 
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 Davies op. cit. at note 8 at p. 87. 
45
 Ibid.  
46
 Ibid., at pp 87-88. 
47
 Bernard op. cit. at note 30 and Snell op. cit. at note 30. 
48
 Snell op. cit. at note 30 at p. 127. 
49
 Bernard rejects the Bosman ruling as „troubling.‟ Bernard op. cit. at note 30 at pp 33-34. 
50
 Bernard op. cit. at note 30 at pp 24-26. 
51
 N. Bernard, „The Future of European Economic Law in the Light of the Principle of Subsidiarity‟ 
(1996) 33(4) CMLRev 633 at pp 636-639. 
52
 Ibid., at p. 638. 
53
 Ibid. 
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present purposes, Bernard‟s reasoning here is linked to his analysis of the 
implications of the introduction of the subsidiarity principle for the Court‟s 
interpretation of the Treaty freedoms. Without going into great detail, Bernard 
argued that subsidiarity necessarily inclined the Court‟s reading of the scope of the 
Treaty freedoms towards the elimination of two categories of national measure: (1) 
discriminatory national rules and (2) non-discriminatory measures that block intra-
EU movement.
54
  We shall return to examine and test this hypothesis in section 3 
below.  
As the above analysis demonstrates, Bernard, Davies and Snell are clearly extremely 
keen to legitimise the Court‟s case law on non-discriminatory obstacles that block 
intra-EU movement.
55
 However, the problem in each case is that their individual 
analyses are fundamentally incoherent. Put bluntly, in order to square the Court‟s 
case law on this particular type of non-discriminatory national measure with their 
preferred discrimination and/or mutual recognitions tests, the three commentators are 
forced to abandon these very same conceptual models. In particular, Davies and 
Snell end up „bolting on‟ additional tests to their preferred discrimination and mutual 
recognition models.
56
 In both cases, this move would appear to be based on an 
intuitive belief that any rule that blocks intra-EU movement should be considered to 
fall within the scope of the Treaty freedoms. However, neither the principle of 
mutual recognition nor the discrimination model is capable of explaining this belief. 
To date, only Bernard has made overtures to subsidiarity as a possible normative 
basis for this particular „discrimination-plus‟ reading of the obstacle concept 
discussed in this section.
57
 However, this line of reasoning was unfortunately not 
fully explored.   
2.3.2 Market circumstances rules 
The analysis so far has attempted to show, through descriptive critique, that there is 
considerably less dispute in the case law and literature concerning the scope of the 




 Of the three, Bernard is the least keen to do so. Bernard rejects the Bosman ruling as „troubling.‟ 
See Bernard op. cit. at note 30 at pp 33-34. 
56
 Snell op. cit. at note 30 at p. 127 and Davies op. cit. at note 8 at p. 87. Snell does express some 
caution about the implications of his additional market access test (at p. 127.) 
57
 Bernard op. cit. at note 51 at p. 638. 
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Treaty freedoms than might be first apparent. At the same time, it has also pointed to 
the limits of the discrimination and/or mutual recognition models as coherent 
normative frameworks. In this sub-section, we turn to consider the exceptional line 
of case law that is considered problematic: case law on market circumstances rules. 
To repeat: these are non-discriminatory national rules that do not block intra-EU 
movement but simply define conditions for the pursuit of economic and/or non-
economic activity within individual Member States. The extension in the scope of the 
Treaty freedoms to permit the scrutiny of such rules at Union level marks the fault 
line in the on-going debate over the proper function of these provisions.
58
 For 
advocates of the narrower approach, the scope of the obstacle concept cannot be 
stretched this far. It is at this point that the Treaty freedoms shift from being tools to 
co-ordinate (legitimately) the exercise of regulatory competence between the 
Member States to become instruments to scrutinise (illegitimately) the substance and 
even very existence of national policies per se.
59
 On the other hand, for supporters of 
the broader approach, the use of the Treaty freedoms to review market circumstances 
rules marks the point at which concepts such as market access or Union citizenship 
kick in as autonomous substantive tests. As discussed earlier, in a great many cases, 
both market access and Union citizenship are simply used to re-brand cases that can 
be adequately explained using the discrimination and/or mutual recognition models.  
This section starts by emphasising the infrequency and nature of the Court‟s review 
of market circumstances rules as obstacles to intra-EU movement. Data from the case 
law on Art 34 TFEU (goods) is used to provide a clearer statistical context to the first 
point (the infrequent but growing body of case law on market circumstances rule). 
Thereafter, we turn to examine the nature of some of the most common forms of 
market circumstances across the freedoms. Section 2.3.2.2 then considers the detail 
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On this point see eg J. Snell, „The Notion of Market Access: A Concept or a Slogan?‟ (2010) 47(2) 
CMLRev 437 at p. 470, who also concludes that: „[the] most fundamental question for free movement 
law remains whether the law is about discrimination and anti-protectionism… or whether it is about 
economic freedom.‟ For earlier expressions to the same effect, see eg Weatherill op. cit. at note 6 at p. 
889,  Maduro op. cit. at note 6 at p. 40 and the Opinion of AG Bot in Case C-110/05 Commission v. 
Italy (Motorcycle Trailers) op. cit. at note 2 at para. 75. 
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 See here esp. Bernard op. cit. at note 8 at p. 106: „While there is clearly a mandate for the Court to 
abolish obstacles that prevent [here: block] access to goods, services and labour markets in other 
[M]ember States, there is no mandate to define the characteristics of those markets and no basis on 
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of the rare, but increasing, number of cases across the Treaty freedoms in which the 
Court has opted to bring such measures within the scope of its review.  
2.3.2.1 The exclusion of market circumstances rules from the scope of 
the Treaty freedoms 
The Court is confronted with challenges to market circumstances rules relatively 
infrequently. For example, in the case law on Arts 34 TFEU (goods), the Court was 
asked between 1995 and 2010 to examine market circumstances measures on 30 
occasions out of a total of 150.
60
 However, the relatively minor position of market 
circumstances rules as a percentage of the total case law on obstacles to intra-EU 
movement (20%) tells only part of the story. Significantly, in the majority of those 
cases in which the Court is requested to rule on market circumstances rules, it 
typically concludes that such measures do not fall within the scope of the Treaty 
freedoms.
61
 In the case law on goods, the Court ruled, in only eight out of thirty 
cases, that the particular national measure constituted an obstacle to intra-EU 
movement, requiring justification in EU law (for the sample period 1995-2010).
62
  
The statistics on Art 34 TFEU also point to the emergence of an important third trend 
in the Court‟s case law on market circumstances rules. The numerical data 
demonstrates clearly that, over the last ten years, the Court has progressively altered 
its approach to the review of market circumstances rules. From around 2000 
onwards, the Court has opted increasingly to scrutinise market circumstances rules as 
obstacles to intra-EU movement. In the case law on goods, the chosen test case here, 
the Court has shifted from a total exclusion of market circumstances rules from the 
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 Data taken from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/de/index.htm (last accessed 14.09.2011). 
61
 See eg Case C-412/93 Leclerc-Siplec op. cit. at note 6 at paras 18-24, Case C-63/94 Groupement 
National des Négociants en Pommes de Terre de Belgique [1995] ECR I-2467 at paras 9-15, Case C-
387/93 Banchero [1995] ECR I-4663 at paras 32-44, Case C-266/96 Corsica Ferries [1998] ECR I-
3949 at paras 29-32, Case C-6/98 PRO Sieben Media AG [1999] ECR I-7599 at paras 45-48, C-
416/02 Morellato [2003] ECR I-9343 at para. 36, Case C-20/03 Burmanjer [2005] ECR I-4133 at 
paras 23-32, esp. at para. 31 and Case C-441/04 A-Punkt Schmuckhandels GmbH [2006] ECR I-2093 
at paras 14-25. 
62
 Case C-473/98 Toolex Alpha AB [2000] ECR I-5681 at para. 35, Case C-112/00 Schmidberger 
[2003] ECR I-5659 at paras 55-64, Case C-366/04 Georg Schwarz [2005] ECR I-10139 at paras 28-29 
and esp. para 39, Case C-320/03 Commission v Austria (Lorries) [2005] ECR I-9871 at paras 66-69, 
Case C-65/05 Commission v Greece (Electronic Games) [2006] ECR I-10341 at paras 27-30, Case C-
265/06 Commission v. Portugal (Tinted Film) op. cit. at note 2 at paras 31-36, Case C-110/05 
Commission v. Italy (Motorcycle Trailers) op. cit. at note 2 at para.58 and Case C-142/05 Mickelsson 
and Roos op. cit. at note 2 at para. 28. 
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scope of Art 34 TFEU (between 1995 and 2000) to a far more interventionist 
position.
63
 From 2000 to 2005, the ECJ reviewed two market circumstances rules as 
obstacles to intra-EU movement.
64
 During 2005-2010, this number rose to six 
national measures.
65
 From 2010 to the time of writing, a further two cases have 
arisen.
66
 As we shall see in section 2.3.2.2 below, the Court‟s changing approach in 
the area of goods is not atypical and is replicated across the individual Treaty 
freedoms.  
In terms of their nature, typical examples of excluded measures include non-
discriminatory tax laws
67
 and non-discriminatory national measures regulating 
trading hours or marketing/operating practices.
68
 The common feature uniting these 
different categories of rules is their effect on intra-EU movement. In each case, the 
specific rules at issue do not block movement between Member States and, provided 
they are genuinely non-discriminatory, simply characterise the regulatory 
environment within that State. Of course, this does not mean that these measures 
have no impact on intra-EU movement. For example, with respect to non-
discriminatory tax rules, the Court noted in Weigel that the co-existence of different 
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 The Court‟s earlier review of market circumstances rules as obstacles to Art 34 TFEU (between 
1985 and 1992) is discussed further below. 
64
 Case C-473/98 Toolex Alpha op. cit. at note 62 at para. 35 and Case C-112/00 Schmidberger op. cit. 
at note 62 at paras 55-64. 
65
 Case C-366/04 Schwarz op. cit. at note 62 at paras 28-29 and esp. para 39, Case C-320/03 
Commission v Austria (Lorries) op. cit. at note 62 at paras 66-69, Case C-65/05 Commission v Greece 
(Electronic Games) op. cit. at note 62 at paras 27-30, Case C-265/06 Commission v. Portugal (Tinted 
Film) op. cit. at note 2 at paras 31-36, Case C-110/05 Commission v. Italy (Motorcycle Trailers) op. 
cit. at note 2 at para. 58 and Case C-142/05 Mickelsson and Roos op. cit. at note 2 at para. 28. 
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 Case C-433/05 Lars Sandström, judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 15 April 2010 (nyr) at 
para 32 and Case C-142/09 Vincent Willy Lahousse and Lavichy BVBA, judgment of the Court (First 
Chamber) of 18 November 2010 (nyr) at paras 44-45. 
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 Eg Case C-391/97 Gschwind op. cit. at note 29, Case C-387/01 Weigel op. cit. at note 29, Case C-
403/03 Schempp op. cit. at note 29, Case C-134/03 Viacom Outdoor Srl [2005] ECR I-1167, Joined 
Cases C-544/03 and C-545/03 Mobistar SA (C-544/03) and Belgacom Mobile SA (C-545/03) [2005] 
ECR I-7723, Case C-513/04 Mark Kerckhaert and Bernadette Morres v Belgische Staat [2006] ECR 
I-10967 and Case C-298/05 Columbus Container Services op. cit. at note 29. For discussion, see Snell 
op. cit. at note 8 at pp 349-335. 
68
 Eg Case 75/81 Blesgen [1982] ECR 1211, Case C-379/92 Peralta [1994] ECR I-3453, C-402/92 
Boermans [1994] ECR I-2199, Case C-134/94 Esso Española SA [1995] ECR I-4223, Joined Cases C-
140-2/94 DIP SpA [1995] ECR I-3257, Case C-71/02 Herbert Karner [2004] ECR I-3025, Case 20/03 
Burmanjer op. cit. at note 61, Case C-441/04 A-Punkt Schmuckhandels op. cit. at note 61 and Case C-
393/08 Emanuela Sbarigia, Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 1 July 2010 (nyr) at para. 35. 
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tax regimes across the Member States might affect intra-EU movement (favourably 
or unfavourably).
69
 However, the Court stressed that: 
„the Treaty offers no guarantee to [here: a worker] that transferring his 
activities to a Member State other than the one in which he previously resided 
will be neutral as regards taxation.‟
70
 
The Court‟s ruling in Keck remains the most striking example of the Court‟s attempt 
to place market circumstances rules beyond the scope of its review as obstacles to 
intra-EU movement.
71
 In that case, the Court excluded a specific category of such 
rules („non-product‟ marketing rules) from the scope of Art 34 TFEU as „certain 
selling arrangements.‟
72
 As noted above, this objective was achieved by 
reintroducing discrimination analysis into the assessment of such rules.
73
 The Court‟s 
Keck ruling marked a clear break with several of its previous decisions, in which the 
Court had sanctioned the use of Art 34 TFEU to review, for example, non-
discriminatory national rules on shop opening hours.
74
 As discussed in Chapter 3, the 
Court has been reluctant to extend the scope of its „selling arrangement‟ concept to 
other categories of national measures that, on one view, exhibit comparable effects 
on intra-EU movement (these cases are discussed below).
75
 However, 
notwithstanding this development, the Keck exception continues to apply.
76
  
2.3.2.2 Market circumstances rules as obstacles to intra-EU movement 
The decision in Keck can be taken as a ruling of principle on the Court‟s use of the 
Treaty freedoms to scrutinise market circumstances rules. Required to rule 
conclusively on whether such rules – or at least a particular category of such rules – 
fall within the scope of its review as obstacles to intra-EU movement, the ECJ 
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 Case C-387/01 Weigel op. cit. at note 29. 
70
 Ibid., at para. 55. See also eg Case C-403/03 Schempp op. cit. at note 29 at paras 34 and 45. 
71
 Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Keck and Mithouard op. cit. at note 12. 
72
 Ibid., at paras 14-16. 
73
 For examples of discriminatory selling arrangements, see eg Case C-405/98 Gourmet International 
Products op. cit. at note 20, Case C-254/98 TK-Heimdienst op. cit. at note 20 and Case C-322/01 
DocMorris op. cit. at note 20.  
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 See Joined Cases 60 and 61/84 Cinéthèque SA op. cit. at note 16, Case 145/88 Torfaen BC op. cit. at 
note 16 and C-362/88 GB-INNO-BM op. cit. at note 16. However, it should be noted that the Court in 
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 T. Horsley, „Anyone for Keck?‟ Case Comment (2009) 46(6) CMLRev 2001 at pp 2008-2012. 
76
 See eg Case C-531/07 Fachverband der Buch- und Medienwirtschaft [2009] ECR I-3717 at para. 20 
and Case C-108/09 Ker-Optika, judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 2 December 2010 (nyr) at 
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responded in the negative.
77
 In so doing, it confirmed that Art 34 TFEU was a tool 
focused on liberalising intra-EU trade and not an instrument designed to maximise 
commercial freedom per se.
78
 However, in the intervening years, the Court has, on 
occasion, departed from that position. This finding applies both to its case law on 
non-discriminatory rules governing the marketing of products (which the ruling in 
Keck might have been thought to exclude from the scope of Art 34 TFEU) and also 
to its case law on other Treaty freedoms. Taken together, this troublesome body of 
case law includes certain non-discriminatory: (1) product use rules;
79









Turning first to the case law on goods, the Court‟s departure from (or, at least, 
qualification of) the choice it made in Keck can be seen in a subsequent set of 
decisions dealing with product use rules.
83
 The dispute here centres on the 
comparability of such rules with the selling arrangements category introduced in 
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 Prior to the decision in Keck, AG Tesauro had asked the Court to make a clear statement on the 
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Kingdom (Golden Shares) op. cit. at note 4, Joined Cases C-282/04 and C-283/04 Commission v 
Netherlands (Golden Shares) op. cit. at note 4, Case C-112/05 Commission v Germany (Golden 
Shares) op. cit. at note 4 and Case C-171/08 Commission v. Portugal (Golden Shares) op. cit. at note 
4. 
82
 Case C-55/94 Gebhard op. cit. at note 5 (Art 49 TFEU), Case C-108/96 Mac Quen and Others op. 
cit. at note 5, Joined Cases C-171/07 and C-172/07 Apothekerkammer des Saarlandes op. cit. at note 5 
(Art 49 TFEU), Case C-294/00 Gräbner op. cit. at note 5 (Art 49 TFEU), C-140/03 Commission v. 
Greece (Opticians) op. cit. at note 5 (Art 49 TFEU) and Case C-325/08 Olympique Lyonnais op. cit. at 
note 5 (Art 45 TFEU).  
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 Case C-110/05 Commission v. Italy (Motorcycle Trailers) op. cit. at note 2, Case C-142/05 
Mickelsson and Roos op. cit. at note 2 and Case C-265/06 Commission v. Portugal (Tinted Film) op. 
cit. at note 2. See also earlier, Case C-473/98 Toolex Alpha AB op. cit. at note 62 and Case C-65/05 
Commission v Greece (Electronic Games) op. cit. at note 62. 
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Keck.
84
 In common with the latter category, non-discriminatory rules regulating 
product usage do not block the importation of such products into that State. Instead, 
they simply define the conditions under which they may be used (or not, as the case 
may be). Leaving aside any judgment on their merits, the only effect of non-
discriminatory selling arrangements and product use rules is to reduce the size of the 
available product market in the relevant Member State. However, notwithstanding 
the above parallels, the ECJ has confirmed that Art 34 TFEU extends to permit the 
scrutiny of non-discriminatory product use rules. In Commission v. Italy (Motorcycle 
Trailers), the Grand Chamber of the Court concluded that a ban on the towing of 
trailers by motorcycles constituted an obstacle to intra-EU movement.
85
 In its 
subsequent ruling in Mickelsson and Roos, the Court (Second Chamber) reached the 
same result.
86
 This time, the contested national rule imposed restrictions (but not a 
total ban) on the use of jet-skis and other personal watercraft on public waterways 
within the national territory.   
Outside of the free movement of goods, it is possible to point to several clusters of 
cases in which the ECJ has exceptionally invoked the Treaty freedoms to review 
market circumstances rules. This growing body of case law post-dates the ruling in 
Keck.
87
 As such, it provides further evidence of the Court‟s reluctance to explore the 
broader, cross-freedom implications of the choice it made in that key decision.  
First, in several cases, the Court has applied the Treaty provisions to review 
genuinely non-discriminatory Member State tax rules.
88
 As noted above, non-
discriminatory tax rules characterise a classic example of market circumstances rules. 
Such rules do not block intra-EU movement, but simply structure the fiscal 
environment within a State. For that reason, the Court concludes, in the vast majority 
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 As noted by AG Bot in his Opinion in Case C-110/05 Commission v. Italy (Motorcycle Trailers) op. 
cit. at note 2 at para. 1. 
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 Case C-110/05 Commission v. Italy (Motorcycle Trailers) op. cit. at note 2 at para. 58. The goods in 
question were specifically designed for this purpose (see para. 54). 
86
 Case C-142/05 Mickelsson and Roos op. cit. at note 2 at para. 28. See now also Case C-433/05 
Sandström op. cit. at note 66 at para. 32. 
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 For an exception see Case C-370/90 Surinder Singh [1992] ECR I-4265 (discussed below). 
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 Case C-439/97 Sandoz op. cit. at note 3, Joined Cases C-430/99 and C-431/99 Sea-Land Service op. 
cit. at note 3, Case C-464/02 Commission v. Denmark (Vehicle Registrations) op. cit. at note 3, Case 
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of cases, that non-discriminatory tax rules fall outside of the scope of the Treaty 
freedoms. However, in several cases, the ECJ has broken with this approach and 
required Member States to justify – at Union level – their decision to levy a 
particular tax in the first place.
89
 As Banks rightly notes, the use of the Treaty 
freedoms in this manner represents a classic case of the Court „falling into the trap of 
its own rhetoric.‟
90
 It seems to follow from a literal application of its broad effects-
based reading of the term obstacle to intra-EU movement. For example, in Sandoz, 
the ECJ concluded that, in order to trigger the protection of Art 63(1) TFEU, it was 
sufficient that the contested non-discriminatory stamp duty imposed on certain types 
of loan was „likely to deter‟ residents from obtaining loans from providers 
established in other Member States.
91
 According to the Court, the Austrian stamp 
duty „deprived residents [of that State] of the possibility of benefiting from the 




Secondly, in another line of case law, the Court has required Member States to 
justify non-discriminatory legislation governing the taking-up of economic activity 
within that State on a permanent basis. Again, such rules simply define the market 
within a particular State. For that reason, in the absence of any discrimination on 
nationality grounds, the Court generally excludes such rules from the scope of the 
Treaty freedoms on workers and establishment (Arts 45 and 49 TFEU), which apply 
in this context. For example, in Bouchoucha, the ECJ concluded that: 
„in the absence of Community legislation… each Member State is free to 
regulate the exercise of that activity within its territory, without 




However, since 2001, the Court has increasingly challenged the autonomy of 
Member States to outline the non-discriminatory conditions governing the taking-up 
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 For detailed analysis see Banks op. cit. at note 8 esp. at pp 493-499. 
90
 Ibid., at p. 490. 
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 Case C-439/97 Sandoz op. cit. at note 3 at para. 19. 
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 Ibid. (this author‟s emphasis). 
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 Case C-61/89 Bouchoucha op. cit. at note 43 at para. 12. See also recently Case C-345/08 Krzysztof 
Peśla op. cit. at note 43 at para. 50:  „Article [45 TFEU] does not, in order to be given practical effect, 
require that access to a professional activity in a Member State be subject to lower requirements than 
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of economic activity within that State on a permanent basis.
94
 For example, in 
Apokthekerkammer des Saarlands (Doc Morris II), the Grand Chamber of the Court 
condemned as a restriction under Art 49 TFEU a German law restricting the right to 
operate pharmacies on the national territory to pharmacists.
95
 The contested measure 
was genuinely non-discriminatory. Admittedly, in substance, it was more restrictive 
that the legislative environment governing the same activity in other Member States. 
However, in so far as the freedom of establishment (and also workers) is concerned, 
this fact alone is not sufficient to bring national legislation within the scope of the 
Treaty freedoms. As advocates of the dual burden and mutual recognition approaches 
point out, the home Member State retains primary competence for the regulation of 
economic activity on a permanent basis.
96
 
Thirdly, on the free movement of capital, the Court‟s troublesome case law on 
market circumstances rules centres on its „golden shares‟ jurisprudence.
97
 Golden 
shares are national measures that reserve to Member States as shareholder special 
powers in the management of previously State-owned undertakings.
98
 In a series of 
decisions, the Court has made it absolutely clear that the very existence of such 
golden shares constitutes an obstacle to Art 63(1) TFEU. With respect to certain 
golden share rights, this finding is not problematic. First, a number of such 
provisions were discriminatory.
99
 Secondly, of those that were genuinely non-
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 Case C-108/96 Mac Quen and Others op. cit. at note 5, Joined Cases C-171/07 and C-172/07 
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97
 Case C-367/98 Commission v. Portugal (Golden Shares) op. cit. at note 4. See thereafter e.g. Case 
C-463/00 Commission v Spain (Golden Shares) op. cit. at note 4, Case C-98/01 Commission v United 
Kingdom (Golden Shares) op. cit. at note 4, Joined Cases C-282/04 and C-283/04 Commission v 
Netherlands (Golden Shares) op. cit. at note 4, Case C-112/05 Commission v Germany (Golden 
Shares) op. cit. at note 4 and Case C-171/08 Commission v. Portugal (Golden Shares) op. cit. at note 
4. 
98
 For discussion, see eg E. Szyszczak, „Golden Shares and Market Governance‟ (2002) 29(3) ILEI 
255 and H. Fleischer, „Case Note on the Golden Share Cases‟ (2003) 40(2) CMLRev 493. 
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 Case C-367/98 Commission v Portugal (Golden Shares) op. cit. at note 4 at para. 40 (rules 
restricting the acquisition of shares by non-nationals) and Case C-174/04 Commission v Italy (Golden 
Shares) [2005] ECR I-4933 at para. 30 (rules on voting rights discriminating against public utility 
companies established in other Member States). 
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discriminatory, some operated to block intra-EU movement.
100
 This was the case 
where the contested golden shares imposed a prior authorisation requirement on the 
acquisition (or disposal) of shares above a fixed threshold, irrespective of the 
nationality of the investor. Although non-discriminatory, this requirement operated to 
block the acquisition of shares by investors established in other Member States 
(which constitutes an intra-EU capital movement for the purposes of Art 63(1) 
TEU).
101
 However, in a separate line of reasoning, the Court has gone a step further 
and consistently ruled that Art 63(1) TFEU also extends to capture non-
discriminatory golden shares that do not block intra-EU capital movements, but 
instead simply grant Member States powers over the on-going management of 
undertakings.
102
 This covers, for example, reserved rights to appoint board members 
or to veto certain corporate decisions (other than those relating to share 
acquisition/disposal). Although non-discriminatory, the ECJ ruled that the very 
existence of this category of special shareholding, in deviation from the general rules 
of company law in that State, constitutes an obstacle to intra-EU movement.
103
  
Finally, it is possible to point to examples of the Court‟s review of market 
circumstances rules as obstacles to intra-EU movement in the case law on persons. 
This includes the decisions in Singh and Carpenter.
104
 In these rulings, the ECJ 
concluded that the scope of the Treaty rules on Arts 45, 49 and 56 TFEU extended to 
capture non-discriminatory national legislation governing the residency rights of 
third country national (TCN) spouses of migrant EU citizens. In Singh, the applicant 
successfully invoked Articles 45 and 49 TFEU (workers and establishment) in order 
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to secure a residency right for himself upon his spouse‟s return to her home Member 
State after a period of economic activity in another.
105
 In Carpenter, the applicant 
relied on his current and future activities as a provider of intra-EU services to defeat 
a deportation order issued against his TCN spouse by his home Member State. In 
both cases, the contested national legislation was non-discriminatory. Furthermore, 
although it undoubtedly had a real impact on the individuals concerned, it did not 
actually block the applicants‟ rights of intra-EU movement. Both Mrs Singh and Mr 
Carpenter remained (as Member State nationals) free to move between the markets 
of different Member States.  
For each of the above case clusters, it is possible to point to descriptive and 
normative explanation for the Court‟s decision to engage in review of the specific 
market circumstances rule at issue. For example, at the level of description, the 
Court‟s decision to scrutinise the characteristics of national markets could simply 
follow from a literal interpretation of its preferred broad effects-based tests (eg 
Dassonville). Indeed, the Court has fallen into this trap before in its pre-Keck case 
law on goods and there is no reason for it not to do so again in other areas.
106
 More 
specifically and with respect to the case law scrutinising national rules governing 
permanent economic activity, it could also be argued that the Court‟s conclusions are 
based on a failure, on its part, to distinguish properly between the freedoms of 
establishment and services. For example, in Gräbner, the ECJ clearly lost sight of 
this distinction and clumsily read the provisions on establishment and services 
together to conclude that the measure infringed both Arts 49 and 56 TFEU.
107
 This 
had the unfortunate effect of bringing within the scope of Art 49 TFEU a body of 
non-discriminatory national rules that were only capable of constituting obstacles to 
the freedom to provide services.
108
  
                                                          
105
 See also Case C-291/05 Eind op. cit. at note 104 at paras 35-39. Contrast Case C-434/09 
McCarthy, judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 5 May 2011. 
106
 Eg See Joined Cases 60 and 61/84 Cinéthèque SA op. cit. at note 16, Case 145/88 Torfaen BC op. 
cit. at note 16 and C-362/88 GB-INNO-BM op. cit. at note 16. 
107
 Case C-294/00 Gräbner op. cit. at note 5 at paras 38-40. Supporting this view, see the Opinion of 
AG Mischo in that case at para. 57. 
108
 Ibid. With respect to Art 56 TFEU, the contested rules discriminated against economic operators 
permanently established in other Member States where the provision of such services was lawful and 
who were seeking to extend their activities to the host State on a non-permanent basis.  
6. Subsidiarity and obstacles to intra-EU movement 
 
  223 
In other cases, the Court‟s scrutiny of the non-discriminatory conditions within 
national markets could be read as an attempt to respond to/rectify specific problems 
or perceived injustices arising in connection with the exercise of the Treaty rights of 
intra-EU movement. For example, the ruling in Singh might be viewed as an attempt 
on the Court‟s part to fill a gap in the scope of protection afforded to migrant 
workers by (then) Regulation 1612/68 and Directive 73/148.
109
 As the Court noted, 
the latter Union measures granted rights of entry and residence to the family 
members of Member State nationals engaged in economic activity in other Member 
States. However, they did not extend to cover the applicant‟s situation (as a returning 
migrant). On one view, it could be argued that the Court was not satisfied with this 
situation and, presented with the opportunity to do so, used the Treaty freedoms to 
fashion an appropriate solution. The subsequent decision in Carpenter can also be 
explained through similar reasoning.
110
 However, in this case, the Court‟s concern 
was focused more specifically on the impact of the contested deportation order on the 
applicant‟s fundamental rights.
111
 These rights, and the right to the protection of 
family life in particular (in point in Carpenter), form part of the constitutional 
framework of the internal market, which the Court must protect.
112
 
In normative terms, the Court could certainly fall back on the arguments of those 
favouring a broader reading of the Treaty freedoms to support its intervention in all 
of the above cases.  For example, under the market access model, the Court‟s 
decision to scrutinise the rules on product use rules, taxation, golden shares and 
permanent economic activity is justified by the restrictive nature of those 
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measures.
113
 Similarly, the Union citizenship model is capable of defending those 
cases in which the personal freedom and, indeed, fundamental rights of Member 
State nationals were at issue. Under this reading of the obstacle concept, it is the very 
purpose of the Treaty freedoms to ensure that Union citizens are not subject to 




However, recalling the conclusion reached in Chapter 5, the problem with these 
normative models is that they rest on weak foundations. As argued in Chapter 5, both 
the market access and Union citizenship models are based on an untested assumption 
that the Court is essentially free to exercise its competence to define the concept of 
an obstacle to intra-EU movement as it sees fit. In other words, it is largely taken for 
granted that the ECJ can extend the scope of the Treaty freedoms to advance a 
particular „discrimination-plus‟ readings of these provisions. However, the time has 
come to scrutinise this basic assumption against the demands of the subsidiarity 
principle. This principle is specifically designed to safeguard Member State 
autonomy from excessive Union intervention in areas of shared regulatory 
responsibility such as the internal market. 
3. Subsidiarity and obstacles to intra-EU movement 
3.1 Introduction 
The above analysis has attempted to reduce the scale of the problem in the case law 
and literature on obstacles to intra-EU movement. In summary, it has been argued 
that the primary tension in the case law and literature centres on the Court‟s 
extension of the scope of the Treaty freedoms to review market circumstances rules. 
The use of the Treaty freedoms in this manner has been shown to be exceptional, but 
spread across the individual provisions and increasing in frequency in recent years. It 
also cuts through a range of very different areas of national regulatory autonomy 
from more mundane legislation on product usage to highly sensitive matters of direct 
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taxation and immigration policy. In this section, analysis shifts from the descriptive 
to the normative. Introducing subsidiarity into the debate, it is argued that this 
principle provides the clear (and missing) normative basis to declare the Court‟s 
troublesome market circumstances case law wrong.  
We begin our analysis with discussion of the substance of subsidiarity test (section 
3.2). Thereafter, the chapter turns to consider, in section 3.3, the implications of the 
proposed subsidiarity test for the review of market circumstances rules (as the 
„problem cases‟). We then examine the impact of subsidiarity on the Court‟s less 
problematic case law on discriminatory obstacles (section 3.4). Although the core 
tension is focused on market circumstances rules, this second strand of analysis 
remains important. A coherent and normatively sound conceptual framework must be 
capable of rationalising all of the Court‟s case law on obstacles to intra-EU 
movement. 
3.2 Formulating the subsidiarity test 
In Chapter 1, it was argued that subsidiarity aims to protect Member State autonomy 
in areas of concurrent competence (as defined in Art 4 TFEU). This objective is 
achieved by placing conditions on the exercise of competence by the Union 
institutions in such areas. According to Art 5(3) TEU, in order to exercise concurrent 
competences, Union institutions must demonstrate that there is a need for 
intervention at Union level. It was argued that the test comprises two cumulative 
requirements. First, it must be shown that Union action is necessary to address 
regulatory problems that exhibit sufficient transnational or cross-border effects. 
Secondly, subsidiarity requires that the Union institutions demonstrate that their 
action is associated with clear benefits or „added value‟ as compared to continued 
unilateral action (or inaction) at Member State level. The desire to limit Union 
intervention in these terms is based on subsidiarity‟s presumption in favour of 
localised decision-making, which is considered to be superior for reasons of both 
economic efficiency and democratic legitimacy.
115
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The conclusion reached in Chapter 2 was that the Court must integrate the demands 
of subsidiarity into its own interpretative choices. Specifically, subsidiarity applies 
where these choices involve decisions about whether or not there is a need for 
intervention at Union level in an area of shared competence. In Chapter 3, it was 
argued that the Court‟s interpretation of the scope of the Treaty freedoms meets the 
above prerequisites. This follows from the finding that, when interpreting the scope 
of these provisions, the Court is making a decision about the extent to which Member 
States are required to justify, at Union level, their contribution to the regulation of 
the internal market (as an area of shared competence). Only where a national 
measure falls within the scope of the Treaty freedoms is that Member State required 
to subsume and defend its policy choice within the Union derogation framework. In 
all other cases, the Member States are left to contribute to the regulation of the 




The question now is how subsidiarity functions in practice. How can this principle 
translate into a substantive test to restrain the Court in the exercise of its interpretive 
freedom to define the scope of the Treaty freedoms? The solution proposed in this 
section builds on the arguments of certain commentators, discussed in Chapter 2, 
who reflected briefly on subsidiarity‟s implications in this context. It also draws 
directly from the case law addressing the principle‟s application as a restraint on the 
Union legislature. Bringing these distinct strands of analysis together, it is argued 
that, as a source of self-restraint on its reading of the scope of the Treaty freedoms, 
subsidiarity precludes the Court from using those provisions as tools to scrutinise the 
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3.2.1 Building on the literature and case law 
In Chapter 2, we noted that, during an early flurry of academic interest post-
Maastricht, a few commentators broke with the dominant line of analysis and 
reflected on the broader implications of the subsidiarity principle in EU law. 
Bermann, Schilling, Bernard and, more recently, de Búrca discussed, to varying 
degrees, how the principle might affect the Court‟s functions as an institutional 
actor.
117
 De Búrca focused primarily on discussing the procedural dimension; that is, 
whether or not the Court is capable of responding unilaterally to subsidiarity as a 
self-enforcing restraint or whether the introduction of new mechanisms of ex post 
review would be necessary to ensure its compliance with the principle. However, in 
so doing, de Búrca recognised that subsidiarity was relevant to the exercise of the 
Court‟s own functions. By contrast, in their earlier analyses, Bermann, Bernard and 
Schilling focused more on the substance of the subsidiarity test. All three 
commentators explored the principle‟s impact on the Court‟s case law on obstacles to 
intra-EU movement.  
Both Bermann and Bernard called for the Court to show greater awareness of the 
subsidiarity principle in its free movement case law. Bermann argued, in broad 
terms, that: 
„the Court [should] pay more attention in particular cases as to whether the 
exercise of regulatory authority by a Member State or its subcommunities 
sufficiently impairs cross-border mobility to justify suppression of the 
relevant measure in the interest of the common market.‟
118
  
Bernard was more precise in his (brief) analysis. He concluded that, in accordance 
with the demands of subsidiarity, the ECJ should focus its reading of the Treaty 
freedoms on „removing barriers to entry or exit from one Member State to another 
and ensuring equal treatment once inside the territory/market of each Member 
State.‟
119
 Schilling adopted a different view.
120
 He argued that subsidiarity qualifies 
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the principle of primacy in EU law. For Schilling, in cases where the contested 
national rule is not intended to restrict imports, subsidiarity requires the Court to 
balance the Union interest in securing uniformity (which he interprets as the function 
of the primacy principle) with the protection of Member State autonomy (protected 
by subsidiarity).
121
 Of the three approaches offered, it was argued that Bermann‟s 
and Bernard‟s analyses were to be preferred. Schilling‟s argument falls down by 
reason of the fact that it does not focus on the effects of national measures on intra-
EU movement – the core focus of the subsidiarity principle. Instead, his argument is 
based on a distinction between different categories of national measures – economic 
versus non-economic rules – which is of no relevance to the subsidiarity assessment.  
Although preferred, Bermann‟s analysis is rather short on detail. In his brief review, 
he does not elaborate further on his criterion of „sufficient cross-border impediment.‟ 
This decisive piece of the subsidiarity jigsaw is left out. Equally, whilst more precise 
in its outcome, Bernard‟s hypothesis also requires further development. In particular, 
his argument does not explain why the Court should always enjoy the right to review 
discriminatory national measures. As discussed in Chapter 2, it could be argued that, 
in a great many cases, the discriminatory effects of specific national policies do not 
in fact extend beyond the territory of that Member State. On that basis, the logic of 
subsidiarity would appear to preclude the Court‟s use of the Treaty freedoms to 
review such measures as obstacles to intra-EU movement (which would amount, of 
course, to a radical revision of the current case law). 
To tackle the limitations inherent in the existing analyses and formulate a more 
precise subsidiarity test, it is argued that we should re-examine how the principle has 
developed as a restraint on the Union legislature. As discussed in Chapter 1, when 
exercising its competence to contribute to the regulation of the internal market (Art 
114 TFEU), the Union legislature is faced with a comparable decision to that which 
the Court is required to take when defining the scope of the Treaty freedoms. Both 
instances involve a decision about whether or not there is a need for intervention at 
Union level or whether the Member States can be left to act unilaterally. The 
difference between the actions of the Union legislature and the Court in this specific 
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sphere is one of perspective. When seeking to exercise its competence under Art 114 
TFEU, the Union legislature is contemplating the adoption of new Union measures to 
tackle particular regulatory problems that met the subsidiarity test (see further 
below). By contrast, the Court of Justice, in the exercise of its competence to 
interpret the scope of the Treaty freedoms, does not enjoy this same right of 
initiation. Instead, its actions seek to police the boundaries of existing Member State 
action. The Court‟s role is to ensure that Member States exercise their competence to 
contribute to the regulation of the internal market responsibly
122
 and, where 
appropriate, to „re-regulate‟ these choices at Union level (using the justification 
framework as its filter) in cases where they do not.
123
 
In Chapter 1, it was argued that the Court has already crafted subsidiarity into a legal 
test to restrain the Union legislature‟s exercise of its competence under Art 114 
TFEU. This ex post subsidiarity review was shown to have developed initially under 
the heading of the Court‟s „legal basis‟ review. Analysing Tobacco Advertising, it 
was argued that the Court‟s scrutiny of whether or not the contested Union 
legislation had been enacted using the correct legal basis was in fact more concerned 
with review of the exercise of competence rather than its mere existence.
124
 In 
connection with the assessment of Union legislation enacted under Art 114 TFEU, 
discussion of the conditions under which the Union legislature may exercise 
regulatory competence is the proper domain of the subsidiarity principle. However, 
in its subsequent case law, the Court was shown to have transposed its de facto 
subsidiarity reasoning to the analysis of subsidiarity proper; in other words, to its 
scrutiny of the Union legislature‟s actions against Art 5(3) TEU.
125
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The Court‟s ex post review of Union legislation against the demands of the 
subsidiarity principle (both initially under the „legal basis‟ heading and subsequently 
under Art 5(3) TEU proper) is important. In substantive terms, it tell us that, in 
accordance with Art 5(3) TEU, the Union legislature does not enjoy competence to 
engage in the per se review of the conditions for economic/non-economic activity 
within individual Member States. Art 114 TFEU does not, in the Court‟s own words, 
confer upon the Union legislature a „general power to regulate the internal 
market.‟
126
 The practical effects of this conclusion can be most clearly seen in the 
decision in Tobacco Advertising itself. As discussed in Chapter 1, the German 
Government successfully contested the scope of Directive 98/43, approximating 
national laws on the advertisement of tobacco products.
127
 In so far as the Directive 
affected intra-EU movement, the German Government‟s attack centred on the 
Directive‟s attempt to regulate the advertising of tobacco products through „static 
advertising media.‟
128
 This covered, for example, the advertising of tobacco products 
using posters and parasols and also through cinema advertising within Member 
States. As the German Government argued, inter-State trade in such products was 
„practically non-existent.‟
129
 It is submitted that the decision, at Member State level, 
to permit, restrict or prohibit the marketing of tobacco products using parasols or 
through cinema advertising is precisely the type of regulatory choice that subsidiarity 
was introduced to protect. This follows directly from the absence of any clear 
transnational effects associated with the regulation of these interests. Member State 
legislation governing the marketing of tobacco products using static advertising 
media (where enacted) simply defines the regulatory environment within individual 
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Member States. Moreover, its existence and content (or absence) reflect the 
particular political preferences of voters within the respective Member States. 
The decision in Tobacco Advertising remains, to date, the only case in which the 
Court has intervened to cut down an act of the Union legislature (implicitly) on 
subsidiarity grounds. For that reason, it could be argued that the above analysis rests 
on too weak a foundation to form the basis of a more specific subsidiarity test. 
However, this objection is easily refuted. As discussed in Chapter 1, the fact that the 
Court appears only to have corrected the scope of Union legislation on subsidiarity 
grounds in one specific case (Tobacco Advertising) does not necessarily reflect a 
subsequent change in its basic approach. Indeed, since Tobacco Advertising, the 
Court has been asked on at least three further occasions to review the compatibility 
with Art 5(3) TEU of Union legislation enacted under Art 114 TFEU.
130
 In each 
case, the Court has repeated the substantive test it first formulated under Art 5(2) 
TEU in Tobacco Advertising. According to the ECJ, under Art 114 TFEU, the Union 
legislature: 
„does not [enjoy] exclusive competence to regulate economic activity on the 
internal market, but only a certain competence for the purposes of improving 
the conditions for its establishment and functioning by eliminating barriers to 




Equally, in several other decisions, the Court has also reiterated its finding in 
Tobacco Advertising that „a mere finding of disparities between national rules is not 
sufficient to justify having recourse to [that same provision].‟
132
 
The fact that the Court has not struck down more Union legislation on subsidiarity 
grounds can be explained on (at least) two grounds. First, it could be argued that the 
Union legislature has taken heed of the Court‟s decision in Tobacco Advertising and 
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is now more careful (or less ambitious) in its attempts to enact legislation using Art 
114 TFEU. Secondly, the absence of subsequent successful challenges could also be 
explained with reference to the particular nature of the Court‟s ex post review. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, when reviewing Union legislation against Art 5(3) TEU (and, 
for that matter, on other grounds), the ECJ does not conduct its own de novo inquiry. 
Instead, it restricts itself to examining whether or not the evidence relied upon by the 
Union legislature to support its decision to intervene in the regulation of the internal 
market „adds up‟. Only where the applicant demonstrates that this is clearly not the 
case can the ECJ be expected to step in and strike down Union legislation. In 
Tobacco Advertising, the German Government presented clear, targeted and reasoned 
objections to the Union legislature‟s exercise of competence to regulate tobacco 
advertising within the Union.
133
 By contrast, in subsequent cases, the parties seeking 
to strike down Union legislation on the same basis have failed to adduce sufficiently 
convincing evidence to overturn the reasons for legislative action set out by the 
Union legislature. 
Finally, even if is accepted that Tobacco Advertising marks the „high-water‟ mark of 
the Court‟s Art 114 TFEU subsidiarity review (which is a compelling view),
134
 this 
does not actually weaken the present argument. The finding that the Court has since 
diluted its scrutiny of Union legislation on subsidiarity grounds is a distinct issue for 
separate critique.
135
 What is important for this thesis is the fact that, in Tobacco 
Advertising at the very least, the Court can be seen to have integrated the demands of 
Art 5(3) TEU into its scrutiny of the Union legislature‟s decision to exercise its 
competence under Art 114 TFEU. It is this fact, and in particular, the detail of the 
Court‟s approach that is important here. 
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3.3 Subsidiarity and non-discriminatory obstacles to intra-EU 
movement 
To summarise, it has been argued that the Court‟s case on Art 114 TFEU – and the 
ruling in Tobacco Advertising in particular – provides a useful indication of 
subsidiarity‟s practical function in EU law as a restraint on the exercise of Union 
competence in connection with the regulation of the internal market. Put simply, the 
Court reads subsidiarity to preclude the use of Art 114 TFEU as a „general power to 
regulate the internal market.‟ In practice, the evidence (which matches the substance 
of the subsidiarity test)
136
 suggests that this amounts to preventing the Union 
legislature from using that provision as a basis to engage in nothing other than the re-
regulation at Union level of the conditions for economic/non-economic activity 
within individual Member States. In this specific sphere, subsidiarity therefore 
protects the manner in which national markets are structured. In this section, we now 
turn to examine more closely what this subsidiarity test means for the Court‟s case 
law on obstacles to intra-EU movement. This begins with discussion of the 
principle‟s implications for the case law on non-discriminatory national measures.  
In section 2.3, it was argued that the Court has extended the scope of the Treaty 
freedoms to capture two categories of genuinely non-discriminatory national rules. 
The distinguishing feature of these two categories is whether or not they operate to 
block intra-EU movement. Returning to this line of case law, it is submitted that the 
principle of subsidiarity poses no threat to the Court‟s continued use of the Treaty 
freedoms to review this category; that is, to permit the scrutiny at Union level of non-
discriminatory measures that block intra-EU movement. On the contrary, subsidiarity 
actually provides a stronger normative basis to support the Court‟s continued use of 
the Treaty provisions in this manner. In cases where their policy choices block intra-
EU movement, the Member States have clearly overstepped the limits of their 
autonomy to contribute to the regulation of the internal market as a shared regulatory 
space. Accordingly, there is a need for the Court to step in and engage in the scrutiny 
of these preferences at Union level. This intervention is essential in order to realise 
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the shared objective of establishing a functioning internal market in which the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital is secured (Art 26 TFEU).  
Far more problematic from the perspective of subsidiarity is the Court‟s exceptional, 
but increasing, application of the Treaty freedoms to review non-discriminatory rules 
that do not actually block intra-EU movement.
137
 Transposing analysis of the case 
law on Art 114 TFEU, it is submitted that subsidiarity provides the missing 
normative basis to declare this line of case law wrong. The Court‟s use of the Treaty 
freedoms to scrutinise market circumstances rules amounts to nothing other than 
interference at Union level in the precise sphere of Member State regulatory 
autonomy that subsidiarity was introduced to protect. Whilst they may affect intra-
EU movement, market circumstances rules do not exhibit the prerequisite 
transnational effects required by the subsidiarity principle to justify the Court‟s 
decision to use the Treaty freedoms as tools of review. For example, disparities 
between the tax rules of two different Member States might, in effect, lead an 
economic operator or Union citizen not to bother entering the market of that State. 
However, this should not give rise to an obstacle to intra-EU movement. It is not the 
existence of the tax that is important but the nature of its effects. Given that national 
tax rules are incapable of blocking intra-EU movement, the only question for EU free 
movement law is whether or not they are discriminatory (see section 3.4 below).  
Why is it necessary to limit the Court‟s intervention to the review of non-
discriminatory rules that actually block intra-EU movement? Should the Court not 
also enjoy competence to review market circumstances rules that, although genuinely 
non-discriminatory and not blocking intra-EU movement, nevertheless severely 
restrict personal or economic freedom within that State? This represents the popular 
view in the commentary and would also reflect closely the Court‟s current position 
on the scrutiny of such rules as obstacles to intra-EU movement (see section 2.3.2.2 
above). The Court‟s existing qualitative appreciability test could serve a useful 
function here.
138
 This judicial device could be used to manage the scope of the 
Court‟s scrutiny of market circumstances rules. However, whilst appealing to some, 
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it is submitted that even this, more targeted extension in the scope of the Treaty 
freedoms cannot be squared with the demands of subsidiarity. In so far as the 
subsidiarity principle is concerned, the use of the Treaty freedoms in the above 
manner is no different to their (broader) use to scrutinise any non-discriminatory 
market circumstances rule. In both cases, the Court is, in the end, simply scrutinising 
the conditions for economic/non-economic activity as defined by the Member State 
concerned. The severity or restrictiveness of particular market circumstances rules is 
irrelevant and must not be confused or conflated with subsidiarity‟s focus on 
sufficient transnational effects. To conclude otherwise risks sanctioning the review of 
the very existence of Member State legislation. And, as we have already seen, 
subsidiarity does not grant the Union institutions such a general power of review 
over conditions within the internal market. 
Similarly, it does not matter how outdated, stupid or unreasonable the non-
discriminatory preferences of a particular Member State may seem. If they do not 
block intra-EU movement, then it is not for the Court to review them as obstacles to 
intra-EU movement.
139
 On the contrary, it falls exclusively to the enfranchised 
citizens of that Member State to pronounce – through national or sub-national 
democratic processes – on the merits (or otherwise) of such rules. This division of 
regulatory competence for the regulation of the internal market is precisely what 
subsidiarity is designed to achieve. Accordingly, if a Member State wishes to impose 
restrictions on the use of motorcycle trailers or jet-skis on its national territory; 
impose particularly high taxes on certain activities; place severe restrictions on the 
opening of shops within its jurisdiction; or outline particularly onerous conditions for 
the taking-up and pursuit of permanent economic activity within that State, then it 
should be free to do so without interference from the Court. Of course, it can be 
argued that such rules are economically inefficient or too restrictive of personal 
freedom. However, as noted already, this is entirely irrelevant. What is more 
important is that the contested rules reflect (at least when enacted) the particular 
preferences of that State. It is this competence – to determine and, where appropriate, 
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subsequently repeal/amend the characteristics of national markets though national 
democratic processes – that subsidiarity protects.  
To adhere to subsidiarity‟s demands, the Court of Justice should not, therefore, allow 
itself to be captured by the complaints of disgruntled citizens (or the clever 
arguments of legal commentators) who object per se to the existence of regulation or 
the exercise of Member State competence in certain areas. It must always be 
remembered that alternative paths remain open to citizens at Member State level. For 
example, disgruntled citizens can seek to challenge such rules at the national level by 
lobbying for changes in national legislative or administrative practices. In European 
democracies, this will amount to trying to secure a majority view for such a change. 
Alternatively, applicants can exploit other avenues of judicial redress. For example, 
those seeking to contest non-discriminatory market circumstances rules that restrict 
their fundamental rights can seek to petition the European Court of Human Rights. 
Finally, in certain cases, a disgruntled economic operator or Union citizen can opt to 
transfer their interests to the territory of another Member State where the prevailing 
conditions are more favourable to them. This latter reality – the right to move and 
exercise choice within a diverse internal market – characterises the true wonder of 
the Treaty freedoms. They are not instruments to undermine – or sidestep – 
regulatory choices expressed through national democratic processes; instead, they are 
tools to empower individuals to exercise greater choice within an enlarged Union of 
27 Member States. 
Reflecting again on the case law, it is interesting to note that the Court appears 
already to be implicitly aware of subsidiarity‟s function as a restraint on its freedom 
to review market circumstances rules. First, recalling the analysis in section 2 above, 
it is clear that the Court does not consistently use the Treaty freedoms to scrutinise 
the existence of Member State regulation. In numerous cases, the Court continues to 
conclude that market circumstances rules fall outside of the scope of the Treaty 
freedoms.
140
 This gives rise to a suspicion of selectivity, which could be explained by 
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the Court‟s awareness of the fact that it does not enjoy a „general power to regulate‟ 
market conditions per se. Secondly, the Court has also been shown sometimes to rely 
on a qualitative appreciability test in connection with its review of non-
discriminatory national rules. The use of this threshold test provides further evidence 
of the Court‟s own concerns over the scope of its competence to contribute to the 
regulation of the internal market through the interpretation of the Treaty freedoms. 
On the basis of the analysis in Chapter 4, it would appear that the Court is prepared 
to overlook: (1) non-discriminatory national rules the only effect of which is to 
increase (marginally) the costs of a particular economic activity;
141
 (2) non-
discriminatory measures that are liable to have a low-level impact on consumer 
behaviour;
142
 and (3) national measures that might cause natural persons no real 




In addition to the above, it is submitted further that the Court has already reacted to 
the introduction of the subsidiarity principle and adjusted its reading of the obstacle 
concept accordingly. The case in point here is Keck.
144
 Although not referring to the 
principle at any point, the Court‟s change of direction in that ruling can be re-
interpreted as a precise reflection of the demands of subsidiarity. This should not 
surprise, as the decision was taken at a time when subsidiarity was emerging as a 
core principle of European integration.
145
 Indeed, the decision in Keck can be read 
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alongside the subsequent ruling in Tobacco Advertising (for Art 114 TFEU) as the 
flipside of the same subsidiarity coin.
146
 In accordance with the demands of the 
subsidiarity principle, the selling arrangement concept in Keck sought to exclude 
from the scope of Art 34 TFEU a specific category of market circumstances rule 
(non-product marketing rules). In parallel with the subsequent Tobacco Advertising 
ruling, this judicial rule was designed to ensure that Art 34 TFEU remained focused 
on the elimination of obstacles to intra-EU movement and did not become a tool 
granting the Court a „general power to regulate the internal market.‟
147
 It is therefore 
submitted that the Keck ruling offers a framework around which the Court‟s case law 
on intra-EU movement should be adjusted to reflect the demands of subsidiarity. 
However, before discussing this conclusion further, it is first necessary to reflect on 
the principle‟s implications for the Court‟s less controversial case law on 
discriminatory national measures. 
3.4 Subsidiarity and discriminatory obstacles to intra-EU movement 
The use of the Treaty freedoms to scrutinise discriminatory national rules as 
obstacles to intra-EU movement is universally accepted in the literature. More 
importantly, it is also clearly signposted in the Treaty.
148
 However, the Court‟s 
decision to review discriminatory national rules must still be squared with the 
subsidiarity principle. Otherwise, we are left with an incomplete conceptual 
framework. 
At first sight, subsidiarity presents a serious challenge to the Court‟s case law on 
discriminatory obstacles to intra-EU movement. Very often, the contested 
discriminatory national measures do not actually block intra-EU movement (the 
criterion for judicial intervention under Art 5(3) TEU developed above). This is the 
case, for example, with respect to the jurisprudence on Member State tax laws.
149
 
Even where discriminatory, such rules do not block intra-EU movement. Instead, 
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they simply affect the attractiveness of the choices available to those 
operating/residing within the Union. The only difference is, of course, that, where 
discriminatory, the contested rules work to the advantage of those already 
operating/residing within the market/territory of that Member State. It could be 
argued that subsidiarity precludes the Court from exercising its competence to review 
discriminatory national rules except in those cases where intra-EU movement is 
actually blocked. Examples of such cases would include: Member State legislation 
prescribing product characteristic requirements;
150
 national rules prohibiting the 
provision of services lawfully provided in other Member States in cases where this 
protects competing domestic operators;
151
 and directly discriminatory national rules 
prohibiting nationals of other Member States from taking-up employed or self-
employed activity within that State.
152
  
Does this mean that the Court‟s reading of the scope of the Treaty freedoms must be 
radically cut down to capture only discriminatory (and non-discriminatory obstacles) 
that block intra-EU movement? After all, are the Member States not capable of 
eliminating – at the national level – discriminatory elements from their policy 
preferences?
153
 Moreover, has it not been argued that subsidiarity operates to protect 
their very right to do so unilaterally?   
Notwithstanding the above, it is submitted that there is strong argument to support 
the view that the Court should not alter its approach to the scrutiny of Member State 
measures that discriminate on nationality grounds. Although Member States may be 
perfectly capable of correcting discrimination at the national level through unilateral 
action, it is submitted that the Court‟s intervention at Union level remains necessary 
to safeguard the special constitutional significance of the principle of non-
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discrimination on nationality grounds in EU free movement law. If the elimination of 
discrimination were to be left in the hands of national courts, then the level of 
protection may differ across the Member States to the detriment of Union citizens. 
On that basis and in line with the second limb of the subsidiarity test in Art 5(3) 
TEU, one can argue therefore that the ECJ is better able to secure the guarantee of 
non-discrimination on nationality grounds as compared with continued Member State 
regulation.  
However, the above argument could be transposed to the many other guiding 
principles of EU integration. For example, one could argue that the Court should also 
enjoy the right to review market circumstances rules that are environmentally 
unsound (Art 11 TFEU), fail to guarantee adequate consumer protection (Art 12 
TFEU) or undermine the Treaty‟s objectives of promoting a high level of 
employment, education and training or fighting social exclusion (Art 9 TFEU). 
Perhaps even more importantly, it could be argued that the Court should enjoy the 
right to scrutinise market circumstances rules that undermine the Treaty‟s guarantee 
of equality (on various grounds) (Arts 8 and 9 TFEU) or those measures that infringe 
fundamental rights as protected within the constitutional framework of the Union.
154
 
What is so special about the guarantee of non-discrimination on nationality grounds 
in connection with the Treaty provisions on intra-EU movement?  
The key distinguishing feature, it is submitted, is that the prohibition of 
discrimination on the grounds of Member State nationality characterises the very 
substance of the Treaty provisions.
155
 As the Court has repeatedly confirmed, the 
individual Treaty provisions are, first and foremost, specific expressions of the 
principle of non-discrimination on nationality grounds.
156
 By contrast, it is submitted 
that the Treaty freedoms cannot be construed as proxies for additional constitutional 
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values, such as the protection of the environment or fundamental rights. Of course, to 
be absolutely clear, this does not mean that there is no space to secure and develop 
such objectives in EU free movement law. On the contrary, the Court does – and 
should – integrate the promotion of such flanking Union policy objectives into its 
review of national measures that are found to (1) discriminate (directly or indirectly) 
on nationality grounds and/or (2) block intra-EU movement (the subsidiarity test 
developed in section 3.3.). For example, it is well-established that values such as 
environmental and consumer protection and fundamental rights shape the Court‟s 
„re-regulation‟ of national policies at the second-stage justification review.
157
  
However, the key point is that the application of such principles in the justification 
context remains distinct from the function played by the principle of non-
discrimination in EU free movement law. The other general principles do not define 
the scope of the Treaty freedoms, but instead simply inform their implementation at 
the justification stage; that is, once it has been established – in accordance with the 
demands of Art 5(3) TEU – that the Court has competence to intervene at Union 
level in the (re)regulation of the internal market. It is only in this residual sphere that 
the Treaty‟s general principles on, inter alia, fundamental rights or environmental 
protection should kick in to shape the Court‟s choices as a Union policy-maker.   
4. A new normative framework 
To bring together the conclusions of the above analysis, this section offers a new 
conceptual framework to guide the Court in its interpretation of the scope of the 
Treaty freedoms. It is submitted that the proposed framework provides a normatively 
sound response to the long-running dispute in the literature concerning the proper 
function of the Treaty freedoms. In terms of its result, the proposed solution comes 
close to that advocated by supporters of the narrower discrimination/mutual 
recognition based reading of the term „obstacle to intra-EU movement‟.
158
 However, 
subsidiarity is the key differentiating factor between the aforementioned existing 
models and the framework proposed here. Subsidiarity provides the necessary and 
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missing normative basis to justify the Court‟s expansion of the scope of the Treaty 
freedoms beyond the discrimination/mutual recognition models in specific instances.  
It is submitted that, to comply with the demands of the subsidiarity principle, the 
Court‟s interpretation of the scope of the Treaty freedoms must be limited to the 
scrutiny of two distinct categories of national measure. These are: (1) discriminatory 
national rules and (2) genuinely non-discriminatory national rules that block intra-EU 
movement. Conversely, the conclusion reached is that subsidiarity precludes the 
Court‟s application of the Treaty freedoms to engage in the review of non-
discriminatory national rules that simply define the characteristics of national 
markets (market circumstances rules). In so doing, the principle operates to isolate 
and protect a meaningful space for citizens residing within those States to exercise 
their non-discriminatory policy preferences (typically through national democratic 
processes).  
As the above analysis has shown, subsidiarity does not call for a radical shake-up of 
the existing case law on obstacles to intra-EU movement; it demands an adjustment 
at the margins, not a total revolution. Indeed, much of the current confusion in the 
case law and literature can be resolved at the level of descriptive analysis. In 
particular, the Court‟s increasingly broad effects-based reading of the obstacle 
concept is worryingly misleading. This test is, in fact, most frequently used to review 
indirectly discriminatory national measures. In the interests of accuracy, it is argued 
therefore that the Court should adjust its approach to reflect this reality. This call for 
greater accuracy applies, a fortiori, in the context of the preliminary reference 
procedure (Art 267 TFEU). In accordance with the division of adjudicative 
competences inherent in this important procedure, the Court is charged with the task 
of providing referring national courts with interpretations of provisions of EU law. In 
the present context, there is a genuine risk that the Court‟s increasingly broad (and 
misleading) reading of the obstacle concept could cause real confusion among 
national judges. At worst, this could even threaten one of the Court‟s sacred cows – 
the uniformity of Union law.  
With respect to genuinely non-discriminatory national rules, it has been argued that 
subsidiarity provides us with a normatively sound basis to support the exclusion of 
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market circumstances rules from the scope of the Court‟s review. In practical terms, 
the subsidiarity principle requires a reversal of the burden of proof in this exceptional 
body of case law. Under the principle of subsidiarity, market circumstances rules 
should be presumed to fall outwith the scope of the Treaty freedoms. Those seeking 
to contest such rules as obstacles to intra-EU movement must overturn this 
presumption. They must adduce (at least) some credible evidence to indicate that the 
national rule in question is either discriminatory or operates to block intra-EU 
movement.
159
 For example, with respect to the ban on the use of motorcycle trailers 
in Commission v. Italy, it would no longer be sufficient to hide behind the ambiguous 
„market access‟ test and simply rely on the contested measure‟s potential abstract 
effects on the volume of intra-EU trade in such products.
160
 In order to trigger the 
Court‟s review of this measure as an obstacle to intra-EU movement, subsidiarity 
requires the Commission first to identify the domestic products or resident economic 
operators that this measure might reasonably be considered to protect from intra-EU 
competition.  
Admittedly, the use of Art 34 TFEU in Commission v. Italy to review a national 
measure based solely on its potential abstract effects on the volume of intra-EU trade 
may, on one view, appear to follow from the wording of that same provision. This 
refers, of course, expressly to „measures having equivalent effect to quantitative 
restrictions‟; in other words, to national rules that simply affect (i.e. reduce) the 
quantity of imports.
161
 This broad effects-based reading of the scope of Art 34 TFEU 
is supported further by the wording of the Court‟s formative decision in Dassonville. 
However, it is submitted that such a reading of Art 34 TFEU, together with the literal 
interpretation of the Dassonville test, is simply wrong. Any reduction (actual or 
potential) in the volume of sales of imported products is only relevant to the 
assessment of an MEQR – and the concept of an obstacle to intra-EU movement 
generally – when it is connected to the existence of discrimination (actual or 
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potential, direct or indirect) in favour of the national market. Subsidiarity tells us 
that, in all other cases, the Court of Justice only enjoys the right to review national 
measures that actually block movement between the markets of the different Member 
States. Only the latter type of rule exhibits the transnational effects required by Art 
5(3) TEU. To conclude otherwise amounts to nothing less that sanctioning the use of 
the Treaty freedoms as tools to regulate market conditions within Member States per 
se.  
As the example in Commission v. Italy illustrates, shifting the burden of proof with 
respect to market circumstances rules requires the introduction of some basic 
(market) analysis into the case law. Legal commentators tend to oppose this move.
162
 
They argue, for example, that free movement law „is not competition law‟ or that any 
requirement for market analysis is too costly or onerous for applicants to bear.
163
 
However, it is submitted that such objections are overstated. First, the current 
position in the case law is simply indefensible. At present, Court does not just simply 
excuse litigants from the burden of market analysis. It excuses them from the need to 
argue anything at all. This is not acceptable. Secondly, in EU free movement law, 
subsidiarity‟s requirement for market analysis does not in fact take us beyond a 
properly functioning discrimination test. Following the above illustration from the 
case law on goods, all that is required in EU free movement law is the identification 
of potential competing products and/or economic operators operating within the 
Member State in question. This level of market analysis does not go beyond that 
which the Court already requires, for example, in its case law prohibiting 
(discriminatory) internal taxation.
164
 In contrast with the Treaty rules on anti-
competitive conduct (Arts 101 and 102 TFEU), there is no need for further market 
analysis; for example, analysis of market power or the definition of a specific intra-
EU geographical market. In EU free movement law, the latter criteria remain 
constant variables: Member States are presumed to enjoy sufficient regulatory power 
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and the relevant geographical market remains synonymous with the territory of the 
Member State in question.  
In the final analysis, it is submitted that the subsidiarity principle effectively requires 
the universalisation of the Court‟s Keck ruling across the freedoms. As argued above, 
in this ruling, the Court demonstrated (implicitly) through its introduction of the 
„selling arrangement‟ concept the very degree of self-restraint that subsidiarity 
demands. Sadly, in more recent years, the Court has clearly chosen to break with the 
normatively sound interpretative choice it made in this decision. This is unfortunate 
and should be reversed at the first appropriate opportunity. Should the Court not 
choose to do so, then it risks undermining further its own legitimacy as a Union 
institution.
165
 To steer the Court back onto the correct path and ensure that Member 
States retain appropriate space to breathe in the integration process, the following 
subsidiarity-compliant reading of the scope of the Treaty freedoms is proposed: 
The concept of an obstacle to intra-EU movement should be interpreted as 
precluding national measures that: (1) discriminate actually or potentially, 
directly or indirectly, on the grounds of Member State nationality (covering 
both natural and legal persons), together with: (2) genuinely non-
discriminatory national measures that block (actually or potentially) the 
movement of goods, persons, services or capital between the markets of the 
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Conclusion 
This aim of this thesis has been to examine the function of subsidiarity as a legal 
principle in European integration. Its primary objective has been to investigate 
whether or not this principle could and, ultimately, should also apply as a brake on 
the interpretative authority of the Court of Justice. The desire to explore 
subsidiarity‟s impact as a source of restraint on the Court‟s functions is motivated by 
a firm belief that subsidiarity has considerable untapped potential as a legal principle 
in EU integration. Subsidiarity is not a miracle solution to the tensions associated 
with continued integration and, in particular, the need to ensure an appropriate 
distribution of competence between the Union institutions and the Member States. 
However, it is one of the key instruments in the constitutional toolbox of EU law and 
should be made to work much harder.  
At present, attention remains overly focused on bolstering the effectiveness of the 
subsidiarity principle as a restraint on the Union legislature. The recent Treaty 
innovations, engaging national Parliaments in the enforcement of subsidiarity, will 
undoubtedly prompt renewed academic interest in the principle‟s application in this 
area.
1
 However, as this thesis has argued, subsidiarity is not only relevant to the 
actions of the Union legislature. It must also unfold its effects more widely and, in 
particular, take hold as a source of restraint on the exercise of the Court‟s 
interpretative functions in appropriate areas. The Court‟s power to contribute to the 
regulation of areas of shared regulatory responsibility, such as the internal market, 
through its interpretation of the Treaty provisions and secondary Union legislation is 
widely acknowledged. Yet, virtually no attempt has been made to assess 
subsidiarity‟s impact on the Court‟s interpretative choices. It is largely assumed that 
the Court enjoys a broad sphere of autonomy to shape the contours and outer limits 
of EU law as it sees fit. 
                                                          
1
 Early indications from the United Kingdom suggested that national parliaments are taking their new 
responsibilities seriously. At the time of writing, the House of Lords European Union Select 
Committee has already recommended the submission of a reasoned opinion for non-compliance with 
Art 5(3) TEU on at least two occasions.  
See, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201011/ldselect/ldeucom/35/3503.htm and http://ww
w.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201011/ldselect/ldeucom/44/4403.htm (last accessed 14.09.11). 
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The first part of this thesis challenged this assumption. It was argued that subsidiarity 
should also be applied to the Court. The conclusion reached was that subsidiarity 
does not challenge the existence of the Court‟s competence to interpret the Treaties 
and/or provisions of Union legislation. However, it does the operate to guide the 
exercise of this competence in certain circumstances. Specifically, the Court must 
engage with the subsidiarity principle in cases where it is confronted with 
interpretative choices that affect the distribution of competence between the Union 
and the Member States in areas of shared regulatory responsibility. In such instances, 
subsidiarity requires the Court to ensure that its choices respect the conditions 
imposed on Union intervention by Art 5(3) TEU. In particular, the Court must satisfy 
itself that its preferred reading of the Treaty/EU legislation remains focused on the 
scrutiny of regulatory problems that exhibit clear transnational effects. It must not 
use its interpretative freedom in order to establish a general power to regulate areas 
of shared responsibility at Union level.  
The second part of this thesis tested the implications of the subsidiarity argument 
through a case study in EU free movement law. It examined the principle‟s impact on 
the Court‟s freedom to interpret the scope of the Treaty freedoms guaranteeing intra-
EU movement within the internal market. In this specific area, the Court‟s 
interpretative choices were shown to meet the operating conditions for the 
subsidiarity tested developed in Chapter 2. Reviewing the case law, the Court‟s 
reading of the term obstacle to intra-EU movement was then shown to be converging 
around a series of extremely broad effects-based tests. Applied literally, these could 
bring almost any national measure within the scope of the Court‟s review – a 
position clearly at odds with subsidiarity. Crucially, the Court appears fully aware of 
the need to place limits on its own case law. As we observed in Chapter 4, the Court 
has developed a series of judicial devices in order to manage the scope of the Treaty 
freedoms. However, on closer inspection, these tools are poorly explained and 
inconsistently applied and, even when presented in their best light, offer the Member 
States little protection.  
In the final analysis, it was submitted that subsidiarity requires only an adjustment of 
the Court‟s case law on obstacles to intra-EU movement. In summary, the principle 
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precludes the Court‟s use of the Treaty freedoms to review genuinely non-
discriminatory national measures that simply characterise the conditions for the 
pursuit of economic or non-economic activity within individual Member States 
(„market circumstances‟ rules). The use of the Treaty freedoms to scrutinise such 
rules effectively affords the Court a general power to engage in the regulation of the 
internal market. It permits the Court to review at Union level the efficiency, 
reasonableness and even very existence of Member State regulation. In Chapter 1, it 
was argued that the Court has now made it very clear that, in accordance with Art 
5(3) TEU, the Union legislature does not enjoy a comparable general power to 
regulate the internal market. Why therefore should the position be any different with 
respect to the Court‟s reading of the scope of the Treaty freedoms when the 
underlying objective is the same? 
As argued in Chapter 6, the Court‟s use of the Treaty freedoms to review market 
circumstances rules is rarer than one might first expect, especially given the Court‟s 
unwavering preference for broad effects-based tests. However, in recent years there 
has been marked increase in the Court‟s scrutiny of market circumstances rules 
across the Treaty freedoms, which shows no sign of abating. This is a worrying 
trend. To the extent that it extends its interpretation of the scope of the Treaty 
freedoms in this manner, the Court is sacrificing the economic benefits of regulatory 
diversity. It is also trampling all over the right of Member State nationals to express 
their views through national and/or sub-national democratic processes. As argued in 
Chapter 5, the Court‟s scrutiny of market circumstances rules as obstacles to intra-
EU movement enjoys considerable support in the commentary (to differing degrees). 
However, attempts to invoke, inter alia, the status of Union citizenship or the concept 
of market access in order to legitimatise its review of market circumstances rules all 
share the same fundamental weakness. These conceptual models all assume that the 
Court is essentially free to exploit its freedom to interpret the Treaty freedoms to 
advance specific Union policy objectives. Subsidiarity tells us that this is a false 
premise. 
This thesis places considerable faith in the Court‟s own ability to respond unilaterally 
to the demands of the subsidiarity principle. This faith is not misplaced. The Court 
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has already demonstrated that it is capable of adjusting its case law on obstacles to 
intra-EU movement in line with the demands of Art 5(3) TEU. It did so implicitly in 
Keck. Furthermore, as we saw in Chapter 1, the Court played a leading role in 
crafting subsidiarity into a legal test that applies to restrain the Union legislature in 
connection with its exercise of its shared competence to regulate the internal market 
(Art 114 TFEU). Indeed, it was the Court that pieced together the poorly constructed 
arguments of the Member States to develop subsidiarity into a workable legal test.  
Thus, the Court‟s capability to operationalise subsidiarity should not be doubted. 
However, the question remains: what is its incentive to adjust its case law on 
obstacles to intra-EU movement in line with the demands of Art 5(3) TEU? It is 
submitted that the need to comply with the subsidiarity principle is not simply a 
matter of judicial self-restraint. There is more at stake here. The Court‟s choice to 
use the Treaty freedoms to scrutinise market circumstances rules threatens its very 
legitimacy as a Union institution. There are no two ways about it. In the end, Art 5(3) 
TEU provides a clear normative basis to declare this application of the Treaty 
freedoms ultra vires. Should the Court therefore not choose to integrate the demands 
of the subsidiarity principle into its case law on obstacles to intra-EU movement, it 
might one day find itself struggling to assert its authority over Member State 
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